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Chapter 1
Introduction
Knowledge pervades all human activity and with the advent of current technol-
ogy those activities get more and more intertwined with the use of the computer.
The possibilities offered by recent computer technology are limited, however.
Simple data handling operations, such as searching in databases can be very
well automated, but a realization of computer assistance in complex operations
is yet less successful, basically due to the lack of knowledge available for the
computer. This is opposed to the potentially unlimited amount of knowledge
about the world, which explains the growing need for adequate knowledge rep-
resentation (Nagy, 1984), (Piaget, 1970).
In this thesis I take as my starting point that knowledge arises from the
cognition of phenomena, by means of signs. Accordingly, I introduce a model
for knowledge representation that is based on an analysis of the properties of
cognitive activity and signification. As knowledge may be defined as learned
meaning, adequate knowledge modeling requires an adequate representation of
meaning. Searle’s famous Chinese room argument indicates, however, that the
differences between the interpretation by humans, and current computers may
not be resolved. Because the goal of this thesis is the introduction of a model
for knowledge representation that also suits a computational interpretation, the
reader may ask if in principle that goal can be achieved. In this thesis it is
suggested that although we cannot represent the full potential of human inter-
pretation, we may represent the important interpretation moments of human
information processing, defining the brain’s ‘program’. This view may be ex-
plained with the metaphor of a recipe, as a generic notion. Such a prescription
can precisely specify the meaning of the elementary events of a process, but it
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can at most point in the direction of the meaning of the ingredients and the
final product.
But if we cannot represent the full potential of meaningful interpretation, is
it possible to talk about that process in any sense? I believe the answer can be
positive again. When we experience a phenomenon as meaningful, we usually
do not grasp its full meaning (if ever), but we only understand it approximately,
that is, from a certain point of view. In this thesis I will assume that meaning,
be it full or approximate, is inherently related to the experience of completeness.
When we understand a phenomenon approximately, we experience its complete-
ness from a certain point of view. What makes this conjecture interesting is that
the conditions for ‘completeness from a certain point of view’ can be formalized
more easily than the conditions for ‘the experience of full meaning’. In fact, this
notion will be used as an indication that the representation generated may be
meaningful (from a certain point of view). For example, in natural language,
the experience of the input as a meaningful sentence may be understood approx-
imately through the experience of its syntactic well-formedness (Grice, 1975),
(Kiefer, 1992).
The element of completeness points in the direction of a teleological (goal-
oriented) character of interpretation. I will capitalize on this property, by in-
troducing a process model for knowledge. Following Debrock (Debrock, Farkas,
& Sarbo, 1999), a process will be considered to be any sequence of events such,
that (i) one event initiates the sequence and another terminates it, (ii) every
event ‘contributes’ to the sequences ‘yielding’ the terminating event, (iii) the
terminating event ‘governs’ the decision of which events make up the sequence,
and (iv) the determinate character of the events making up the sequence neces-
sitates the terminating event. An event will be considered as whatever makes a
difference.
Although it will be assumed that meaning arises from phenomena inter-
preted as signs, the computational interpretation of the proposed model is not
purely bottom-up. In this respect the theory of this thesis differs from some
of those suggested by current research, for example, the theory of Ga¨rdenfors
(Ga¨rdenfors, 2004), or the generative theory of Pribram (Pribram, 1971) and
Prueitt (Prueitt, 1995), which is related to the fundamental work by Gibson
(Gibson, 1997). These bottom-up theories, that aim at developing generic
mechanisms for the definition of primary entities and complex process compart-
ments in cognitive processing, cannot cope with the symbol grounding problem1
1This is the problem: How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be
made intrinsic to the system?
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raised by Harnad (Harnad, 1990), however. The theory proposed in this thesis
circumvents Harnad’s problem by only considering signs with regard to knowl-
edge domains (Mackay, 1987). Roughly, a knowledge domain is defined as a
‘closed’ collection of signs representing a point of view of interpretation. Some
of the most well-known knowledge domains are natural language, logic, and
mathematics (Halassy, 1992). The abstraction of knowledge domains can be
practical for modeling purposes. As the primary entities of the domains are in-
tuitively meaningful, their formal properties can be easily defined. For example,
in natural language syntax, the primary syntactic entities can be defined as the
collection of morpho-syntactically complete ‘words’.
1.1 The properties of meaningful interpretation
The observation of phenomena entails the existence of an interaction between
two entities: observer and observed. Their interaction, which reveals itself as
change, is interpreted by the observer as an event. Such an event interpretation
of an interaction is what I shall call an observation, or the actual meaning of a
phenomenon that I use interchangeably. By virtue of the general character of
interaction, change, and event, it will be suggested that the model proposed in
this thesis could be used as a uniform model for knowledge representation. I
will attempt to justify this hypothesis by introducing a model for cognitive pro-
cessing in different knowledge domains, including those mentioned earlier. By
considering the observer occurring in a ‘state’, at the moment of the interaction,
the change brought about by the ‘effect’ due to the observed phenomenon can
be interpreted as a ‘transition’ of that state.
The first step in meaningful interpretation is a perceptual judgment, the
‘naive’ or natural interpretation of a phenomenon by the brain. The interpre-
tation of phenomena as meaningful signs depends on the observer’s knowledge
about similar phenomena and earlier response strategies. This knowledge (mem-
ory information) is invoked by the observed phenomenon as input (stimulus).
By interpreting the relation between the input and the memory information,
the actual meaning of the input is determined by the observer.
The assumption that knowledge arises from the observation of phenomena is
not without consequences. As nature is inherently dynamic, adequate represen-
tation of cognitive activity must be dynamic as well. According to the received
view of cognitive theory, however, the brain processes the external stimulus in
samples, which are static snapshots. Is it possible to bridge the gap between
the static input and its dynamic representation as meaning? Following Sarbo
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(Sarbo, 2006) I shall maintain that dynamic representation may arise from the
interpretation of static information, as a process. According to that view, the
interpretation moments of input processing may contribute to the (full) meaning
of the input, as ‘proto-signs’, that are in a process of becoming a sign.
That we are able to represent static information dynamically, can be il-
lustrated by the phenomenon of apparent motion perception, that I use as a
metaphor. This phenomenon consists of the presentation of a series of still pic-
tures, and although each picture can be meaningful in itself, combined they
are interpreted as parameters in the experience of the series of pictures as a
whole, resulting in the experience of motion. It is a conjecture of this thesis
that an analogous relation may exist between the interpretation moments of
cognitive processing, on the one hand, and the experience of the entire process
as meaningful, on the other (Roediger & Blaxton, 1987).
That ‘naive’ knowledge representation can be efficient is known from the
brain’s ability to recognize phenomena in ‘real-time’, which is formally equiva-
lent to real-time or linear complexity. This assumed efficiency of ‘naive’ knowl-
edge representation is in sharp contrast with traditional knowledge modeling,
that is more complex. For example, unification based formalisms are known to
be inherently exponential (Dwork, Kanellakis, & Mitchell, 1984). If we assume
that this difference between the complexity of formal mathematical and natural
representation is not due to the underlying hardware, such as the computation
speed or the available memory size, we may ask the question: If the brain can
be modeled as a Turing automaton, what could be its program that makes it
so efficient? The answer given in this thesis is that ‘naive’ or natural represen-
tation is a certain kind of process. Also other representations of phenomena
can be interpreted by the brain as meaningful, but their interpretation can be
more troublesome. A conjecture of this thesis is that representations respecting
the ‘program’ of cognitive activity can be more easily processed as knowledge
by the human than representations that do not adhere to this program. The
results of a recent experimental research by Draskovic, Couwenberg and Sarbo
indicate that the above conjecture may be true (Couwenberg, 2007).
1.2 The role of cognitive and semiotic theory
Cognitive theory is concerned with the cognitive processes underlying the ac-
quisition and use of knowledge. Peircean semiotics is a study of signs, and how
meaning is constructed and understood.
This thesis is an attempt to introduce a model for knowledge representation
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respecting some of the important results of cognitive theory. One of them is the
concept of qualia. According to cognitive theory we perceive the qualities of the
‘real’-world in qualia. Following the theory of Categorical Perception (Harnad,
1987), qualia not only characterize the sensory level, but also the higher levels
of information processing by the brain. Although in this thesis the relation with
cognitive theory is unilateral, I believe that the uniform representation proposed
in this work could also be interesting for cognitive theory, for example, in current
research on information integration (Tononi, 2004), (Seith, Izhikevich, Reeke,
& Edelman, 2006).
The role of Peircean semiotic theory for explaining our model as a meaningful
representation is much more intricate. On the one hand, an embedding of the
knowledge representation model in the Peircean semiotics is not a prerequisite
for the theory of this thesis, however the existence of such an embedding can
make the proposed representation more intelligible. As the focus of this thesis
is not on the philosophical issues, but on the definition of a theory of knowledge
representation, below I briefly summarize the concepts and theories adopted
from the Peircean theory.
1.2.1 An overview of Peirce’s theory of categories and
signs
All phenomena, according to Peirce, are marked by three aspects which he, sig-
nificantly, called firstness, secondness and thirdness, respectively (Peirce, 1931).
Because whatever appears requires a certain shock or contrast, it may be said
that the appearance itself, i.e., the event of appearing requires two elements
which by themselves must be said to be mere ‘possibles’. Thus the appearance
of red undoubtedly requires ‘red’ though this red does not really appear unless
it is perceived. Thus the firstness of pure red appears only in the event of the
perception consisting in the ‘meeting’ of the observer and the observed. And
thus, the appearance itself, the event of appearing, constitutes the aspect of
secondness. But the appearance itself, as it is the merely brute fact of meeting,
appears only as it reveals itself as this particular perception, for instance in the
perception of this color red. Thus, in order to appear as the perception of red,
perception as an agent must do so according to the rule that applies when this
sort of event occurs. It is the latter aspect of the appearance that constitutes
thirdness which tells us in what respect the appearance as event reveals the
‘possible’ elements of thirdness.
We may know about phenomena through the mediation of signs. Peirce
defines a sign as anything that stands for something else. That for which a sign
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stands, he calls the sign’s object . But that is only part of the story. Equally
important is that a sign always stands for something in some respect. Every sign
must therefore have an element which tells us in what respect the sign stands
for its object. For instance, it is usually acknowledged that smoke stands for
fire. For a person lost in the wilderness, smoke may stand for fire in the sense
that it indicates that people may be living there. But it may also indicate some
danger.
The element of a sign in virtue of which a sign stands for its object is what
Peirce calls an interpretant . Sign, object and interpretant (each of which can
be a sign, recursively) form an irreducible relation, called the triadic relation of
sign. According to Peirce, cognition without signs is unthinkable and, inasmuch
as it represents what is known, it is a sign itself. The triadic relation of signs,
or simply, (triadic) signs arise through authentic semiosis.
The complexity of the notion of a sign is due to its inherent ambiguity. To
Peirce, the interpretant is an integral part of the sign in the sense that the
interpretant together with the representamen (potential sign) and its object
constitutes what is properly called a Sign. Thus, we could make a distinction
between a Sign and a sign. The term ‘Sign’ stands for the triadic structure
of sign, object and interpretant, while the term ‘sign’ stands for whatever it is
that stands in place of its object. Thus, in the case of the smoke, the Sign is
constituted by the smoke-signifying-fire-as-danger, while the sign is simply the
smoke.
1.2.2 A classification of signs
Besides his definition of signs, Peirce introduced an ingenious classification of
signs as aspects of meaning that surface if we are analyzing meaningful signs
(Liszka, 1996), (A. Breemen & Sarbo, 2007). He introduced three signs: icon, in-
dex and symbol, which represent their object on the basis of likeness, connection
and convention, respectively. Besides this taxonomy, Peirce also distinguished
signs according to the categorical status of the sign and according to the rela-
tionship between object and interpretant. From a categorical perspective signs
can be qualisigns, sinsigns or legisigns, which correspond to firstness, secondness
and thirdness, respectively. In other words, a sign can be a quality, an actual
event, or a rule. Seen from the perspective of the relationship between sign and
interpretant, a sign may be a rheme, a dicent or an argument. In other words
a sign may signify a qualitative possibility, a proposition of an actual existence,
or a proposition in a process of thought. Thus we obtain nine kinds of signs as
meaning aspects which may be arranged in a matrix, as shown in fig. 1.1 and
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index
dicent
icon
qualisign
argument
rheme legisign
symbol
sinsign
Figure 1.1: Peirce’s nonadic classification of signs
connection
likeness actual event
quality
actual
rule
proposition
existence
qualitative
possibility
convention
Figure 1.2: Peirce’s classification of signs as meaning aspects
fig. 1.2. Although Peirce defined more complex systems of signs, we hold that
his ‘simple’ classification is the most practical.
Following an example presented in (Sowa, 1999), Peirce’s nonadic classifica-
tion may be illustrated with the meaning aspects of a ringing telephone.
The representation of the sudden appearance of the ringing sound of the
telephone as a quality, independent of its source, is a qualisign (quality). The
representation of the simultaneity included in the appearance of the ringing
sound and the telephone, is a sinsign (actual event). The representation of the
habit that a ringing telephone means that someone is trying to call somebody
else is a legisign (rule).
The representation of the similarity of this phenomenon to a certain shape
and sound is an icon sign (likeness). The interpretation of that shape and sound
as a pointer connecting the ringing telephone with its known properties is an
index sign (connection). The interpretation of the ringing sound of the telephone
as a telephone call is a symbol sign (convention).
A telephone as an abstract concept representing a range of possible inter-
pretations is a rheme sign (qualitative possibility). The expression of one of
the possible interpretations as an actually existent entity, for example, “this
telephone”, or “this ringing sound”, is a dicent sign (actual existence). The
representation of the actual situation as a proposition which is a premise in
a process of reasoning, is an argument sign, e.g. “the telephone is ringing”
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(proposition).
The nine types of distinctions as well as their definition as a hierarchy play an
important role in this thesis. Roughly, it will be suggested that Peirce’s nonadic
classification can be interpreted as a process ‘generating’ meaning aspects. In
the rest of this thesis some familiarity with Peircean semiotics will be assumed.
An introduction in his theory of signs can be found in (Tejera, 1988), amongst
others.
1.2.3 Sign aspects and interpretation moments
According to Peirce, triadic signs exhibit each one of the sign types according
to a rule (Liszka, 1996). Although in past research by (Farkas & Sarbo, 2000)
it has always been assumed that the signs of Peirce’s nonadic classification only
function as parameters of (full) meaning, no attention has been paid to a proper
embedding of the knowledge representation model in the Peircean theory. It
took a long time to understand the consequences of the process view of sign
interpretation (Sarbo, 2006) and to offer a Peircean justification of the theory
(A. Breemen & Sarbo, 2007), that I briefly recapitulate below.
Peirce nonadic signs correspond to the kinds of distinctions that can be cog-
nitively made. According to van Breemen and Sarbo (A. Breemen & Sarbo,
2007), those distinctions must also characterize the different interpretants that
may exist. In the paper, the existence of a close relationship between Peirce’s
signs and interpretants is proposed. According to the authors, some of the in-
terpretants correspond to interpretation moments representing the properties of
the representamen (potential sign), others to interpretation moments expressing
the properties of the relation between the representamen and the interpreting
system. The important conclusion of their research is that the process view
of interpretation, also adopted by this thesis, is compatible with the Peircean
theory of signs.
Motivated by the results presented in (A. Breemen & Sarbo, 2007) and also
in (A. Breemen, Sarbo, & Weide, 2007), in the rest of this thesis I will use the
Peircean sign aspects as references to the various interpretation moments of the
process model introduced. But this is all that is assumed. The results of this
thesis are not depending on the results of the semiotic embedding.
An advantage of the Peircean terminology is due to its unconventional char-
acter that cannot be confused with the names introduced by traditional knowl-
edge representation theories. Let me emphasize that throughout this thesis the
Peircean nonadic signs will only be used as meaning aspects or parameters of
(full) meaning. In order to prevent any confusion in this matter, I will use foot-
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notes in the different chapters, to remind the reader of the restricted use of the
Peircean concepts in this work.
1.3 Traditional knowledge representation
I cannot delve into a new model of knowledge representation without at least
briefly recapitulating some of the merits and limitations of traditional knowledge
modeling. A complete overview is beyond the goal of this thesis, however.
In the broad sense, knowledge representation theory includes all languages
devoted to the representation of information on the Web, for example, the Se-
mantic Web (T. Berners-Lee & Lassila, 2001), such as XML, RDF, and OWL,
but also for the representation of common sense knowledge, for example, the
CYC system (Lenat & Guha, 1989), as well as the many different formalisms
for capturing linguistic meaning, such as Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987),
but this list is far from complete (Csapo´, 1992). Traditional approaches can be
commonly characterized by the absence of a property, being really based on a
model of cognitive activity.
Although traditional knowledge representation is typically relational, its re-
lations are basically meaningful only in the formal mathematical sense. Such
relations can be favorably used for proving formal properties, such as the formal
correctness of a representation, they can be less adequate in establishing a link
between formal and ‘real’ world concepts.
Relational knowledge representation can be characterized by two extremes.
The first one, which is capitalizing on a single type of relation, can be illustrated
by the theory of Formal Concept Analysis (FCA), introduced by Rudolf Wille
(Wille, 1982), (Wille, 1996). An advantage of FCA theory is that its world on-
tology is very close to the one taken by this research. According to this theory,
the world consists of objects (O), attributes (A), and relations (R⊆O×A). For-
mally, the knowledge representation by FCA theory can be defined as a Galois
connection between the powersets of objects and attributes (Birkhoff & Bartee,
1970). The practical value of this framework is due to its potential for a closure,
enabling the derivation of all information transitively related to the objects or
attributes. FCA theory can also be applied to embedded relations, recursively,
thereby enabling information structuring (Sarbo, 1996).
The other extreme, characterized by formalisms based on or using predicate
calculus, such as Prolog, or Conceptual Graphs (Sowa, 1984), allow any number
of types of relations. That the abundance of the types of relations may not
be a solution for the problems of knowledge representation is witnessed by the
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inherently high complexity of such models. The goal of this thesis is an attempt
to show that on the basis of an analysis of the properties of cognitive activity a
process model can be defined, from which, a finite set of types of relations can
be derived, enabling adequate and efficient representation of knowledge.
Knowledge representation is also closely related to natural language process-
ing (NLP). A comparison of traditional approaches of NLP, such as dependency
based formalisms as well as X-bar theory, with the theory proposed in this thesis
is postponed until section 5.3.
1.4 The structure of this thesis
The focus of Part I is on the definition of a model for knowledge representation.
This includes a study of the duality involved in phenomena, and an analysis of
the consequences of duality for signification. On the basis of that analysis, a
schema for cognitive processing of phenomena as signs is introduced. In con-
formity with the assumption of this thesis about the interactions included in
phenomena, and the use of memory information involved in the recognition of
phenomena, two instances of the processing schema are defined, that are called
perception and cognition.
Part II is devoted to the application of the proposed model of knowledge
representation. In this part I attempt to show that the theory of this work
can be successfully applied to natural language, as a knowledge representation.
To this end I introduce a model for (morpho-)syntactic symbols and illustrate
its potential by the analysis of some morpho-syntactic and syntactic utterances
taken from actual language use.
In Part III, the focus of the theory is extended, by including other knowl-
edge domains, such as the domains of ‘naive’ semantic syntactic, reasoning,
and mathematical signs. The models of the various knowledge domains are
used for the introduction of a technique for meaningful text summarization. As
knowledge representation itself appears in our experience as a phenomenon, in
the summarizing final chapter I discuss the possibility of the application of the
theory to itself, recursively.
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Part I
Process model
21

This part is an attempt to introduce a model of knowledge representation on
the basis of an analysis of the properties of cognitive activity and signification.
It will be suggested that this representation can be uniformly used for modeling
the different stages of cognitive activity, and that the interpretation moments
introduced by the model show strong affinity with the distinctions identified by
Peirce in his semiotic theory (Peirce, 1931). In addition, a logical account of
the representation is given, and a cognitive mechanism potentially underlying
the proposed model is discussed.
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Chapter 2
A world of signs
The intimate relationship between knowledge and signification suggested in the
Introduction is further developed by identifying an inherent property of phe-
nomena and analyzing its consequences for an ontological definition of signs.
The result of this chapter is a definition of a process model of cognitive activity.
2.1 The nature of observation
As explained in the Introduction, in this thesis it is assumed that the world
consists of phenomena and that knowledge emerges from the observation of
such phenomena. The Webster Dictionary defines the term ‘phenomenon’ as an
“appearance, or immediate object of awareness in experience”. Earlier it has
been pointed out that an observation always involves an interaction between
two entities, the phenomenon observed , and the observer . Because both entities
are part of the ‘real’ world (i.e. nature), it follows that knowledge must emerge
from interactions between phenomena. In addition, it was maintained that
knowledge arises from interpretation by the observer. An interpretation, which
is an event , may vary from direct responses, such as a brute reaction, to complex
answers, involving reasoning. This broad understanding of interpretative acts
is maintained in this chapter only. In the rest of the thesis, knowledge will
be assumed to arise from interpretation by means of reasoning. Inasmuch as
interactions are inherently related to change, and are the stuff of our experience,
it follows that interaction and change must exist. Moreover, because nature may
be defined as the set of interactions, nature must be inherently dynamic.
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stone
light ray
reflected
illuminating
light ray
Figure 2.1: A sample interaction
In summary, it is assumed that knowledge emerges ultimately from inter-
actions which reveal themselves as events in our experience of change. The
condition for change is what shall be called duality , for no change can occur
unless there are two independent qualities. For the sake of clarity, a distinction
is made between interactions, change, and events. Though these three concepts
are intimately related, the first, interaction, refers to what is assumed to occur,
independently from any experience, the second, change refers to the duality of
what is involved in an interaction, and the third, event , refers to the interac-
tion and change as experienced, that is, to a phenomenon. Because interaction
requires duality, and events require interaction, the three concepts are related
to each other by a relation of subservience. Though the concept of event is the
most complex, duality is the more fundamental.
2.1.1 Sample phenomena
The concept of duality may be illustrated by the interaction between a stone
and an illuminating light ray that it reflects (see fig. 2.1). Due to its light
reflecting properties, the stone changes the illuminating light ray by modulating
its properties (as the properties of the stone are changed by the light ray – but
that aspect shall be left out of consideration). That change may appear as a
sign of the interaction between stone and light ray, if it is interpreted as such.
Because the reflected light ray may signify the interaction between stone
and light ray (which we may know from experience), one is interested in the
conditions for signification. In the current example, the interaction is occurring
between two entities, the stone and the illuminating light, which are qualities,
that is, primary entities of experience. Because the two qualities of our exam-
ple are in principle independent, an adequate signification of their interaction
requires a quality capable of representing them both. This thesis maintains
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that ‘light’ is such a quality. Indeed, any light phenomenon can be uniquely
characterized by two independent qualities: frequency and intensity.1 There-
fore ‘light’ may function as a constituent (illuminating light ray), in interaction
with the stone, but also as a duality (reflected light ray), when it is interpreted
as a sign of its interaction with the stone. From this it follows that each one
of interaction, change, and event is a duality, but which may also appear as a
single entity.
A completely different illustration of a duality, in language syntax, is the
noun phrase (a syntactic phenomenon): nice girls. As a single entity, this phrase
is a representation of a syntactically meaningful concept (the syntactic mod-
ification of a noun by an adjective), defined by the interaction between the
independent symbols, nice and girls, as syntactic qualities.
An interaction may only occur if the dual qualities (the constituents of the
interaction) are compatible. The stone and the light ray, in the above thought
experiment, are compatible for an interaction, as the stone possesses the quality
of reflectancy (of light), and the light ray has the potential that it can be subject
to reflection (by a stone). The compatibility involved in all interaction implies
that the constituent qualities must have some shared common property.
For example, in the interaction between the stone and the light ray, both
constituents can be interpreted as wave-type phenomena,2 and their frequency
and intensity qualities can be conceptually used for the definition of the prop-
erties of the arising new phenomenon, the reflected light. By assuming that the
stone is affecting the light, the reflected light may be interpreted as a modulation
of the illuminating light by the stone. Similarly, girls and nice are compatible
for an interaction, as girls may be interpreted as a noun having the potential
to be modified by an adjective, and nice as such a syntactic entity. The in-
teraction between the two symbols as constituent qualities may ‘generate’ a
new phenomenon: nice girls, representing girls (following the interaction) as a
‘modulation’ of girls3 (preceding the interaction), due to nice.
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stone
(observed) (observer) (observer)
(sign) (observed)
senses
signal
(observed)(sign) (sign)
sensory
light ray
reflected
(memory)
Brain
illuminating
light ray
(observer)
’There is a stone’
propos−
ition
Figure 2.2: A sample sequence of interactions
2.1.2 Interactions
What makes the above example of stone and light interesting, is the fact that
the reflected light ray, which is a sign, may become an observed phenomenon,
as a quality, in the subsequent interaction with the eyes (the receptors of the
retina). This interaction, which is represented from the point of view of the
light (observer), is illustrated in fig. 2.2. The eyes (observer) generate a sensory
signal capable of representing the interaction between the reflected light ray
and the eyes, and transitively so, between the stone and the illuminating light
ray. That signal, as an observed phenomenon, may then interact with the brain
(observer) which, by comparing the sensory signal with memory information
about the stimulus (cf. background light ray), may eventually generate the
meaning of the observation in the proposition: ‘There is a stone’.
As part of the observation of the reflected light ray, the eyes may compare
the two light qualities, by making use of information about the properties of the
background light obtained in a previous observation. As a result, the sensory
signal of the eyes may represent the reflected light ray as a modulation of the
background light ray. That modulation can be recognized by the brain, as a
modulation of light due to an appearing stone or, briefly, as a stone.
The successive interaction and interpretation of qualities defines a recogni-
tion process, representing the observed input phenomenon as meaningful. This
chapter is an attempt to introduce such a process model for cognitive activity.
In addition, a logical analysis is offered to the model (in the next chapter),
1Which value of frequency and intensity may represent a certain phenomenon is not the
issue here.
2The stone through its reflectancy.
3The combinatory potential of nice (as well as of girls) is satisfied. The consequences of
the sequential character of language on the interpretation of language phenomena will be
discussed later, in chapter 5.
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observation
qualityquality
relation
observerphenomenon interaction
event
change
(re−presentation)
(quality)
(duality)
Figure 2.3: An overview of the introduced concepts. A horizontal line denotes
an interaction, a diagonal one a representation, a vertical one a subservience
relation. This convention will be used also in later diagrams.
in order to reveal the close relationship between the cognitive processual and
logical concepts.
2.1.3 The concept of re-presentation
An interaction between dual qualities that are signs, will be called a sign interac-
tion. The existence of an interaction is clearly a pre-requisite for its recognition
as a sign. But a quality functions as a sign, and therefore is a sign, if and only
if it is interpreted as such. Hence, the interpretation of a quality as well as of
an interaction of qualities, as a sign, is the other condition for sign recognition,
as a process.
Any event involves a duality between an observed phenomenon and an ob-
server. When a phenomenon interacts with the observer, the representation by
the observer of the event presented by nature is itself an event. The first event
may be called nature’s interpretation, the second the observer’s. For example,
the reflected light ray is nature’s presentation of the stone-and-light-ray inter-
action (first event), the eyes are the observer and the sensory signal generated
by the eyes functions as the observer’s interpretation (second event).
Although the observed phenomenon as well as the observer are independent,
and the event representing the (observed) phenomenon is ‘conceived’ by the
observer, that conception is at least partly forced upon the observer by the
interaction. Such an event representation of an interaction will be called an
observation or actual meaning. Because the qualities of the two events must be
related to each other by virtue of the interaction, it can be concluded that the
observer is re-presenting the observed phenomenon. The concepts introduced
so far are collected in fig. 2.3.
Fig. 2.1 contains sample types of dualities in ‘natural’ phenomena. Dilution
and solubility refer to the independent qualities of the diluted substance, on
the one hand, and the liquid, in which the substance is dissolved, on the other.
Not all pairs of qualities can be interpreted as a duality. For example, the two
29
dual modulation
wave type
mechanical
(sign) (information)
chemical bond
energy
continuous stream
(form−content)
dilution−solubility
distribution−intensity
frequency−intensity
phenomenon carrier
chemical
Table 2.1: Sample dualities of natural phenomena
types of distribution of energy, potential and kinetic, are not independent, and
therefore not dual. The examples of table. 2.1 are illustrations of types of phe-
nomena, interpreted as signs. This relation is expressed by the parenthesized
terms in the last line. The carrier of any phenomenon which is a sign, is in-
formation, carrying form and content as independent qualities. According to
this view, which is in conformity with our earlier assumption, information is
potential knowledge.
2.2 Towards a model of re-presentation
The duality involved in all signs, which is a fundamental assumption of the
theory presented here, forms the basis for our model of cognitive activity as a
process. The input of cognitive processing is the stimulus, which is recognized
by the brain. An inherent property of all systems, including biological ones,
is their potential for generating an answer (re-action) to the stimulus (action).
For example, if we observe smoke, as a stimulus, then running away might be
our reaction, interpreting smoke as a sign of danger. The ‘goal’ of cognitive
processing is the generation of an adequate reaction to the stimulus, as an ex-
ternal effect. An important element of response generation is the interaction
between the external effect, on the one hand, and the interpreting system, on
the other. Interactions in the world are dynamic and since knowledge is assumed
to be a re-presentation of these interactions, knowledge too must be inherently
dynamic.
The external effect (stimulus) is affecting the recognizing system, appear-
ing as a state. As any ‘real’ world entity (quality) can be an effect or a state,
all phenomena can be considered as an interaction between independent quali-
ties. It should be emphasized that there may be an infinite number of qualities
involved in an interaction, but, according to the theory of this thesis, those qual-
ities are always distinguished by cognition in two collections (state and effect)
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and, consequently, are treated as single entities.4
2.3 Processing schema
Phenomena are interactions appearing via the mediation of change, as an event
(cf. reaction). Following the received view of cognitive theory (Harnad, 1987),
the re-presentation of phenomena by cognition may be modeled as follows.
By virtue of the change caused by an appearing stimulus, the input qualities
are sampled by the senses in a percept (Solso, 1988). In a single operation, the
brain compares the current percept with the previous one, and this enables it
to distinguish between two sorts of input qualities (in short, input): One, which
was there and remained there, which can be called a ‘state’; and another, which,
though it was not there, is there now, which can be called an ‘effect’5 (Sarbo,
Farkas, & Breemen, 2006). In cognitive theory, qualities as perceived are called
qualia6 (Stillings, 1998).
The change, signifying an interaction in the ‘real’ world, may be explained
as follows. During input processing the stimulus may change, meaning that its
current value and the value stored in the last percept are different. That differ-
ence may be interpreted by the brain, as a change, mediating the present value
of the stimulus to its actual meaning. The reaction of an interpreting system is
determined by the system’s ‘knowledge’ of the properties of the external stim-
ulus, and its experience with the results of earlier response strategies (habit).
Such knowledge is an expression of the system’s potential for interpreting, i.e.
combining with, a type of input effect, depending on the system’s state. Such
properties shall be called the ‘combinatory’ properties of the input qualia, or
the (complementary) context of the observation.
In complex biological systems, knowledge is concentrated in functional units
such as the sensory, central, and motor sub-systems. The most important of
these is the central system, which includes memory. The ‘translation’ from ex-
ternal stimuli to internal representation (qualia) is brought about by the sensory
sub-system, which itself is an interpreting system, generating ‘brute reactions’
(translations). For the goals of this thesis, the role of the motor sub-system is
ignored. The primary task of cognitive processing is the interpretation of the
4In cognitive theory, the potential for treating a collection of qualities as a single entity is
known as ‘chunking’.
5The importance of similarity (comparison) is also emphasized by (Goldstone & Barsalou,
1998).
6Qualia is plural for quale.
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external stimuli, by making use of their combinatory properties. Since the input
is assumed to consist of two types of qualia (state and effect), together appear-
ing as a ‘primordial soup’ ([q1 q2]), the stages of recognition may be defined as
follows (see also fig. 2.4).
(1) the identification of the two types of qualia in the ‘primordial soup’.
sorting : [q1], [q2]
(2) the separation of the collections of the two types of qualia.
abstraction: q1, q2
(3) the linking of the qualia with their combinatory properties ([C]).
complementation: (q1,C), (q2,C)
(4) the establishment of a relation between the completed qualia.
predication: (q1,C)–(q2,C)
1
2
2
(1)  sorting
(3)  complementation
(4)  predication
(2)  abstraction
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
[C]q q 
[q   q ]
(q  ,C) − (q  ,C)
(q  ,C) (q  ,C)
[q ][q ]
Figure 2.4: The schematic diagram of cognitive processing. Square brackets are
used to indicate that an entity is not yet interpreted as a sign; no bracketing or
the usual bracket symbols indicate that some interpretation is already available.
A horizontal line denotes an interaction between neighboring entities.
Each of the above operations can be realized by means of an interaction
between neighboring entities (such entities are connected by a horizontal line,
in fig. 2.4). The only non-trivial operation is abstration, in which the abstract
representations of the input qualia, q1 and q2, are generated by means of sepa-
rating the qualia represented by [q1] (the input state qualia, in the context of
all other input qualia), from those represented by [q2] (the input effect qualia,
in the context of all other input qualia).
The entire input or the ‘universe of discourse’ of cognitive processing consists
of the qualia of the input stimulus ([q1 q2]), and the combinatory properties
defined by the corresponding activation of the memory or the context ([C]).
This is illustrated in fig. 2.5. Because the context can be large, a specification
of its qualia can be omitted in the input. It is tacitly assumed that [q1 q2] is
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q1 q  2
C
Figure 2.5: The entire input or the ‘universe of discourse’ of cognitive processing
actually standing for [q1 q2 C] and, that the sorting operation generates three
different representations of the input: [q1], [q2], and [C]. Put differently, the
input is assumed to contain all information necessary for its recognition as a
sign.
2.3.1 Events and processes
The importance of processes demands that an earlier definition of this concept,
given in the Introduction, is briefly recapitulated. A process will be considered
to be any sequence of events such, that (i) one event initiates the sequence and
another terminates it, (ii) every event that contributes to the sequences yielding
the terminating event is regarded as part of the process and (iii) the terminating
event governs the decision of which events make up the sequence. Although
the events making up the sequence generate the terminating event (efficient
causation), the whole process is governed by its goal (teleological causation).
An event will be considered as whatever makes a difference ((Debrock et al.,
1999)).
The above model of cognitive processing is compatible with the assumption
laid down by the Peircean theory of perceptual judgments that the ‘real’ world
is forced upon us in percepts (CP 2.142),7 from which perceptual judgments
are obtained through interpretation (CP 5.54), by means of a process which is
utterly beyond our control (CP 5.115).
The interaction between the ‘real’ world phenomenon and the interpreting
system, and the perceptual judgment correspond to the two events of (i); the
events generated by the recognition process, to the events of (ii); and the tele-
ological character of that process, to the governing property mentioned in (iii).
The dynamic nature of phenomena is re-presented by the processual character
of the model of cognitive activity. The interaction included in a ‘real’ world
phenomenon is re-presented by a sequence of interactions, by the interpreting
system.
7A reference to (Peirce, 1931) is given by volume and paragraph, separated by a point.
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Chapter 3
Perception and cognition
Adequate representation of the input stimulus requires that the two types of
input qualia (state and effect) are recognized in themselves, as well as in relation
to each other. This is acknowledged in the proposed model, by introducing two
stages of cognitive activity, that are called perception and cognition.1 It will be
suggested that although those stages are different, their models may be defined
as isomorphic instances of the processing schema introduced in the previous
chapter. This part is followed by a logical analysis of the processing schema,
proving the completeness of the model of cognitive activity, from the logical
point of view.
3.1 Perception
According to this thesis, cognitive activity may be modeled by means of two
processes that are isomorphic instances of the processing schema. The ‘goal’
of the first process, perception, is the establishment of a relation between the
input qualia and the information stored in the memory (the relation between
the input qualia is of secondary importance in this process). As a result, per-
ception obtains an interpretation of the qualia in themselves. In accordance
with perception’s goal, the memory response, defining the context ([C]), con-
tains ‘iconic’ information about the combinatory properties of the input qualia,
independently from their actual relations. In the proposed model, the state and
effect type qualia of the input are indicated by a and b, respectively; those of
1Cognition alternatively could be called conception [Van Breemen, pers. comm. 2006].
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the memory by a’ and b’ . All four signs may refer to a type as well as to a
collection of qualia.
Among the representations obtained by perception, only step 4, the final
one is of interest for this section (a complete definition of all events of the
perception process will be given in chapter 4). Following the assumption of this
thesis, the a’ (b’ ) memory response signs arise by means of the a(b) input qualia,
which trigger memory. Although the two types of memory response signs are
independent, they have a shared, common meaning. This is due to the fact
that there is an interaction between the input qualia, and the assumption that
the memory information stored by the brain arises from earlier observations,
through memorization.
Depending on the actual activation of the memory, defining the state of
the brain/mind as an interpreting system, there may be qualia in the memory
response having an intensity: above (i) or below (ii) threshold, referring to an
input meaning which is in the brain’s focus, and which is only complementary ,
respectively. A high intensity type (i) memory response signifies the recognition
of the input as an agreement between the input and memory response: the input
a(b) is recognized or ‘known’ as a’ (b’ ). A low intensity response of type (ii) refers
to input recognition as a possibility only: the input a(b) is not recognized or ‘not
known’ as a’ (b’ ). In this case, the memory response only represents a secondary
or even less important aspect of the input qualia.
By indicating the first type of intensity relationship between input and mem-
ory response by a ‘∗’ symbol, and the second type by a ‘+’, the signs of per-
ception can be represented as: a∗a’ , a+a’ , b∗b’ , b+b’ . For example, a∗a’ is a
representation of a positive identification of a by a’ ; as opposed to a+a’ which
signifies the event of the identification of a possible meaning of a by a’ (in other
words, to a denial of a positive identification).
In the model of perception, as a process, the four signs are represented as a
single sign. The recognition of the difference between the four types of intensity
relations is beyond the scope of this process (the ‘,’ symbol separating the four
types of signs above, is an expression of their synonymous interpretation, as the
final signs of perception; it is this perspective that makes them synonymous).
A schematic diagram of our model of perception is depicted in fig. 3.1.
3.2 Cognition
The second process, cognition, is an exact copy of the first one, perception,
except that the ‘goal’ of cognition is the interpretation of the relation between
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Figure 3.1: A schematic diagram of the model of perception. Triggered by a
change, the current value of the input stimulus is sampled. The current percept
is compared with the previous percept, which results in two types of input signs
(a, b). The relation between these signs and the corresponding memory signs
(a’ , b’ ) is represented, on the basis of the intensity of the memory response, by
the expressions: a∗a’ , a+a’ , b∗b’ , b+b’ .
the input qualia, more specifically, the relation between the qualia that are in
the focus (a∗a’ , b∗b’ ), in the light of those that are complementary (a+a’ , b+b’ )
(now it is the relation between the input and the context that is of secondary
importance). In accordance with cognition’s ‘goal’, the context ([C]) contains
‘indexical’ information about the complementary properties of the input qualia.
This means that by combining the input of the cognition process with the in-
formation of the context, the relation between A and B (and, transitively so,
the relation between a and b) may be disclosed.
Similarly to perception, as a process, the input appears as a ‘primordial
soup’, this time defined by the synonymous signs of perception. In fact, the
difference between the four meaning elements (a∗a’ , a+a’ , b∗b’ , b+b’ ) functions
as a ground for the process of cognition. This is acknowledged in this model,
by introducing an initial re-presentation of the four relations generated by per-
ception: a∗a’ as A, a+a’ as ¬A, b∗b’ as B and b+b’ as ¬B. The presence or
absence of a ‘¬’ symbol in an expression indicate whether the qualia signified,
are or are not in the focus, i.e. identified (accordingly, ‘¬’ may be interpreted as
a ‘relative difference’ operation with respect to the collection of a type of qualia,
represented as a set). The instantiation of the processing schema for cognition,
is depicted in fig. 3.2 (the input also contains the signs that are not in the focus
(¬A, ¬B); these are omitted in the input position, in this diagram).
The important interpretation moment is step 3 now (complementation), in
which the link between input qualia and the context is established, in accordance
with cognition’s ‘goal’ as well as the duality of phenomena. This explains why
there can be a relation between A and ¬B, and ¬A and B, and why there is no
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(1)  sorting
(3)  complementation
(4)  predication
(2)  abstraction
[A] [B]
[A B]
(A,~B) − (B,~A)
[~B,~A]A B
(A,~B) (B,~A)
Figure 3.2: A schematic diagram of cognition as a process. The input signs
appearing as a ‘primordial soup’ ([A B]) are sorted ([A], [B]), abstracted (A,
B), complemented by the context ((A,¬B), (¬A,B)) and, finally, combined in a
single sign ((A,¬B)−(¬A,B)) by means of predication (negation (‘¬’) is denoted
by a ‘∼’ symbol).
relation between A and ¬A, or B and ¬B.2 The cognition process is completed
in step 4 (predication), by establishing the relation between A and B.
There are three relations, that correspond to the three types of interactions
between the input qualia, that may be characterized by means of the meaning
of their constituents (from the computational point of view, these interactions
are relations that are indicated by a ‘–’ symbol):3
(1) A–¬B: A is ‘known’, but B is ‘not known’;
the complementation of the input state (‘actualization’).
(2) B–¬A: B is ‘known’, but A is ‘not known’;
the complementation of the input effect (‘refinement’).
(3) (A,¬B)–(B,¬A): both A and B are ‘known’;
the establishment of a relation between A and B (‘proposition’).
If neither A nor B is ‘known’, interpretation terminates, meaning that cog-
nition as a process does not actually occur (the process did not reach its goal).
The reader may have noticed the mediational function of the context signs in
step 3. Through the correspondence between ¬A and ¬B, that are triggered by
the same input, the context implicitly determines the actual relation between A
and B. That relation can be called a ‘proposition’ resulting from a hypothetical
inference, but only if we acknowledge, in accordance with the Peircean view of
2A and ¬A (but also B and ¬B) arise due to the same input trigger, indicating that the
two signs are not independent.
3The three types of interactions are also called a 1st, a 2nd, and a 3rd of meaningful
representation (cf. sect. 6.3.1).
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perceptual judgment, that the percept’s “truth consists in the fact that it is
impossible to correct it, and in the fact that it only professes one aspect of the
percept” (CP 5.568).
3.3 Logical analysis
The interpretation of cognition above illustrates, to some extent, the complete-
ness of this process. This becomes even more clear from the logical analysis
of the underlying processing schema. In this section an attempt is made to
elaborate such an analysis, on the basis of the model of cognition introduced
above, but the results apply to the model of perception as well. First, a logical
expression is associated to each interpretation moment, on the basis of common
logical aspects. Second, operations are introduced generating those expressions
according to a procedure. Third, derivations are presented, indicating that
those expressions could be generated by a Boolean logic. The hidden agenda
of this section is a tacit introduction of logical concepts in the process model
of cognition. What makes the use of such concepts especially important is that
they have a well-studied, precise meaning. In this section, the term ‘logical’ is
used as a reference to an aspect of an event or an expression, not to a formally
defined concept. The operations mentioned above are only defined for the ex-
pressions associated to the interpretation moments of the processing schema.
Their specification as a rewriting system is beyond the goal of this work.
An essential element of the logical interpretation of the process model of
cognition is the abstraction of a common meaning for the two different types
of input qualia (state and effect), which is the concept of a logical variable. In
virtue of the duality of the input, the logical interpretation of cognition, as a
process, requires the introduction of two variables. These will be denoted by
A and B. The difference between the qualia that are in the focus and those
that are complementary, is represented by the difference in their expression.
Each one of the two types of qualia is referred to by means of a logical variable
which is either stated positively or negatively. Perceived state and effect qualia
which are in the focus are indicated by A and B, respectively; those which are
complementary by ¬A and ¬B. Notice the use of ‘¬’ as a complementation
operation on collections. For example, the complementary sub-collections of
A-type qualia are denoted by A and ¬A (the label A is used ambiguously).
The relational operators introduced in the application of the processing schema
for perception (‘+’ for possibility and ‘∗’ for agreement), are inherited by the
process model of cognition and its interpretation as operations on expressions.
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The logical meanings of the expressions below are due to the meaning of a logical
‘or’ involved in the possibility meaning of ‘+’, and the meaning of a logical ‘and’
in the agreement meaning of ‘∗’.
1
2
2
(1)  sorting
(3)  complementation
(4)  predication
(2)  abstraction
2
2
1
1
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[C]q q 
[q   q ]
(q  ,C) − (q  ,C)
(q  ,C) (q  ,C)
[q ][q ]
Figure 3.3: The schematic diagram of cognitive processing (recap.)
Conform the above mapping of state and effect qualia to logical variables,
the logical expressions associated to the events of the cognitive process may be
defined in the following way (the interpretation moments of cognitive processing
are recapitulated in fig. 3.3).
[q1]=A+B, [q2]=A∗B: the expression of the simultaneous presence of the input
qualia which are in the focus, respectively, as a simple, possible co-existence
(A+B); and in the sense of agreement, as a meaningful co-occurrence
(A∗B). As A and B are commonly interpreted as logical variables, the
separate representation of any one of the two types of input qualia contains
a reference to both variables. However, we may only observe a state by
virtue of an effect, but the occurrence of an effect entails the existence of a
state. This difference between the two types of input qualia is expressed by
means of the difference between their two types of relations, represented
by the operators ‘+’ and ‘∗’.
q1=A∗¬B, ¬A∗B: the expression of the abstract meaning of the focused in-
put qualia, as constituents, irrespective of the actually co-occurring other
type of qualia. It is this perspective that makes the two logical signs syn-
onymous (notice the use of ‘,’ in the definition of q1 directly above, as a
representation of this equivalence).
q2=A∗¬B+¬A∗B: the expression of the input as an abstract co-occurrence
event, logically represented by a compatibility relation of the two types of
abstract constituents of the input (which are now interpreted differently).
[C]=¬A+¬B, ¬A∗¬B: the expression of the context as a co-existence (¬A+¬B)
and as a co-occurrence relation (¬A∗¬B) of the complementary input
qualia. The synonymous representation of these signs is an expression of
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their secondary (complementary) meaning, but also of the shared meaning
included in the simultaneously present qualia, represented by ¬A and ¬B,
comprising the context.
(q1,C)=A+¬B, ¬A+B: the expression of the abstract constituents (q1) com-
pleted with the information provided by the context ([C]) or, alternatively,
the ‘actual’ or embedded meaning of the input qualia as constituents. For
example, the actual meaning of A (perceived state) as a constituent, is
signified by A itself and by ¬B, the complementary property connecting
A with B (as the relation between A and B is not yet established, the
B type qualia cannot contribute to the actual meaning of A, as a con-
stituent). Alternatively, the meaning of ¬A∗B in context is defined by
the qualia completing this abstract meaning, which are A and ¬B. As
the two interpretations of A as an actual constituent are related to each
other by the relation of co-existence, the logical meaning of (q1,C) can be
represented by A+¬B. For the same reason, as in q1, the two expressions
of (q1,C) are interpreted in the model, as synonymous.
(q2,C)=A∗B+¬A∗¬B: the expression of the abstract compatibility relation in
context. This obtains the sign of the input as a characteristic or conven-
tional property which appears as an event. That event can be looked at
from two different points of view. Through the glass of the qualia which
are in the focus it can be represented as an event between A and B; from
the stance of the complementary context it can be described as an event
between ¬A and ¬B. The two signs represent the interaction which is
in the focus, respectively, positively and negatively. Alternatively, in the
definition of (q1,C) and (q2,C) above, the complementary qualia are used
to sort out those meanings from the possible meanings of the abstract
signs, q1 and q2, that may hold in context ([C]). In other words, the input
is implicitly characterized by means of complementary information of the
context. State qualia occurring in q1 are represented by themselves (A
(B)),4 and by their context (¬B (¬A)); and, similarly, effect qualia oc-
curring in q2 are represented by themselves, (A∗B)5 and by their context
(¬A∗¬B).
(q1,C)–(q2,C)=A is B: the expression of the relation between the input qualia
which are in the focus, represented as a proposition.
The logical expressions assigned to the interpretation moments are presented
4Input qualia are commonly represented as variables.
5As the occurrence of an effect entails the existence of a state, it is A∗B that is representing
the simultaneity included in the meaning of the input interaction.
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Figure 3.4: The logical expressions of cognitive processing (on the left) and the
corresponding Boolean relations (on the right). Negation (‘¬’) is denoted by a
‘∼’ symbol.
in fig. 3.4, on the left-hand side; the corresponding Boolean relations are dis-
played on the right-hand side of the same diagram. The logical signs, ‘0’ and
‘1’, which are omitted, can be defined as representations of a ‘not-valid’ and a
‘valid’ input, respectively. Notice in fig. 3.4 the presence of all Boolean relations
on two variables,6 reinforcing the earlier conjecture of this thesis concerning the
completeness of the underlying cognitive process. The results of the analysis
above show that logical signs (and thereby also the concepts of cognition, as a
process) can be defined as a relation (interaction) between neighboring signs that
is in need of settlement. In fig. 3.4, such signs are connected with a horizontal
line.
3.3.1 Towards a Boolean interpretation
Fig. 3.4 can be interpreted as a procedure, generating expressions from other
expressions, recursively.
In sorting, the expressions A+B ([q1]) and A∗B ([q2]) are generated from
the initial terms: A, B, ¬A, ¬B. A formal definition of this operation is trivial,
therefore omitted.
In abstraction, the expressions of q1 and q2 are generated from the expres-
sions of [q1] and [q2], by means of relative difference operators, “\” and “/”.
A derivation of the expressions of q1 and q2, including a definition of the two
operators, is given as follows. For logical variables X,Y ∈{A,B}, X\X as well
as X/X are defined by the empty term, which can be omitted; X\Y and X/Y
6The Boolean relations as functions: f0=0, f1=A∗B, f2=A∗¬B, f3=A, f4=¬A∗B,
f5=B, f6=¬A∗B+A∗¬B, f7=A+B, f8=¬A∗¬B, f9=A∗B+¬A∗¬B, f10=¬B, f11=A+¬B,
f12=¬A, f13=¬A+B, f14=¬A+¬B, f15=1.
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are identically defined by the expression X∗¬Y .
In the derivation below, the simultaneity meaning included in [q2] (A∗B)
is removed from the constituency meaning included in [q1] (A+B). That this
operation can be feasible, is witnessed by the possible interpretations of A+B
as A, B, and A·B (the last term denotes ‘both A and B’, as a possible co-
existence). The resulting expressions are not related to each other by a relation
of constituency (‘+’), but only by the weaker relation of a synonymous inter-
pretation (from a certain point of view). Such a relation is expressed below by
a “,” symbol.
[q1]\[q2]
= (A+B)\(A∗B)
= A\(A∗B), B\(A∗B)
= A\A, A\B, B\A, B\B
= A\B, B\A
= A∗¬B, B∗¬A
By removing the constituency meaning included in [q1] (A+B), from the
simultaneity meaning included in [q2] (A∗B), an expression can be generated,
representing a relation between the input qualia, which is less tight than a
simultaneity relation, but more close than a simple constituency relation. Such
a meaning is included in the final expression below, representing the meaning
aspect of an exlusive-or relation.
[q2]/[q1]
= (A∗B)/(A+B)
= (A∗B)/A+(A∗B)/B
= A/A+A/B+B/A+B/B
= A∗¬B+B∗¬A
In complementation, the expressions of (q1,C) and (q2,C) are generated by
means of complementation operators applied to the expressions of q1 and q2
(in conformity with its complementary character, in these operations the role
of [C] is secondary). The two operators, which are ambiguously denoted by ‘¬’,
are defined as an involution, for example, ¬¬A= A. In the definition of (q1,C)
below, complementation recursively applies to the state, or the constituent(s)
of an expression. For example, the constituents of A∗¬B are A, ¬B, and the
operator ‘∗’. The complement of an operator is defined by the dual operator:
¬(∗)= +, ¬(+) =∗.
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¬q1
= ¬(A∗¬B), ¬(¬A∗B)
= (¬A)(¬∗)(¬¬B), (¬¬A)(¬∗)(¬B)
= ¬A+B, A+¬B
In the definition of (q2,C) below, complementation recursively applies to the
effect, or an expression as a whole. As state and effect qualia, which are different,
are commonly interpreted as variables, complementation always applies to one
of them in an expression, at the same time. This is indicated below, by the
expressions given in square parentheses (in the first expression, ‘¬’ has been
applied to A and ¬A, in A∗¬B+¬A∗B; in the second, it has been applied to
¬B and B).
¬q2
= ¬(A∗¬B+¬A∗B))
= [¬(A∗¬B)+¬(¬A∗B)]+[¬(A∗¬B)+¬(¬A∗B)]
= (¬A∗¬B)+(A∗¬¬B)+(¬¬A∗B)+¬A∗¬B)
= A∗B+¬A∗¬B
The above interpretation of the processing schema, as a procedure gener-
ating logical expressions, is called in this thesis ‘naive’ logic. As mentioned in
sect. 3.3, a definition of ‘naive’ logical operators, as a rewriting system or, as a
Boolean algebra, is not part of this work. However, the possibility for a Boolean
interpretation of the processing schema is illustrated below by derivations, in-
dicating a close relationship between the expressions depicted in fig. 3.4, and
their interpretation as (isomorphic) Boolean relations.
For example, the term associated to q2 can be defined by a Boolean relative
difference operation between the expressions of [q1] and [q2], this time inter-
preted as Boolean relations: (A+B)\(A∗B)= A∗¬B+B∗¬A. The expressions
associated to (q1,C) and (q2,C) can be defined by a Boolean negation of the ex-
pressions of q1 and q2, interpreted as Boolean relations, respectively: ¬(A∗¬B),
¬(¬A∗B)= ¬A+B, A+¬B; ¬(A∗¬B+¬A∗B)= A∗B+¬A∗¬B.
Finally, the expression of (q1,C)–(q2,C) can be formally interpreted as a syl-
logistic conclusion, defined by the expressions of (q1,C) and (q2,C), interpreted
as premises. In the derivation below  Lukasiewicz’s conception of a syllogism is
used (Dumitriu, 1977), according to which a premise can be equivalently rep-
resented as an implication. The major and minor premises are, respectively,
A∗B+¬A∗¬B= A+B→A∗B and A→B= A→A+B, from which A is B syllo-
gistically follows (by taking A+¬B or A←B as the minor premise, B is A can
be obtained; the two propositions synonymously represent the logical meaning
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of the input, respectively, in the ‘active’ and ‘passive’ sense). In the derivation
below, quantifiers are omitted.
A+B IS A∗B
A IS A+B
⇒ A IS A∗B ;A→A∗B=¬A+A∗B=¬A+B=A→B
= A IS B
3.4 Semiotic analogy
That the formal computational and the intuitive interpretation of a sign are
tightly related to each other must be clear from the above explanation of the
logical relations of cognition. This dependency forms the basis of the semiotic
interpretation of the 9 types of relations, which can be explained as follows.
[q1 q2]: represents the appearing phenomenon as qualities.
[q1]: represents that the constituents are trivially part of their collection, as a
whole. Hence they are similar to it. So, the representation of the input, as
a constituency relation, expresses likeness with respect to the input, which
is represented as ‘primordial soup’.
[q2]: represents that the aspect of simultaneity is a primary element of the
input, as an appearance (event) that happens now.
q1: represents that the abstract conception of the input is an expression of
its being as a qualitatively possibility .
q2: represents that the compatibility of the abstract meaning of the input
qualia is expressive of a rule-like relation.
[C]: represents that the relation between the input and the embedding or
complementary context has the meaning of a connection.
(q1,C): represents the meaning of the abstract constituents in context. It is a
definition of the actual meaning of the input qualia, as something existent .
(q2,C): represents the interpretation of the abstract compatibility relation in
context as a characteristic property; it presupposes the existence of a con-
sensus or convention.
(q1,C)–(q2,C): represents that the assertion of a relation between the input
qualia involves the formation of a proposition which is a hypothesis.
From this semiotic interpretation of the logical relations, the analogy with
the Peircean nonadic sign classification follows trivially.
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3.4.1 Categories and signs
Throughout his philosophical career Peirce was occupied with attempts to clas-
sify signs in a systematic way. This work has led him believe that there are three
basic categories: monadic Firstness (the possible), which appears in conscious-
ness as feeling or the consciousness of quality without recognition or analysis;
dyadic Secondness (the actual), which appears as a consciousness of interrup-
tion in the field of consciousness or as the brute intrusion of another quality;
triadic Thirdness (the lawful), which synthesizes the content of consciousness
or the mediation by thought of the different feeling spread out in time (cf. CP
1.377).
In his work on sign classification, Peirce repeatedly applied the three ba-
sic categorical distinctions to signs. It starts with the definition of a sign as
“. . . something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant
thought C” (CP 1.346). This definition yields three ways in which signs may be
considered. First, a sign may be considered in itself. If we do so, we neglect the
relations a sign may have with its object and interpretant and we only regard
the sign as a possible sign. Second, we may regard the sign in its relation with
its object only and neglect the relation it has with its interpretant. If we do so,
we regard the sign as an existing sign, but still without any effect. And third, we
may look how the sign addresses its interpretant. If we do so, we regard the sign
as a real or effectual sign. In this last case we try to unravel the full meaning
or import a sign may have by figuring out how the sign manages to relate the
interpretant of the sign with its object. If we concentrate on a sign-interpretant
sequence in some concrete situation, we study embedded signs.7
Later Peirce applied the categorical distinctions to the sign relations just dis-
cerned. The first tenable result, the nonadic classification, is summarized at the
left hand side of fig. 3.5, the bottom right-diagonal gives the relational aspects
pertaining to the sign in itself, the intermediate gives the aspects pertaining to
the way the sign may relate to the object, and the top right-diagonal gives the
ways in which the sign may address its interpretant. On the right hand side
of fig. 3.5 the technical terms that give the meaning aspects are stated in more
mundane terms, which are also used in the semiotic interpretation of the nine
types of relations above.
It is important to note that in this thesis the relational aspects of the nonadic
classification are interpreted as the parameters of (full) meaning. The isomor-
phism between the cognitive process and Peirce’s nonadic classification is a
7This analysis of Peirce’s signs is based on lecture notes by Van Breemen (unpublished
manuscript, 2007).
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consequence of the isomorphism between the induced order of cognitive pro-
cessing, on the one hand, and the interdependency of the Peircean signs, based
on categorical distinctions, on the other. But this is all there is! The process-
ing schema introduced in this thesis is suited for computational interpretation.
But, although the above mapping established a link between the Peircean signs
and the Boolean relations (see sect. 3.3), hence define a computational level of
authentic semiosis, the full meaning of the Peircean signs is qualitatively more
than such a logical relation.
rheme index
icon sinsign
symbol
legisign
dicent
qualisign
argument
connection
likeness actual event
quality
qualitative
actual
rule
proposition
possibility
existence convention
Figure 3.5: Peirce’s classification of signs and their mundane aspects
By assuming that the full meaning of a sign emerges, through embedding in
real life interactions with the world, from the relations ‘generated’ by cognitive
processing, the nine sign aspects can be hypothetically considered to be a link
between the computational and the semiotic level of meaning. Inasmuch as
those aspects are enclosed in a process, which finally results in something that
can be characterized as truly meaningful, it is probably best to consider the
nine aspects as unfinished ‘meaning elements’, that is, as signs which are in
a process of becoming signs (A. van Breemen & Sarbo, 2006). Such signs are
called in (Sarbo, 2006), pre- or proto-signs.
The different characterizations of knowledge – a combinatory process of
qualia (fig. 3.2); a representation of logical relations (fig. 3.4); a hierarchy of
increasingly more complex ‘meaning elements’ (fig. 3.5), but also its other pos-
sible interpretations – are interrelated, and it is their collection that approaches
full meaning. The conjecture of this thesis is that, if a uniform representa-
tion can be proved to exist, this can be the key for an efficient (computational)
merging of knowledge obtained in different domains into a single representation.
3.4.2 Process interpretation
On the basis of Peirce’s theory of interpretants, a model of semiosis was intro-
duced in (A. Breemen & Sarbo, 2007). This is briefly recapitulated below. The
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different interpretation events are indicated by labels (i)–(iv).
The representamen (potential sign) enters the interpreting system repre-
sented as a Semiotic Sheet8 (Ss). The effect of the representamen on the Ss,
which is occurring in a certain state, is interpreted as a feeling (qualisign).
i) The feeling is sorted out as an icon and settled as a singularity (sinsign).
ii) Since it is a familiar iconic singularity, a legisign arises (rule); since it is
a singular icon out of any context at this moment, a rheme arises.
iii) Assuming there is a strong habit that is connected to the legisign, by
means of the connection (index sign), a conventional meaning is retrieved
and the sign is interpreted as a request to stop (symbol sign).
iv) This interpretation event is, again through a connection with what is
contained in Ss (index sign), placed under a rule of habit that covers this
kind of case and a response is generated (argument sign).
The response sign, which is called in (A. Breemen & Sarbo, 2007) the dy-
namic interpretant response, may enter the Ss as a quality (for example, a
premise) and initiate further interpretation. Following this view, the dicent
sign exhibits the meaning aspect of a proposition about the relation between
the original representamen and the Ss; this is opposed to the argument sign,
which exhibits the aspect of a proposition which is a premise in a subsequent
interpretation process.
The striking similarity between the process described above and the the-
ory introduced in the previous chapter is beneficially used in this thesis in the
presentation of the processing schema as a model of meaningful sign interpreta-
tion. Following the Peircean theory of interpretants presented in (A. Breemen
& Sarbo, 2007), in the processual interpretation of Peirce’s hierarchy of signs
(see fig. 3.6), the four interpretation events (i)–(iv) can be mapped to the four
sign events: sorting, abstraction, complementation and predication.
index
dicent
icon
qualisign
argument
rheme legisign
symbol
sinsign
(i) sorting
(ii) abstraction
(iii) complementation
(iv) predication
Figure 3.6: The process interpretation of Peirce’s classification of signs
8The concept of the Semiotic Sheet is introduced by A.J.J. van Breemen.
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3.5 Combinatory relations and properties
As earlier mentioned, we may observe an entity, as a state, only by virtue of an
appearing effect, but the occurrence of an effect always entails the existence of a
state. This asymmetry between state and effect is also the ground for a semiotic
interpretation of the differences between the three types of relations recognized
by cognitive processing. This can be exemplified for the model of cognition, as
a process (see fig. 3.2):
(1) A–¬B: A is a potential meaning, which is actualized by ¬B.
(2) B–¬A: B, which is in principle self-sufficient, receives its
full meaning from its association with ¬A.
(3) (A,¬B)–(B,¬A): A and B, which both are self-sufficient,
together generate a new meaning.9
These (cognitive) relations can be interpreted as a representation of the three
types of a nexus between signs, which in turn correspond to the three Peircean
categories. An example of the three types of relations in language syntax are
a syntactic modification of a noun (e.g. by an adjective), a syntactic comple-
mentation of a verb (e.g. by a verb-complement), and a syntactic predication
(subject and predicate forming a sentence), respectively. The important con-
sequence of this transitive relation between cognition and the categories is the
existence of a necessary and sufficient condition for ontological specifications,
which are typically syntactical too, in particular those which are meant to be
used in computer applications. The analysis of the meaning of the constituents,
in the three types of relations, proves that the specification of the (combinatory)
properties of qualia can be restricted to three cases. The specification of
(1) the qualia in themselves
(2) with respect to other qualia
(i) which are complementing it or
(ii) which they are complementing
(3) with respect to other qualia, together with which, they can
generate a new meaning.10
Such a specification will be called a trichotomic specification or, briefly, a
trichotomy. In virtue of the dependency between the Peircean categories, the
9In line with the assumption that all interaction is between state and effect, the constituents
of the three relations above show an analogous difference.
10Notice that (1) allows a single interpretation, (2) provides two and (3) can be expanded
in three meanings, that differ from each other in the question which one of the qualia has a
dominant function in the relation (either the one, or the other, or both).
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meaning of a more developed class contains the meaning of a less developed one,
in a trichotomy. By assuming that the three types of meanings can be defined in
each trichotomic class, recursively, we have in front of us the hierarchical schema
of ontological specification suggested by the theory of this thesis. Trichotomies
will be extensively studied in the domain of ‘naive’ semantic syntactic signs (see
chapter 6).
In sum, there are three types of relations between signs, in accordance with
the three types of the categories of phenomena. As each sign interaction intro-
duced by the processing schema can be interpreted as an interaction between
some state and some effect, the constituents of a sign interaction can be char-
acterized as:
(1) a quality, which is a potential existence
(2) a state, which appears by virtue of an effect
(3) an effect, which implicates the existence of a state
The three categories are not independent from each other. Though third-
ness is the most developed, it nevertheless requires secondness and firstness (the
latter via the mediation of secondness). Analogous with the categorical rela-
tions, an effect can be said to contain a state and, transitively so, a potential
existence. By means of the induced ordering of the dependency between the
categories (‘<’), as a polymorphic operation, the relation between the cognitive
types can be abstracted as follows: a<b and A<B. For example, the meaning
of a quale which is an effect, implies the existence of its meaning as a state.
3.5.1 Example
The running example of this, and the next chapter is the recognition of the
‘real’ world phenomenon ‘smoke’, as the sign of ‘danger’. In this section the
focus will be on some of the important interpretation moments of that process,
a full analysis of the example will be given in the next chapter.
Assume, you are watching for some time the dark cloud of smoke (smoke)
above a roof (roof), and suddenly you ‘see’ that the cloud is rising upward
(rising-air) and that fire is burning on the roof (burning). The input qualia
of perception, and the memory response signs triggered by that input are illus-
trated as follows (boldface and Sans Serif symbols are used for denoting input
and memory signs, respectively; danger and thermal are the memory signs gener-
ated for burning and rising-air, respectively):
a= smoke, roof
b= burning, rising-air
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a’= smoke, roof
b’= danger, thermal
The final signs of perception, re-presented as the initial signs of cognition:
A= smoke∗smoke
¬A= roof+roof
B= burning∗danger
¬B= rising-air+thermal
For instance, smoke is identified as smoke, but roof is only ‘guessed’ as a possible
for roof (for example, because you cannot see the whole roof, only a part of
it). The recognition of the above signs by cognition, as a process, obtains the
following representations of the input qualia:
(q1,C)=smoke∗smoke
(q2,C)=burning∗danger
Finally, the interaction of these signs is represented as a proposition, by making
use of ‘rising-air above the roof, as a mediating context:
(q1,C)–(q2,C)= (smoke as smoke) IS (burning as danger)
or, briefly, ‘smoke IS danger’. This sign can be re-presented, possibly through a
recursive process, by shouting “Fire!” or running away, as a reaction. In order
to enable the recognition of the input as a meaningful relation, the input qualia
have to be adequately specified, by means of suitable trichotomies. This may
be exemplified with the specification of smoke (hence implicitly also of smoke):
(1) in itself: an entity which is a quale, having properties underlying
its combinatory potential, such as a dark color, a density, etc.
(2) in relation to another quale
(i) which is complementing it: e.g. blowing
(as a smoke producing effect) or,
(ii) which it is complementing: e.g. rising-from-the-chimney
(as a state undergoing smoke production)
(3) as a self sufficient sign: such as the subject of any-burning.
Notice that the qualia of (1) function as the ground for the connections of (2),
that in turn underlie the meaningful relations of (3). For example, smoke as
an entity ‘rising-from-the-chimney’ contains the meaning of smoke as an entity
having dark color etc. In turn, smoke as the subject of ‘any-burning’ contains the
meaning of smoke as an entity ‘rising-from-the-chimney’.
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This completes the brief overview of the example of this section. In the
next chapter the example will be further elaborated, by defining all signs ‘gen-
erated’ by perception and cognition, as processes. The reader who only wants
to skim this thesis may safely skip the next chapter and catch on later, with
chapter 5, in which an important application of the theory in language modeling
is introduced.
3.6 Natural representation
An advantage of the model of knowledge representation of this thesis lies in
its potential for generating information, by the computer, that could be more
directly processed as knowledge, by the human user. The essence of such ‘natu-
ral’ processing of information may be illustrated with the metaphor of apparent
motion perception. If a series of pictures is presented correctly, one may experi-
ence it as motion. If the presentation is not correct, for example, if the pictures
are in a wrong order, or the difference between consecutive pictures is too large,
adequate interpretation may still be possible, but will be more difficult.
The idea behind the theory introduced in this thesis is that an analogous
‘correct’ presentation of computations by the computer may enable a ‘natural’
interpretation of those computations, as signs of the recognition of a suitable
phenomenon, that is, the signs of the interaction between some state and effect.
More specifically, the hypothesis of this thesis is that information processing
respecting the nine types of relations of cognitive processing, and their ordering,
may enhance the interpretation of the input information, as meaningful (through
the mediation of proto-signs, that are in a process of becoming a sign).
The potential relation between the cognitive and semiotic concepts of mean-
ing is the key to a natural definition of the combinatory properties of the qualia
as a rule-like habit. Also, the dynamic interpretation of the Peircean classifi-
cation is the key to the conception of sign recognition as a process, generating
increasingly better approximations of the final meaning of observed phenom-
ena. It can be shown that there exists a correspondence between the types of
relations generated by cognitive processing, and the interactions between sign
aspects that are each other’s neighbors, according to Peirce’s classification.11
11A neighborhood relation between signs is indicated by a horizontal line in fig. 3.4.
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3.7 Related research
A framework which is remotely related to the one presented in this thesis, is
the theory of Nonagons (Guerri, 2000), that has been introduced originally for
supporting the completeness of a design, for example, an architectural design.
Nonagons are also based on Peirce’s signs and a recursive expansion of his
nonadic classification. There is however an important difference between the
two approaches in regard to the interpretation of a sign, either as an entity
which emphasizes its character as a single unit (the Nonagon approach), or,
as an entity which stresses the inherent duality implied by authentic semiosis
(the view maintained by this thesis).12 A practical advantage of the latter
view lies in its capacity for defining the nine classes as a product of (dual)
trichotomies, thereby simplifying the specification task, potentially. An example
in text summarization, illustrating the benefits of a recursive specification of the
properties of qualia, will be given in chapter 9.
12Both models depart from a triadic definition of signs, but the difference in goals served
puts a different emphasis on the properties of signs. In this thesis it is maintained that full
understanding of semiosis is only possible when the different perspectives are combined.
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Chapter 4
Process model revisited
In this chapter the model of cognitive activity is further elaborated. This in-
cludes an analysis of the necessary conditions for the representation of memory
information, an overview of the cognitive concept of qualia (sect. 4.2), a full
definition of the perception process (4.3), the introduction of degenerate repre-
sentation (4.4), a comparison of ‘naive’ and Boolean logic (4.5) and, finally, a
complete elaboration of the example introduced in the previous chapter.
4.1 Memory representation
The reader may agree that the processing schema proposed in the previous
chapter is astonishingly simple. In fact, all it does is that it consistently links
the input qualia with memory information obtained in earlier observations. This
raises the questions: How is memory information represented, and how are links
established between the input and the memory responses?
Although the number of observations by the brain/mind is in principle un-
limited, its storage capacity is finite and, therefore, the representation of mem-
ory information must be economic. Economic representation may be illustrated
with the earlier example of smoke. Smoke can be interpreted as a sign of life,
but also as a warning for danger. In both cases the sign (smoke) mediates its
object (fire) to its interpretant (either the iconic sign of thermal or the symbolic
sign of danger). The fact that there may exist different interpretants indicates
that mediation is context dependent. This may be due to the activation of the
brain (what is in its focus) and/or the presence of low intensity input qualia
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that are not in the brain’s focus and are only recognized in the sense of pos-
sibility (complementary qualia). In the example of the previous chapter it has
been assumed that, besides smoke, other qualia that represent the context of
the observation, are present in the sensory input: quale like the burning roof
(in the case of smoke as danger), or that of the rising air in the background (in
the case of smoke as the sign of a thermal).
A specific case of the context is memory, in particular memory response
signs triggered by the input. Because memory information is assumed to arise
from sensory qualia, that have two types, it will be assumed that also memory
information can be distinguished in two classes: focused and complementary.
A consequence of the assumed economic representation of information by the
brain is that all signs must possess combinatory properties. For example, it is
not ‘smoke of the burning roof’ which is a sign, but ‘smoke’+‘the burning roof’.
Even this may not be sufficient for an economic representation of knowledge,
however. Other processes might contribute to economic storage as well. That
we recognize all kinds of appearances of smoke simply as ‘smoke’ might be due
to generalization (abstraction) and the application of threshold values. This
issue will be addressed in chapter 6. For the time being it will be assumed
that the combinatory properties of an entity may arise from the observation
of the properties of similar entities through generalization (cf. habits). The
combinatory properties of (primary) input qualia can be used for the definition
of the properties of complex entities. In virtue of the importance of qualia for the
theory of this thesis, in the next section the cognitive theoretical interpretation
of this concept will be briefly recapitulated.
4.2 Qualia
Following a theory of categorical perception (Harnad, 1987), it is assumed that
input stimuli are perceived in qualia. According to (Harnad, 1987) (p. 387),
the essence of categorical perception is that
[. . .] stimuli that are equally spaced on a physical continuum are per-
ceived as if they belonged to one or another perceptual category,
rather than appearing to vary continuously as a function of their
physical values.
An example of categorical perception is the speech frequency spectrum as it
is subdivided into phoneme discriminations (e.g. formants). One of the possible
mechanisms for categorical perception is selective attention (idem, p. 323),
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which is a mechanism used in cases in which categorization of certain stimuli
has to be learned.
If, through experience with human language or with animal calls,
phonemes and call elements that differ only in the position of a
parameter on a single physical continuum are perceived again and
again, it is conceivable that their relative position on the continuum
is learned. If only a few alternatives occur, their positions receive
specific labels.
The existence of such parameters is the ground for the classification of phe-
nomena. The assumption that a single physical continuum can be sufficient
for the characterization of a domain of qualia is also adopted by this thesis, in
particular, in the representation of memory information (see also chapter 6).
Qualia arising through learning characterize human knowledge representation
possibly in all domains.
A potential property closely related to selective attention could also be pos-
sessed by ‘physical’ phenomena. For example, in the sample interaction between
a stone and a light ray the air around the stone is not involved. That in our
experience of this phenomenon the light ray is interacting only with the stone
but not with the air, is a consequence of the physical properties of these entities:
from our point of view, stone and air cannot ‘combine’. Following this line of
thinking, the potential of an entity for an interaction with other entities can be
identified as a kind of ‘knowledge’ underlying brute reactions.
4.3 The process model of perception
The concept of qualia first appears in the definition of a model of perception as
a process. This section is an attempt to give a full account of the interpretation
moments of that process (see also fig. 4.1).
Earlier it has been assumed that the input of perception is defined by the
collection of a and b qualia (see sect. 3.1). In the initial sign interaction, sorting,
the input qualia are represented type-wise. The fact that the two types of
qualia are related to each other in the ‘primordial soup’ is acknowledged in the
representation of the signs of sorting, by making use of subscripts. Thus, ‘a-type
qualia occurring in the presence of b-type ones’ are denoted by ab .
In the subsequent interpretation moment, the interaction between the sorted
qualia, ab and ba , is represented as an abstraction of the input phenomenon.
By taking the relative difference of ab and ba , thus removing the reference of
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acomplementation
predication
abstraction
sorting
b
− −
a+a’, b+b’
(b,b’)(a,a’)
a*a’, b*b’
a’,b’
ba
ba
a b
Figure 4.1: The signs generated by perception, as a process
the b-type qualia from ab , and the reference of the a-type qualia from ba , the
input is represented as an abstract state (a ), and abstract effect (b ).
According to the current model, memory information is interpreted as (mem-
orized) state and effect qualia, that are dual by definition. As mentioned earlier,
memory response signs arise due to the two types of input qualia separately trig-
gering memory. This defines the context of the observation ([C]) as a pair of
interrelated collections of state and effect qualia (a’ ,b’ ). The interaction between
the abstract input signs (a and b ) and the context ([C]) (complementation) is
interpreted as the actual meaning of the input state and input effect, denoted
by (a,a’ ) and (b,b’ ), respectively. These two signs, finally, are used for the gen-
eration of the final sign of perception. By means of predication (interpreted
degenerately, in the logical sense), the signs (a,a’ ) and (b,b’ ) are merged into a
single sign, representing the relation between the input qualia and the memory
response signs identified as ‘known’ (‘∗’) or ‘not-known’ (‘+’), by the expres-
sions: a∗a’ , a+a’ , b∗b’ , b+b’ . Notice that the information, whether a memory
sign is ‘known’ or ‘not-known’ (or, alternatively, focused or complementary)
was already present in the memory response. However, at that stage it was not
recognized as meaningful.
As earlier mentioned, memory information necessarily partakes in all obser-
vations, therefore memory qualia could already be included in the representation
of the input, as a ‘primordial soup’. For explanatory purposes and for the sake
of consistency with the previous chapter this possibility is omitted in fig. 4.1.
4.3.1 The completeness of representation
In sect. 3.4 it has been shown that the interpretation moments of the processing
schema may be related to Peirce’s signs as meaning aspects. On the basis of
the properties of signification Peirce maintained that his nonadic classification
of signs is complete. The aim of this section is to prove that this completeness
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property of the Peircean signs is also shared by the interpretation moments of
the processing schema of cognitive activity.
Not all signs recognized by perception are independent. Those that are
not independent cannot interact and cannot contribute to the generation of
a meaningful interpretation of the input qualia. Sample signs that are not
dual, are: a and ab , as well as a and ba , due to their shared qualia and
shared references to qualia, respectively; a and b , by virtue of their common
complementary qualia (a,a’ ) and a , as well as (a,a’ ) and a’ , due to their shared
references; (a,a’ ) and b , as (a,a’ ) is not independent from a , which in turn is not
independent from b . Other signs that are not independent, are the symmetrical
pairs of those mentioned above.
This analysis indicates that the process model of perception considers all
possible interactions between the input qualia, as well as their representations,
reinforcing the earlier hypothesis of this thesis about the completeness of cog-
nitive activity as a process. Of course, a similar analysis could also be given for
the process of cognition (see sect. 3.2).
4.3.2 The two types of input–memory relations
The two types of relations between input and memory, in the sense of agreement
(‘∗’) and possibility (‘+’), arise from the same input trigger. This is acknowl-
edged in the current model, by assuming that the two relations contain a shared
common meaning. An illustrative example is the input quale stone,1 and the
corresponding memory signs, stone (in the sense of agreement) and something-
one-can-smash-with (in the sense of possibility). The two meanings are obviously
related, as something-one-can-smash-with includes the meaning of a stone. The
relation does not hold the other way around, since the interpretation of the
input as ‘known’ can only represent qualia that are related to the input stim-
ulus in the sense of agreement. The ‘known’ meaning of an entity can only be
used for the representation of its meaning as ‘not-known’ through degenerate
interpretation (this point will be explained in sect. 4.4).
Although the above containment relation between the two types of inter-
pretations of an entity might be obvious for a human interpreter, its imple-
mentation by a computer may put a great burden on the encoding of qualia
as formal entities. Nevertheless, optimal encoding is theoretically possible due
to the finiteness of the set of input and memory qualia at every stage of in-
terpretation. The above mentioned containment relation between the signs of
1Such as the graphical representation of a stone (see fig. 2.1).
59
ss’
Figure 4.2: Sample degenerate representation
perception may be justified by means of a logical analysis of their expressions,
a∗a’ and a+a’ . Conform the meaning of a ‘naive’ logical ‘or’ (‘+’), a+a’ can be
interpreted as a, a’ , or a·a’ (short for a-and-a’ ). The interesting term is a·a’ ,
degenerately representing the ‘known’ meaning of a∗a’ as a possibility. The
other way around, the degenerate representation of a∗a’ , as a or a’ , trivially
contains the meaning of a and a’ , as a ‘constituent’.
4.4 Degenerate representation
This section is an account of the potential of the proposed model of cognitive
activity for a degenerate representation of its interpretation moments. From
the dependency relation between the constituents of a sign interaction, and the
sign representing the interaction as a whole, one may derive an induced ordering
relation on signs (‘<’). This relation can be used for a definition of degenerate
representation, as follows. For two signs, s, and s’, s is degenerately represented
by s’, if s’<s (see fig. 4.2).
The possibility of a degenerate representation of a sign will be extensively
used in the model of ‘naive’ or natural language (see chapter 5), but it also plays
an important role in the representation of nested phenomena. In that case, the
proposition sign (argument sign) of a nested phenomenon is represented as a
quale in the recognition of the nesting phenomenon. This may be illustrated
with the following example. Assume, the observed phenomenon is ‘crossing the
road’ (by some person). Also assume that during this act of crossing the road,
suddenly a car appears, raises a lot of dust, and disappears. This complex
phenomenon may be recognized, by interpreting the ‘appearing car’ as a nested
phenomenon, and by representing its final sign as a single quale (which itself
has a complex meaning), e.g. the ‘presence of dangerous traffic’. That quale,
together with the other qualia of the nesting phenomenon (‘crossing the road’)
could then be recognized, for example, as: ‘crossing the road in the presence of
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(input) (trigger) (memory) (representation)
s1 s1 →
← s2
s3 (a)
s4 (a’ )
s1 s1\s4 →
← s2
s3 (b)
s4 (b’ )
s1 s1\s4 → . . . . . .
Figure 4.3: The generation of input signs of cognitive processing. The input
is sampled in s1. This value is used as a trigger, generating memory response
represented by s2. The intersection and the union of s1 and s2 are stored in s3
and s4, respectively. s3 is representing the input, as a state. By comparing s4
with the new value of s1 (s1\s4), a change in the input can be discovered. If
there is a change (that is, s1\s4 is not the emptyset), it can be recognized by
means of an analogous procedure, as an effect.
dangerous traffic’, or simply, ‘carefully crossing the road’.
4.4.1 A possible mechanism underlying perception
Why perception as a process generates precisely four representations of the
input? The senses and the brain, that are basically independent, are linked
by means of bio-electric signals. This continuous stream of information of the
senses in principle can be blocked by the brain allowing it to work ‘stand-alone’,
without taking in additional sensory input, but this type of operation shall be
left out of consideration. In this section, it will be assumed that the sensory
signal is the input processed by the brain. A change occurring in that signal can
be detected by means of a mechanism that shows similarity with the perception
of apparent motion phenomena, mentioned earlier. An important element of
this analogy is that information processing by the brain too is based on sub-
sequent samples of qualia (cf. snapshots), that are analyzed and manipulated
individually.
In the first step (see fig. 4.3), the actual value of the sensory input is sampled
by the brain in a percept. According to the current model, the value of the
neurons of the corresponding working area, representing its state, is used by
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the brain as a trigger, in order to generate a memory response. At the moment
that the returned information arrives in the working area, there are two samples
available: one representing the input qualia (s1), and another representing the
memory response (s2). By comparing them, the brain is able to determine the
values that are present in both samples, and represent them in a third snapshot
(s3) for later use. The ‘intersection’ of the input stimulus and the memory
response qualia, generates a stationary view of the observed phenomenon. The
common elements occurring in the two samples represent an agreement relation
between the input and the memory qualia that are in the focus, or ‘known’ by
the brain.
But the input, as well as the memory response may also contain qualia that
are not in the focus. I assume that, inn order to avoid any loss of information,
the brain makes a fourth snapshot (s4), containing all qualia that are present
in the input and in the memory response. This completes the recognition of the
input as a state.
If the sensory input signal is not blocked by the brain, the value of the
input stimulus may change (its earlier value was represented by s1), before the
information returns to the working area. This explains the necessity for the
generation of s4. This sample, that contains information about the input, and
the memory response qualia of the previous sampling moment, is used now for
the detection of the input change (by sampling the current value of the input
stimulus, the previous value of s1 disappears).2
If there is no change in the input, the brain may ‘know’ that the input refers
to a stationary phenomenon. But, if the qualities represented by s1 and s4 differ,
the observed phenomenon must be a dynamical one. Since a difference can be
important, it has to be interpreted by the brain. This is realized by means
of making a second comparison. The common part of the input trigger and
the responding memory qualia is used now as a representation of the type and
measure of the change of the observed input state. Again, the brain generates
the ‘union’ of the input and the memory samples, representing all qualia involved
in the change, as a possible co-occurrence.
In sum, the brain samples the sensory input signal in a percept, and links
it with the corresponding memory information. Since the sensory input is a
continuous stream, but retrieval of information from memory may not be in-
stantaneous, the previous and the current values of the input stimulus may not
match. In that case, the difference between the two values can be interpreted as
2It is assumed that the representation of the input and the memory qualia is such that a
separate identification of the two types of signs is possible. For example, their representations
make use of different frequency and intensity values.
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an effect, generating a ‘next’ state. This difference, in relation to the previous
sample, is underlying the meaning of a change, as well as its representation as
knowledge, by the brain.
The samples generated by the process of perception are depicted in fig. 4.3
(the symbol, ‘\’, stands for relative difference). As a more convenient repre-
sentation for the different instances of s3 and s4, expressive labels have been
introduced: a, a’ , b, b’ . From the logical point of view, the comparison of per-
cepts involves the dual operators intersection and relative difference, which are
also the basic operators involved in the interpretation of the process of sign
recognition as a ‘naive’ logic. The comparison of s1 with s4 is the key to a re-
cursive analysis of input information, realizing the ‘goal’ of cognitive processing.
This can be summarized as follows: As long as there is a change in the sensory
context, sign processing may not terminate.
This closes the refined definition of the process model of perception. In the
rest of this chapter a complete elaboration of the example introduced in the
previous chapter will be given. Preceding the example, ‘naive’ and Boolean
logic are briefly compared.
4.5 Naive vs. Boolean logic
Although the model of logical signs introduced in sect. 3.3 contains all Boolean
relations on two variables, it represents those concepts only in a ‘naive’ logi-
cal sense. Boolean logic differs from ‘naive’ logic in three aspects, which are
the following. The first is the uniform representation of the collections of dif-
ferent types of qualia as a universe, and state and effect as logical variables.
The second is the interpretation of the logical operations, as operations of sets
(Boolean logic), not as operations on collections (‘naive’ logic). The third is the
non-synonymous interpretation of cognitively synonymous expressions, such as
A∗¬B and ¬A∗B.
Besides these, there are also some technical differences between the two
systems. One of them is the potential of Boolean logic for the combination of
variables, as well as of logical operations, in arbitrary order. This is opposed to
the limitations of ‘naive’ logic (which is a procedure), specifying that a relation
may only be established between two variables at a time, and that the order of
the operations is dictated by the order of the sign interactions, in the processing
schema. Another difference is the interpretation of true/false as a representation
of the status of cognitive processing (‘naive’ logic) or as a constant (Boolean
logic).
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The results of this research indicate that ‘naive’ logic has a crucial role in
the interpretation of natural language (see sect. 5), and it is suggested that it
may have a similar important function in all knowledge representations that are
‘close’ to perception, and, therefore, are natural or ‘naive’ too.
4.6 A complete example
This section contains a full account of sign recognition as a process. To this end,
the example of ‘smoke-as-danger’ introduced in sect. 3.5.1 is revisited and the
various interpretation moments of its recognition process are elaborated step by
step.
In the example below the existence of the following input and memory qualia
are assumed. Memory response qualia that are in the focus are underlined;
complementary sensory input qualia are omitted. In this example too, boldface
and Sans Serif symbols are used for denoting input qualia and memory signs,
respectively; slanted symbols are used for indicating the signs generated by the
recognition process.
a = smoke, roof; a’= smoke, roof;
b = rising-air, burning; b’= thermal, danger;
In other words, the qualia of the dark cloud of smoke (smoke) above the roof
(roof) are identified as smoke and possibly also as roof, and the suddenly observed
qualia of the cloud rising upward (rising-air) and those of the burning fire on
the roof (burning) as danger and possibly also as thermal.
A major problem with phenomena such as smoke is due to the difficulty
with an adequate specification of their combinatory properties. That is, which
entities may co-occur with which other entities, in our experience. Although
this can be a serious problem for a computational interpretation, it may not
be a problem for the human interpreter, who is almost certainly familiar with
the properties of this and similar phenomena through experience. The analysis
below capitalizes on this knowledge of the reader. In the presentation of the
example the various interpretation moments can also be referred to by means
of their logical expressions. Comments are preceded by a ‘%’ sign.
4.6.1 Perception
Perception, as a process, begins with the representation acts sorting and ab-
straction, which are defined as follows. An overview of the signs generated the
perception process is given in fig. 4.4.
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(smoke,           ), (roof,        )        smoke             roof (rising−air,             ),(burning,            )                   thermal                  danger
rising−air,burning{smoke,roof},{thermal,danger}
[smoke roof rising−air burning]
smoke,roof
          smoke
           roof 
           burningb*b’=               *danger =
           rising−air
a+a’=         +roof =
b+b’=                 +thermal =
a*a’=           *smoke =
roof−form−as−a−possible−for−roof
burning−as−danger
thermal−as−a−possible−for−rising−air
smoke−as−smoke
[smoke,roof] [rising−air,burning]
Figure 4.4: The signs generated by the process of perception
Sorting
ab = smoke, roof % in the presence of rising-air and burning
ba = rising-air, burning % co-occrring with smoke and roof
Abstraction
a = smoke, roof; % independently from the input effect
b = rising-air, burning; % independently from the input state
Next, the abstract signs above are interpreted in context (complementation) and
the resulting representations are merged in a single sign (predication). In the
first operation, the abstract meaning of the input qualia is completed with the
prototypical meaning of the memory signs. The abstract meaning of smoke (a )
is complemented with anything ‘smoke-like’ (a’ ), which may include the steam
of a locomotive or even a picture of smoke. In the current example it is as-
sumed that smoke is ‘known’ as smoke, and roof (that is not in the focus of
the brain/mind) is recognized as some roof-like form, indicating that it is ‘not-
known’ as a roof. Similarly, burning is completed with danger (‘known’), and
rising-air is completed with thermal (‘not-known’). It should be mentioned that
a single input quale can very well trigger memory responses both in the sense of
agreement and in the sense of possibility. For instance, in another phenomenon,
smoke could be associated with smoke (‘known’) and with roof (‘not-known’).
Such a possibility is not considered in the current example.
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Complementation
(a,a’ ) = ({smoke,smoke}), ({roof,roof});
(b,b’ ) = ({rising-air,thermal}), ({burning,danger});
Predication
a∗a’ = smoke∗smoke; % smoke-as-smoke
a+a’ = roof+roof; % roof-as-a-possible-for-roof
b∗b’ = burning∗danger; % burning-as-danger
b+b’ = rising-air+thermal; % thermal-as-a-possible-for-rising-air
4.6.2 Cognition
In cognition as a process the context is represented by ¬A+¬B and ¬A∗¬B,
indicating that the context signs arise from the complementary qualia, by means
of an analogous procedure of ‘sorting’. This conceptually renders ¬A and ¬B
the meaning of the qualia of a complementary phenomenon, and interaction.
Interpretation begins with a re-presentation of the final signs of perception as
the input qualia of cognition. An overview of the signs generated by the process
of cognition may be found in fig. 4.5.
A = a∗a’= smoke∗smoke= smoke
¬A = a+a’= roof+roof= roof-like-form
B = b∗b’= burning∗danger= burning-as-danger
¬B = b+b’= rising-air+thermal= rising-hot-air
Sorting
A+B = smoke + burning-as-danger;
% there is smoke and some dangerous burning
A∗B = smoke ∗ burning-as-danger;
% smoke appears with some dangerous burning
¬A+¬B = roof-like-form+ rising-hot-air;
% there is a roof-like thing and rising hot air in the background
¬A∗¬B = roof-like-form∗ rising-hot-air;
% hot air is rising above the roof, in the background
At this stage, the input may be ‘known’ as a collection of qualia that are con-
stituents, and as a co-occurrence event of those qualia, that is happening now.
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However, it is not known yet that smoke is related to ‘burning’ hence also to
‘danger’ and, therefore, the fire department should be called. That interpreta-
tion of the input may come later.
Abstraction
A∗¬B = smoke ∗ rising-hot-air;
% smoke in relation to any rising-like motion,
% e.g. smoke may rise, whirl, etc.
¬A∗B = roof-like-form∗ burning-as-danger;
% dangerous burning, in relation to anything roof-like,
% e.g. balks, piles, etc. can burn
The synonymous representation of the above signs may be summarized as the
representation of the input as ‘something smoke or burning’: A∗¬B, ¬A∗B (see
also sect. 3.3). The other result of the abstraction operation is the following.
A∗¬B+¬A∗B =
smoke ∗ rising-hot-air + roof-like-form∗ burning-as-danger
% the possible co-occurrence of the rising smoke and burning roof, as an
% expression of the rule-like meaning: ‘where smoke is, there is burning’
Here, smoke indicates the smoke that is ‘rising as hot air’, and ‘burning as danger’
refers to the ‘dangerous burning of the roof’. The observed phenomenon can be
viewed in two different ways, but it is their compatibility that is recognized in
this interpretation of the input as an abstract event: the co-occurrence of smoke
and burning, in a rule-like sense.
Complementation
The meaning of the input as an actual existent is obtained from its abstract
sign, through complementation by the context. The context signs are:
¬A∗¬B = roof-like-form ∗ rising-hot-air,
¬A+¬B = roof-like-form + rising-hot-air;
A synonymous interpretation of these signs is ‘rising hot air above the roof’.
The meaning of the input, as an actual constituent, is signified, respectively,
by a roof-like ‘thing’ in the background (¬A) and the burning itself (B) and,
by the smoke (A) and the rising hot air in the background of the observation
(¬B).
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above the roof
dangerous burning
where smoke is
there is burning
dangerous smoke due to 
{smoke burning−as−danger
rising−hot−air roof}
smoke and some dangerous 
burning are there
smoke appears with
rising hot air 
the smoke is rising
above the burning roof a burning roof
Fire!
something smoke
or burning
Figure 4.5: The signs generated by the four stages of the process of cognition
¬A+B = roof-like-form + burning-as-danger,
% this dangerous burning on the roof
A+¬B = smoke + rising-hot-air;
% this rising smoke
A synonymous interpretation of the above two signs is ‘smoke is rising above the
burning roof’. Another representation of the input, this time, as a characteristic
or conventional property, is defined as follows.
A∗B+¬A∗¬B =
smoke ∗ burning-as-danger + roof-like-form ∗ rising-hot-air
% dangerous smoke due to burning like hot air rising above the roof
% or, dangerous smoking due to a burning roof
This property, the association of smoke with danger, and rising hot air with
its location on the roof, applies to the input, signified as an actual existent.
That relation can be important, either because we are familiar with its meaning
(we may know what could be an adequate reaction on this input), or because
something or somebody draws our attention to it, and we learn its importance
now.
Finally, by combining the two signs, by means of predication, the sign recog-
nition process generates the representation of the entire input, as a hypothesis:
A is B = smoke IS burning-as-danger
% . . . smoke IS . . . danger
An alternative representation of this proposition may be derived by means of
reasoning. For example, from ‘smoke IS danger’, one may deduce that it is fire
that smoke signifies as danger. By assuming the existence of lexical information
about fire, for example, that its meaning contains the meaning of danger (as
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the effect meaning of danger implies its interpretation as a state), the above
representation of the input can be paraphrased as: ‘Fire!’
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Part II
Language as knowledge
71

This part is a first attempt to illustrate that the theory of this thesis could
meet the requirements set out for knowledge representation earlier in this book.
A formal proof may not be possible as knowledge is not some ‘thing’ that can
be captured in formal rules. What can be done is test whether the theory
can be applied to modeling phenomena, in different domains of knowledge. An
application shall be called potentially adequate, if the concepts suggested by the
model of a domain form a subset of the ‘naive’ or natural concepts of the same
domain, known from experience. Although testing can be weaker than a formal
proof, the introduction of potentially adequate models for some new domains
may increase the confidence in the theory presented, that it could be used for
the representation of knowledge in any domain.
As part of this program, the model of cognitive activity will be applied to
natural language processing. To this end, a model for the ‘naive’ syntactic and
morpho-syntactic domains of symbols will be elaborated. A formal specification
of the syntactic model introduced in this chapter, as well as a proof that its
complexity is linear in the number of input symbols and operations on them
may be found in (Sarbo & Farkas, 2002). The important result of this part
is the definition of a sequential version of the processing schema, enabling the
recognition of complex phenomena as signs.
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Chapter 5
Language as a process
Natural language consists of symbols that can be considered as signs (Squire et
al., 1993), (Squire, 1992), (Debrock et al., 1999), (Jakobson, 1980). What makes
language symbols especially interesting is that their interactions can be inter-
preted as relations between lexically defined combinatory properties. Because
natural language appears ‘naturally’ in our experience, by defining a model for
language we also make an attempt to answer the question: What is ‘natural’ in
natural language?
A model for natural language as a process requires a representation of pri-
mary language symbols as input qualia. The lexical definition of qualia is an
expression of their combinatory properties, representing ‘naive’ language rules
be they of syntactic, semantic or of any other kind.1 As a full scale definition
of those properties is beyond the scope of this work, a systematic comparison
with traditional language modeling is omitted.
The focus of this chapter is on the introduction of a model for ‘naive’ syn-
tactic and morpho-syntactic symbols. The language of illustration is English.
The word classes used in the definitions are restricted to the major types such
as verbs, nouns, adjectives and adverbs.
Natural language processing is sequential, implicating that language signs
are typically complex, containing nested signs recursively. The definition of a
model for language processing requires that the processing schema introduced
in sect. 2.3 is equipped with facilities enabling the recognition of a series of
phenomena as a single phenomenon. In general, language symbols may be
1A preliminary version of a lexicon for syntactic symbols can be found in the Appendix.
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interpreted in two different ways: as independent entities contributing to the
sign of an encompassing language phenomenon, for example, the sentence; or,
as qualia underlying that phenomenon, which is interpreted as a sign. This
chapter is concerned with the the first interpretation which is also the more
natural one, as in our experience of language, subsequent input symbols may
appear so fast that an interpretation of their full individual meaning cannot
be realized, only a recognition of their meaning with respect to the input as a
whole. This implies that in the interpretation of the event(s) triggered by the
next input symbol, proto-signs (see sect. 3.4) of earlier input symbols may have
to be considered. The other interpretation of language symbols is postponed
until chapter 9, introducing a method for text summarization.
In conformity with previous chapters, in the examples, lexically defined lan-
guage symbols (memory signs), and symbols generated by the recognition pro-
cess are presented in Sans Serif and slanted fonts, respectively.
5.1 Towards a model of language signs
The processing schema can be easily adapted to the domain of language sym-
bols. The input qualia may be defined by the primary morpho-syntactic entities
and words (morpho-syntactically finished symbols), in a morpho-syntactic and a
syntactic analysis, respectively. In the model of cognitive activity (see sect. 2.3),
earlier it has been assumed that the entire input is presented as a single collec-
tion of qualia (‘primordial soup’), derived from previous and current percepts in
a comparison operation. In the proposed language model, this ‘feature’ of the
input qualia is implemented, by means of interpreting the interactions between
the existing previous symbols, representing the state of the interpreting system
(cf. Ss, in sect. 3.4.2), and the appearing next symbols, as effects. In these in-
teractions, the appearing new symbol is represented as a collection of potential
combinatory properties or relational needs. Although the symbol interactions
are always between the interpreting system (state) and the appearing next sym-
bol (effect), defining the ‘primordial soup’, it is the encompassing phenomenon,
for example, the sentence, from the point of view of which those symbol inter-
actions are interpreted.
Similarly to the model of cognitive activity, the model of language introduced
in this chapter has two stages: perception, i.e. the linking of the input qualia
with memory information (lexical analysis); cognition, i.e. the establishing of a
relation between lexically analyzed symbols (syntactic/morpho-syntactic pars-
ing). Roughly, in a syntactic phenomenon, nominals, appearing as a state,
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subject predicate
verb phrasenoun phrase modifier,
complement
John, Mary likes
John likesMary
John likes Mary
word
nominal non−nominal
John, likes, Mary
sentence John likes Mary
Figure 5.1: A classification of basic syntactic concepts (left), and the concepts
of the sample utterance ‘John likes Mary’ (right)
undergo effects due to non-nominals. An example are the syntactic modifica-
tion and predication of nouns, by means of adjectives and verbs, respectively.
Which existing symbols (proto-signs) are transitively effected by the appear-
ing next symbol, that is, how the state of the interpreting system is eventually
changed, can be derived by interpreting the sequence of symbol interactions
triggered by the next symbol. Such a sequence of events is called an evaluation
step, in the language model of this chapter.
Due to its minor importance for the goals of this thesis, a definition of the
perception process (lexical analysis) is omitted; perceived language symbols are
represented by their lexical definitions. The final signs of perception, represent-
ing the input symbols of cognitive analysis are taken for granted.
In the model of English syntactic symbols it will be assumed that the pri-
mary nominal entities are nouns, and the primary non-nominal symbols are
verbs, adjectives, adverbs and certain prepositional phrases.2 A classification of
the basic syntactic concepts and their dependencies are depicted in fig. 5.1 (on
the left-hand side). The reader may compare the syntactic meaning of these
concepts with the corresponding meaning aspects displayed in fig. 3.5. For ex-
ample, words, nominals and noun phrases have the meaning aspect of a syntactic
quality, a constituent and a qualitative possibility (for undergoing a syntactic
modification), respectively. On the right-hand side of fig. 5.1, the reader may
find an analogous classification of the meaningful syntactic entities and relations
of the utterance: ‘John likes Mary’.
In the processing schema, sorting corresponds to the classification of the
input symbols as a nominal ([q1]) and non-nominal entity ([q2]). Which input
symbol is in the focus, and which one is only complementary can be derived
from the symbol’s type, or from the interactions the symbol may potentially
2Non-nominal entities are interpreted as a representation of an appearing new property
occurring as an effect.
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partake in (relational need). Adjectives and adverbs are taken as symbols capa-
ble of representing the context of a language phenomenon ([C]). The other sign
interactions of the process model of cognition may be characterized as follows.
Abstraction corresponds to the identification of nominals and non-nominals as
noun phrases (q1) and verb phrases (q2), but also as modifiers and comple-
ments ([C]); complementation to syntactic modification ((q1,C)) and syntactic
complementation ((q2,C)); predication to syntactic predication ((q1,C)–(q2,C)).
5.1.1 Sequential processing
Different from the earlier example of smoke-and-fire (see sect. 3.5.1), the sen-
tence ‘John likes Mary’ (in short ‘JlM’) contains more than two qualia. However,
those qualia are distinguished by the language model in two interrelated col-
lections, [JM] and [l]: ‘[l] happens to [JM]’. The linguistic meaning of this phe-
nomenon is clearly more refined. The relation between l and J is different from
the one between l and M. This difference is signified, in English, by the order of
appearance of the input symbols. That ordering, together with the combinatory
properties of the input symbols are finally recognized by the language user as
a syntactically meaningful phenomenon. On ‘surface level’, the input symbols
appear one after the other. Because each symbol may only contribute to the
meaning of the entire sequence (the sentence) as a proto-sign, the processing
schema is generalized such that the recognition of individual input entities may
overlap, that is, their events may be merged in a single process. Assuming the
input is a continuous stream of symbols, the recognition of subsequent utter-
ances may overlap as well.
This line of thinking has led us to the definition of a sequential version of the
process model of syntactic sign recognition (Sarbo & Farkas, 2002), in which the
meaning of the input symbols is defined in terms of the nine Peircean aspects
introduced in the previous part (in sect. 3.4).3 In the sample sentence above (see
fig. 5.1 and also fig. 5.2), the input symbols appear one after the other, and J is
recognized as a qualisign. As the input symbols are in principle independent and
partake in the phenomenon presented by the entire sentence, the appearance
of the next symbol, l, forces a re-evaluation of the earlier interpretation of J
(qualisign).4 A possible solution is the re-presentation of J as a constituent of
the entire input (icon), in conformity with the principle of economy, that a less
3Please note that the Peircean signs are only used as pointers to the status of language
symbols in the process of recognition.
4Because J and l are independent, they cannot be represented as synonymous signs.
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Figure 5.2: The syntactic analysis of ‘John likes Mary’
developed representation of a phenomenon has to be generated before a more
developed one.
The appearance of M has similar consequences on the representation of l as
a qualisign and, transitively so, on the representation of J as an icon. The latter
is a consequence of the earlier assumption that the signs obtained by a sorting
operation (see sect. 2.3) are incompatible and cannot generate a new symbol
by means of binding, except in the negative sense, through the interpretation
of their relative difference (cf. abstraction operation). For this reason, J has to
be re-presented again, but this time as an abstract representation of the input
(rheme). The subsequently appearing dot symbol (the role of dot symbols will
be explained later) trigger M (icon) to be represented as an index sign. This is
possible due to the presence of l, anticipating M as a possible for a complement.
The remaining representation events leading to a correct analysis are depicted
in fig. 5.2.
The sequential nature of the input introduces two new cases of symbol in-
teraction. The first is accumulation, in which signs having identical meaning
aspects are merged in a single sign (this includes the merging of their combi-
natory properties).5 The second is coercion, which is a ‘pseudo’ interaction,
that is, an interaction that does not actually happen. What does happen in a
coercion is that an existing sign (s) is forced to be re-presented by, or ‘coerced
to’ a sign having a more developed meaning aspect. Formally, s is re-presented
by s′, which is an immediate successor of s in the ‘<’ ordering of signs. A co-
ercion may occur, if s and some other symbol, which are about to interact, are
not compatible for a syntactic binding. After a coercion, the symbolic repre-
sentations of s and s′ are identical. Accumulation and coercion are degenerate
versions of a genuine binding, respectively, in the first and the second degree.
The specification of qualia with respect to other qualia which they are com-
plementing corresponds to syntactic modification and complementation, indi-
cating that the two types of phenomena can be treated uniformly in the model
5As all signs generated by the process model are proto-signs, except the final sentence sign
(argument), in the rest of this thesis the ‘proto’ prefix can be omitted.
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s,e s,e
s,e
[s e]
s,es,e
(s,e)
s,es,e
Figure 5.3: The constituents of syntactic bindings, functioning as a state (s)
or an effect (e). In the qualisign and argument positions this potential of a
language symbol is represented as a possibility, actualized by the current, and
the encompassing recognition process, respectively. Syntactic symbols as inter-
pretants of a binding symbol interaction are not indicated.
proposed (Aarts & Aarts, 1982). Lexical definitions typically specify the com-
binatory potential of a symbol, from the point of view of the symbol itself. For
example, verb complements are traditionally specified in the verb’s entry. From
the semiotic point of view, however, it is the complement that points to the verb
and defines its (more) specific meaning.
5.1.2 Relational needs
The three types of constituents of a syntactic sign interaction or binding: (1)
a quality which is a potential existence, (2) a state which appears by virtue
of an effect, and (3) an effect which implicates the existence of a state (see
sect. 3.5, but also fig. 5.3), underlies their interpretation as the three types of
syntactic relational needs: (1) neutral, (2) passive, and (3) active, in short,
n-need, p-need and a-need; an n-need is a substitute for ‘no relational need’.
The goal of ‘naive’ syntactic language processing is the establishing of syntactic
well-formedness (see sect. 3.2). This is formally interpreted by requiring that the
final representation of the (entire) input does not have any unsatisfied relational
needs; it must be neutral, syntactically. The different types of binding can be
characterized, from this point of view, as follows. A coercion satisfies an n-
need, conceptually; in an accumulation, two relational needs of the same type
are merged in a single need; a (genuine) binding satisfies a pair of a- and p-needs.
A relation which is fulfilled is conceptually removed.
A language symbol is formally defined as a set, consisting of references to
types of interactions the symbol may partake in as a constituent. Such a set,
defining a symbol’s formal relational potential, is a list of relational properties
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labeled by a sign class (a class name is abbreviated by a four-letter name). For
example, the relational potential of likes can be defined as the set: {nsins , plegi ,
alegi , asymb}, indicating that likes can be modified (plegi), can take a complement
(alegi) and can predicate the subject of the sentence (asymb).
A language symbol is called an A-type sign, if its relational potential only
consists of p- and n-needs; otherwise it is called a B-type sign. A-type symbols
represent a ‘thing’, B-type symbols refer to an ‘event’.
5.1.3 Towards a formal model
Fig. 5.4 summarizes the relational potential of syntactic symbols for the types
of word classes, according to the model of this chapter. The input qualia,
represented as qualisigns, are defined as follows:
A= noun
B= verb, adjective, adverb, prep(-compl)
where ‘compl’ can be a noun, verb, adjective or adverb. A precise definition
of ‘prep-compl’ qualia is postponed until sect. 5.2. In accordance with the
asymmetry between the interpretation of qualia as a state or an effect, lexically
defined a-needs need to be satisfied, whereas p-needs need not. As syntactic
signs almost always have a p-need and n-need (that is, in all sign classes), in
the examples of this chapter the definition of the relational potentials of the
symbols is restricted to the specification of their a-needs. For example, the
above definition of likes reduces to: {legi, symb}.
A ‘dot’ symbol is defined as an A and B type sign, that cannot bind with
any other symbol except its own type. Dot symbols may be used to force the
‘realization’ of pending interactions. The entire input is assumed to be closed
by maximally nine dots.
The relational potential of syntactic symbols can be classified as follows.
A-type symbols can have a relational potential as an (1) icon, (2) rheme or
index, and (3) dicent sign; B-type symbols as a (1) sinsign, (2) legisign or index,
and (3) symbol sign, allowing for a trichotomic specification of the relational
needs of language symbols. A more elaborate analysis of this potential of the
current model is postponed until chapter 6.
The category-related dependency between the different interpretations of a
symbol, as an A-, or a B-type quale, can be used for modeling modification
phenomena such as ‘runs quickly’ (notice that both ‘runs’ and ‘quickly’ are B-type
symbols). In this example, the a-need of quickly (index) satisfies the p-need
of runs (legisign), indicating that in this interaction the effect due to the verb
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(a)verb
(n)noun
(a)adj,adv,
prep−compl
(n)adj,adv,verb,
(a)prep(−compl)(p)noun
prep(−compl)
(a,p)verb
(p)noun
(p)noun
(n)word
(n)sentence
Figure 5.4: The classification of the syntactic symbols used, on the basis of the
relational properties of the types of word classes
run is only considered as a state. Object complementation phenomena, for
example, ‘painted black’ can be modeled analogously (Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech,
& Svartvik, 1985).
5.1.4 Complementary syntactic qualia
The analysis depicted in Fig. 5.2 illustrates how the recognition process may
discover if an input symbol is part of the complementary context. In general,
the potential of an input symbol to function as a context sign follows directly
from the symbol’s relational potential. This is clearly the case when a symbol
has an a-need in the index class. Examples of such symbols are the adjectives,
adverbs, and prepositional phrases. Symbols having a p-need in the index class
have to be treated differently, however. Such symbols can be re-presented as
an index sign for two reasons. First, if there exists a legisign with an a-need
which anticipates the p-need of the symbol in question; second, if any other
interpretation of the symbol in question eventually fails, and such a legisign
arises in a subsequent interpretation event.
An example is the utterance: ‘Mary, John likes’. The initial analysis assuming
Mary (A-type) to be the subject, eventually fails (see fig. 5.5). As a result,
the sign recognition algorithm backtracks6 down to step (b), which is the first
choice-point7 providing another alternative for Mary. Parsing is continued by
coercing Mary to an index sign (see fig. 5.6) based on the potential of this symbol
to function as the syntactic complement of a verb (likes), which appears later.
6Nondeterminism is assumed to be implemented by backtracking (Aho & Ullman, 1972).
7As earlier mentioned, an evaluation step is defined by the set of events triggered by the
appearing (next) input symbol. Such a set of events is represented by a single ‘diamond’.
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Figure 5.5: The ‘naive’ syntactic analysis of ‘Mary, John likes’
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Figure 5.6: The ‘naive’ syntactic analysis of ‘Mary, John likes’ (cont.)
5.1.5 Nesting
Nested phenomena frequently occur in language. In conformity with the earlier
assumption that the input of an observation is defined by a single collection of
qualia (‘primordial soup’), the proposed model of language processing assumes
syntactic phenomena always to be defined by a contiguous segment of input
symbols. Nested phenomena, such as subordinate clauses and complex phrases
are degenerately represented as input qualia in the recognition of the nearest
nesting phenomenon. The recognition of nested phenomena can be implemented
by means of recursion. As in principle any input symbol may start or end a
nested segment, and the number of different types of nested segments is finite,
the potential of language symbols for nesting can be modeled by a finite set
of lexically defined relational needs as usual. Recursive parsing can be applied
to other phenomena as well. Besides embedded clauses, it can be applied to
multiple modification and complementation, amongst others.
5.1.6 Coordination
The above framework of syntactic sign recognition can be successfully applied
to the complex phenomenon of coordination. A description of the kernel of such
an algorithm is as follows. Three phases of coordination are distinguished. In
the first phase, the input symbols preceding the coordinator are analyzed in
the way described above. In the second phase, first, all existing signs are saved
(their relational needs are remembered as ‘traces’). Then, the remaining input
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Figure 5.7: The syntactic analysis of ‘John likes Mary and Kim’ (until the coordi-
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Figure 5.8: Coordination (alternative #1)
is analyzed recursively as a nested sign. In this process, actually generated and
saved signs of corresponding identical classes are coordinated (this may include
the inheritance of syntactic properties). In the last phase, saved signs that are
not coordinated, are restored. Save and restore can be preceded or followed by
the elaboration of a number of pending symbol interactions, respectively (Sarbo
& Farkas, 2004). The number of such interactions is limited by the number of
simultaneously existing proto-signs and by the number of their relational needs,
which both are finite.
The analysis of a sample coordination structure is shown in fig. 5.7-5.9 (saved
signs having the potential for coordination with another sign are indicated by
parenthesized expressions). The analysis depicted in fig. 5.9 assumes that, pre-
ceding coordination, the signs generated by the recognition process displayed in
fig. 5.7 undergo an extra coercion and complementation operation: J is coerced
to the dicent position; the complementation of l by M is represented by lM in
the symbol position. Notice in fig. 5.8 the use of the ‘traced’ a-need due to l
(legisign), in the coercion of K (icon) to a syntactic complement (index). The
sentence John likes Mary and Kim is not ambiguous, but it can be, if it is used for
the utterance John likes Mary and Kim (too). Nesting plays also an important role
in the modeling of subordination phenomena (see sect. 5.4).
5.1.7 Syntactic and logical meaning compared
Syntactic signs can also be characterized from the logical point of view (the
corresponding logical meaning, this time as an operation, is given in parenthe-
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ses). Syntactic icon and sinsign symbols arise through sorting the input symbols
in two types, nominal and non-nominal. The first type exhibits the aspect of
a constituent or some ‘thing’ (or); the second type exhibits the aspect of an
‘event’ that occurs now (and). A syntactic rheme sign may represent the ab-
stract meaning of a noun (cf. lexical meaning), lacking any actual properties.
Those properties refer to qualia that are omitted in the definition of the rheme
(inhibition). A syntactic index sign may be an adjective, or adverb, indicating
a complementary fact or property (negation). A syntactic legisign may refer
to the rule-like abstract event meaning of an (unsaturated) verb, which can
be explained either from the verb’s or from the complement’s point of view
(exclusive-or). A syntactic dicent sign may be a nominal representing the in-
put as an actual existent (syntactic subject), which is intimately related to the
event signified by the predicate (implication). A syntactic symbol sign may be
an expression of the agreement relation between the verb and its complement(s),
representing the input as a characteristic or conventional property (equivalence).
A syntactic argument sign may be a representation of a syntactically well-formed
sentence, arising from a hypothetical inference as a proposition (syllogism). Be-
sides the above analysis, syntactic signs also can be characterized from the point
of view of the realization of their logical meaning. That analysis, which shows
a striking similarity with the model of cognition (see fig. 3.2), is recapitulated
in fig. 5.10. A nominal and a non-nominal entity is indicated by A and B,
respectively.
5.2 Morpho-syntactic signs
A model for ‘naive’ morpho-syntactic symbols can be defined analogously to
the model of ‘naive’ syntactic signs, introduced in sect. 5.1.3. Morpho-syntactic
symbols deserve our attention, because of the earlier assumption in the model of
syntactic symbols that certain prepositional phrases (‘prep-compl’) can function
as syntactic input qualia. The results of this section show that the definition
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~A,~B
[A  B]
Figure 5.10: The logical interpretation of syntactic signs. In virtue of the se-
quential nature of language, syntactic signs may either be a representation of a
state (A) or an effect (B), and this property is inherited by their logical interpre-
tation as well (in the qualisign position this is indicated by [A B]). For example,
the logical expression of a syntactic icon sign is A, degenerately containing the
meaning of A+B.
of other primary syntactic symbols can be sharpened as well. Although the
explanation of the model of ‘naive’ morpho-syntactic symbols below is concise,
this section might also be interesting from another point of view: How the spec-
ification of a complex domain may be developed by means of the nine meaning
aspects used as ‘pigeonholes’.
Syntactic and morpho-syntactic symbols are different. In the syntactic do-
main, well-formed input symbols are the sentences (argument sign), in the
morpho-syntactic domain such entities are the ‘words’. There is a hierarchical
dependency between the two domains: syntactic input sign (qualisign) are de-
fined as morpho-syntactically finished symbols (argument sign). Of course, both
domains have their own types of relational needs. For example, the morpho-
syntactic relational need of a symbol is a representation of the symbol’s potential
in a morpho-syntactic sign interaction.
Morpho-syntactic signs may be characterized as follows. A morpho-syntactic
proposition sign (argument sign) refers to a morpho-syntactically finished sym-
bol. In conformity with the ‘flat’ structure of morpho-syntactic signs arising
from adjacent input symbols by means of ‘gluing’ them together, the proposed
model assumes that morpho-syntactic dicent and symbol signs cannot establish
a binding. This indicates that morpho-syntactic dicent and symbol signs are
in principle finished. However, the two types of signs exhibit different prop-
erties and this is respected by their morpho-syntactic interpretation. Morpho-
syntactic symbol signs such as adjectives have the (syntactic) property, or satisfy
the convention that they must be adjacent to their complement in the input,
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that is, on ‘surface level’. Morpho-syntactic dicent signs, for example, nouns and
verbs do not have this property, indicating that such signs can represent the in-
put as an actually existent , therefore such dicent signs are morpho-syntactically
complete signs.
Morpho-syntactic rheme, index and legisign symbols have the aspect of a
qualitative possibility, connection and rule, respectively. A morpho-syntactic
rheme, that can be a noun or a verb, may function as a possible for a dicent. A
legisign can be a prep(-compl), representing the rule-like meaning of morpho-
logical structures. An index sign, that can be an article or a morpho-syntactic
complement, may connect a rheme with its referential property, and a legisign
with its morpho-syntactic complement.
In conformity with the goal of morpho-syntactic sign recognition, which
is the generation of primary syntactic entities, the above three types of signs
are involved in the generation of syntactic relational needs. For example, the
morpho-syntactic complementation of girl (rheme) by the (index) can be used
for the definition of the syntactic p-need of the girl; the complementation of with
(legisign) by a fork (index) can be used for the generation of the adverb-like
syntactic a-need of with a fork.
Morpho-syntactic icon and sinsign symbols arise through sorting, from in-
put symbols represented as qualisigns. An interaction between an icon and a
sinsign, for example, a verb (icon) and a participle affix (sinsign), respectively,
may generate a morpho-syntactic sign (index or legisign), having adjective-like
syntactic properties. In English, such symbols are typically written as one word.
The classification of the used morpho-syntactic symbols, on the basis of their
lexical relational properties, is displayed in fig. 5.11. This diagram seems to
indicate that morpho-syntactic icon and sinsign symbols have the potential of
establishing a binding, but this is not the case. The proposed model tacitly as-
sumes that such phenomena (affixation) can be recognized by means of nesting ,
recursively. In order to simplify the specification of this ‘feature’ of affixation,
the final symbol interaction (predication) of a nested segment is allowed to
overlap with the first non-degenerate sign interaction event (abstraction) of the
nesting phenomenon. This optimization of the model of morpho-syntactic sign
recognition is illustrated in fig. 5.12.
The relational potential of morpho-syntactic input symbols (qualisigns) are
specified, as follows:
A= noun, verb, adjective, adverb
B= preposition, article, particle, affix
Space symbols are represented as generic A and B symbols, incompatible for
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verb(aux),prep
(a)article,particle, (n)adj,adv
verb
(p)noun,adj,
adv,verb
(a)affix, (n)prep,
article,particle
(n)lexeme
(n)noun,verb (n)adj,adv,prep
(p)noun,
(a)prep
(p)noun,adj,adv
(n)word
Figure 5.11: The classification of morpho-syntactic symbols
‘base’ ‘affix’
Figure 5.12: Overlapping symbol interactions in affixation phenomena
binding, except for accumulation (with the symbol triggering such an inter-
action) and coercion. Space symbols may be used to ‘sweep out’ morpho-
syntactically finished signs. Contrary to syntactic symbols, in the model of
morpho-syntactic signs, the use of recursion is not assumed, except in affixation
phenomena (a consequence of the ‘flat’ structure of such symbols, in English).
The analysis of a sample morpho-syntactic phenomenon: ‘John  like -s  Mary’, is
shown in fig. 5.13 (the analysis of embedded affixation phenomena, as well as the
treatment of accumulated space symbols are omitted). Similarly to the model
of syntactic symbols of this chapter, the recognition processes of subsequent
morpho-syntactically finished symbols may overlap.
J
J
JJ
l −s
J
M
l−s
J
−sll
Figure 5.13: The initial part of the morphological analysis of John like -s Mary
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5.3 Summary and related work
The introduction of a model for natural language processing the previous section
also makes an attempt to answer the initial question of this chapter: What is
‘natural’ in natural language? Following the view taken by (Sarbo et al., 2006),
it is the types of distinctions that can be made cognitively, the organization of
their recognition events in a process, and the appearance or ‘feeling ’ of such a
process as knowledge (the last is beyond the scope of the current model).
The potential semiotic foundation of the approach presented entails the pro-
posed model with the property of robustness. If the parser encounters a yet
unknown language phenomenon, it is only the lexicon, specifying the combina-
tory properties of language symbols, that may have to be adjusted, the parsing
algorithm can be invariantly used (Solso, 1988). Systematic adaptations of the
lexicon can be enabled by a systematic use of trichotomic specifications, that
can be more simple and intelligible than traditional specification using formal
grammars, which are less easily manageable.
The language model of this chapter bears similarity to the dependency based
formalisms of cognitive linguistics such as Word Grammar (Hudson, 1984).
Word Grammar is a branch of Dependency Grammar in that it uses word–word
dependencies as a determinant for linguistic structure. As a result it presents
language as a network of knowledge that links concepts about words, such as
their meaning (e.g. grammatical function) to the form, the word class, etc.
Such grammars do not rely on phrasal categories. But the language model of
this chapter is also remotely related to constituency based approaches, in that
its types of rules define an induced triadic classification of language concepts
which show some analogy to that of X-bar theory (Chomsky, 1975), (Cowper,
1992), (Pollard & Sag, 1994). The three concepts of X-bar theory, which are
denoted by X, X’, and X”, are a representation of a lexical category, a rela-
tion, and a phrase, respectively. In turn, the three categories of X-bar theory
correspond to the operations: sorting, abstraction, and complementation.
A fundamental difference between the above two approaches and the one
presented in this chapter lies in the character of the rules. Contrary to cognitive
linguistics, which aims at incorporating the conceptual categories of language
in rules that are dictated by a formal theory, the rules of our model are derived
from ‘real’ world phenomena, on the basis of an analysis of the properties of
cognitive activity and the processing of signs. The linear complexity of the
model,8 indicates that the proposed representation can be practical.
8This is formally proved by J.J. Sarbo in (Sarbo & Farkas, 2002).
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5.4 Examples
The potential of our model for parsing complex linguistic phenomena is illus-
trated in this section, with non-trivial examples. The analysis of a couple of
more complex utterances taken from actual language use will be presented later,
in chapter 9.
The presentation of an analysis is simplified by introducing a tabular form
for the sign ‘matrix’, in which a column corresponds to a sign aspect, and a row
to re-presentation act(s) due to the application of rules, that are indicated in
last column.9 The following abbreviations are used: input(i), accumulation(a),
coercion(c), binding(b). Degenerate representation is indicated by the subscript
‘d’; accumulated signs are separated by a “/” symbol. Input symbols are written
in boldface; sign classes are abbreviated to a four letter name, as in earlier
examples. The parsing of space and dot symbols, as well as the generation
of the final sign yielded by parsing, is omitted. Also now, the Peircean signs
are only used as pointers, indicating the status of a symbol in the process of
(morpho-)syntactic sign recognition. A lexical definition of the input symbols
used is given ‘on the fly’ (but see also the Appendix).
5.4.1 PP-attachment
The first example is the utterance ‘Mary eats pizza with a fork’. The ’naive’
morpho-syntactic analysis of this input is depicted in fig. 5.14 and table 5.1.
In step 8 (table 5.1), a (index) binds with fork (rheme), thereby complementing
it with the property ‘non-definiteness’; a fork is represented degenerately, as an
index sign. That sign is used, in turn, as a context symbol, in the complementa-
tion sign interaction with the preposition with (legisign). This is represented by
the expression, with a fork (symbol), which is a prep-complement sign having po-
tential adjective-, or adverb-like syntactic properties. The final signs obtained
by the morpho-syntactic analysis are: (Mary)(eats)(pizza)(with a fork), where
an item enclosed in parentheses indicates a morpho-syntactically complete sign
(argument).
Preceding a syntactic analysis, the syntactic relational needs of the morpho-
syntactically finished symbols are defined by a perception process (cf. lexical
analysis).
9The elements of row i (i>0) are either a representation of the current input symbol, or,
of elements introduced in row i−1. The corresponding recognition events are indicated in the
last column of row i.
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(M) (e−s)
p−s
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Figure 5.14: The morpho-syntactic analysis of ‘Mary eat -s pizza with a fork’ yield-
ing (Mary)(eats)(pizza)(with a fork)
eats= {legi , symb}
with a fork= {indx}
The ‘naive’ syntactic analysis of the current example is displayed in table 5.2
(and fig. 5.14), and in table 5.3 (in the second table only those entities are
indicated that are different from the first analysis).
w
ww
M e p
MM
M e p
M p e
M M e−p−w
w
e−p e−pM
af
afaf
af
af
Figure 5.15: The syntactic analysis of ‘Mary eats pizza with a fork’ (alternative
#1) yielding Mary eats pizza-with-a-fork
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nr. qual icon sins rhme indx legi dcnt symb rule
0 Mary(M) i
1 eat(e) M i, c
2 -s e M i, c, c
3 pizza(p) e -s M i, c
4 with(w) p e-s M i, c, b, c
5 a(a) w p e-s i, c, c, c
6 fork(f) a p w e-s i, c, c
7 f a w p c, c, c, c
8 f a w p bd
9 a-f w p b, c
10 w-a-f c
Table 5.1: A tabular representation of the morpho-syntactic analysis of ‘Mary
eat -s pizza with a fork’ displayed in fig. 5.14
nr. qual icon sins rhme indx legi dcnt symb rule
0 Mary(M) i
1 eats(e) M i, c
2 pizza(p) e M i, c, c
3 with a fork(waf) p M e i, c, c
4 waf M p e c, bd
5 M waf e-p c
6 waf e-p M b
7 M e-p-waf b
Table 5.2: A tabular representation of the syntactic analysis of ‘Mary eats pizza
with a fork’ (alternative #1) displayed in fig. 5.15
nr. qual icon sins rhme indx legi dcnt symb rule
3’ with a fork(waf) p M e i, c, c
4’ waf p e M c
5’ p waf e M bd
6’ p-waf e M b
7’ M e-p-waf b
Table 5.3: The syntactic analysis of ‘Mary eats pizza with a fork’ (alternative #2)
yielding Mary eats-pizza with-a-fork
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nr. qual icon sins rhme indx legi dcnt symb rule
0 Mary(M) i
1 is(i) M i,c
2 a democrat (ad) i M i,c,c
3 and(&) ad M i i,c,c
4 ad i M c,c
save
5 proud(p) i
6 of it(oi) p i,c
7 oi p c,c
8 p/oi c,a
coordination
9 ad&p/oi
restore
10 ad&p/oi i M
11 M i-ad&p/oi b
Table 5.4: The syntactic analysis of ‘Mary is a democrat and proud of it’
5.4.2 Coordination
The second example is the coordination structure ‘Mary is a democrat and proud of it’,
which is morpho-syntactically analyzed as: (Mary)(is)(a democrat)(and)(proud)
(of it). The syntactic relational needs of the symbols are defined as follows:
is= {legi , symb}
proud= {indx}
of it= {indx}
The syntactic analysis of this utterance is depicted in table 5.4. In step 8,
two index signs, proud and of it, are bound through accumulation in a single ex-
pression: proud of it, having a single a-need in the index class. The coordination
of proud of it with a democrat is possible, as both symbols can be ‘is’-complements,
syntactically.
5.4.3 Discontinuous modification
The last example is the sentence ‘A man entered who was covered with mud’, which
is morpho-syntactically analyzed as: (A man)(entered)(who)(was covered)(with
mud). In the syntactic parsing (see table 5.5), the segment beginning with the
symbol who and ending with the sentence ending dot is analyzed recursively.
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nr. qual icon sins rhme indx legi dcnt symb rule
0 a man (am) i
1 entered(e) am i,c
2 who(wh) e am i,c,c
recursion
3 was covered (wcd) wh i,c
4 with mud (wm) wcd wh i,c,c
5 wm wh wcd c,c
6 wh wm wcd c
7 wm wcd wh c
8 wh wcd-wm b
return
9 who-. . .-mud(wcm) e am i
10 wcm am e c,c
11 am wcm e c
12 e am-wcm b
13 am-wcm e c
Table 5.5: The syntactic analysis of ‘A man entered who was covered with mud’
The syntactic relational needs of the symbols of the current example are:
entered= {legi , symb}
was covered= {legi , symb}
with mud= {indx}
In the recursively analyzed segment, who is considered as the syntactic subject.
In the end, the sentence sign of this nested segment is degenerately represented
as a single quality (wcm). By virtue of the referential properties of who, wcm is
represented in the nesting phenomenon as quale, having adjective-like syntactic
properties.
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Part III
Knowledge domains
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Testing the uniform representation potential of the theory developed so far
is pursued in this part by applying it to other domains of knowledge, besides
‘naive’ logic and language. To this end, the theory is refined by means of the
introduction of a more elaborate model for the representation of memory signs.
The extended theory is applied to ‘naive’ semantic syntactic, ‘naive’ reasoning
and mathematical sign processing.
By leaving the domain of ‘naive’ syntactic signs, characterized by the avail-
ability of a lexical definition of combinatory properties of qualia, we are facing
with less well studied domains, in which such a definition may not be available.
As a consequence, the elaboration of the examples given in this part will capi-
talize on the reader’s intuitive understanding of the input qualia, including their
combinatory properties. Having said this, this part also considers the question
how a lexical definition of qualia can be systematically derived in any knowledge
domain.
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Chapter 6
Semantic syntactic signs
Signs that fall outside the domain traditionally acknowledged as syntactic, but
that nevertheless can be treated syntactic-like are called in this thesis ‘naive’
semantic syntactic signs. The above definition indicates that the difference
between ‘naive’ syntactic and ‘naive’ semantic syntactic symbols can be reduced
to a difference in the way their symbols call for another symbol in a symbol
nexus. In order to simplify the presentation below, the expressions ‘semantic’
and ‘semantic syntactic’ are used interchangeably. As the focus of this thesis is
on ‘naive’ language processing, the ‘naive’ prefix can be omitted.
Besides illustrating the potential of the theory of this thesis for modeling
semantic sign processing, the question will be discussed how knowledge obtained
in different domains can be amalgamated in a single representation. This is
not the first time that we are facing with different interpretations of the same
representamen (potential sign). For example, input symbols may be interpreted
from the syntactic point of view, as syntactic signs, but the same entities also
may be interpreted from the logical stance, as logical signs. For instance, in
sect. 5.4.1, ‘with a fork’ is syntactically interpreted as a syntactic complement
(syntactic modifier), but the same expression may as well be interpreted as a
logical complement (¬B).1
A distinguishing property of ‘naive’ semantic signs is that they can more
aptly capture the diversity of ‘real’ world phenomena than ‘naive’ logical or
syntactic signs. By leaving the domain of (morpho-)syntactic symbols, this
chapter enters a new domain in which a lexical definition of combinatory (rela-
1Cf. figure 5.10 and 5.15.
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tional) properties of symbols may not be available. The premise of this chapter
is that, on the basis of the Peircean categorization of phenomena, a systematic
specification of the relational properties of the symbols of a domain is possible,
nevertheless.
Preceding the introduction of a model for semantic sign processing, this
chapter begins with a brief overview of the properties of semantic qualia (sect.
6.1). This is followed by the presentation of a theory for memory representation
(sect. 6.2) and a discussion of some of the consequences of that representation
for a trichotomic specification of semantic qualia (sect. 6.3 and 6.4). The
chapter is closed with an example (sect. 6.5).
6.1 ‘Naive’ semantic syntactic qualia
Memory qualia are a representation of input qualia (re)cognized in earlier ob-
servations. This may also include qualia arising from complex signs, through a
degenerate representation. Input qualia can be interpreted from different points
of views. One of them is the logical stance, which is traditionally accepted as
the most general interpretation of a phenomenon.
Evidence for information processing by the brain in knowledge domains is
found, amongst others, in neuro-physiological research on language compre-
hension and production (Deacon, 1997). Results of that study indicate that
syntactic symbol processing in one’s mother tongue shows such a degree of au-
tomatism (cf. habitualness) that its rules are evolutionary organized in separate
unit of the brain, the Broca area (Rizolatti & Arbib, 1998), (Arbib, P.Erdi, &
Szentagothai, 1997), (Musso, Moro, Glauche, Rijntjes, & Reichenbach, 2003),
amongst others.
In the proposed theory of ‘naive’ language processing, memory is modeled
by the lexicon, containing information about the relational properties of pri-
mary language entities, represented as memorized states (a’ ) and effects (b’ ).2
Following the assumption of sect. 5.1.2, the combinatory potential of syntactic
symbols can be modeled as a neutral (n), passive (p), and active (a) relational
need, defining the induced hierarchy: n<p<a (throughout this chapter, ‘<’ is
used as a polymorphic order relation).
Syntactic signs may uniformly represent different relations existing between
symbols, as constituency relations. For example, the relation between nice and
girls, and interesting and girls, but also the relation between runs and slowly, and
runs and fast can be uniformly represented as syntactic modification relations.
2Effect qualia may also refer to an appearing new fact or property.
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‘run’
fastslow 
Figure 6.1: The continuous domain of ‘run’ effects. Slow and fast are symbolic
representations of different measures of this domain.
However, there is a clear difference between those relations, from a semantic syn-
tactic stance. In the first two examples, girls can be semantically interpreted as
a possible constituent (rheme),3 and nice and interesting as expressions of differ-
ent semantic values. This relation between the two adjectives can be expressed
as an ordering of discrete values of some states: nice<interesting, assuming in-
teresting contains the more meaningful aspect of selection, as opposed to nice
which is only interpreted as a general reference.4 In the last two examples, run
can be semantically interpreted as a rule-like property (legisign), and slow and
fast as different measures of the continuous domain of ‘run’ effects: slow<fast
(see fig. 6.1). This hidden potential of semantic syntactic signs will be explored
in the classification of their relational needs, as value/measure elements of se-
mantic trichotomies. In ‘naive’ language processing, syntactic values/measures
(cf. syntactic relational needs) can be captured in a few trichotomies. This is
opposed to semantic values/measures that may be more abundant.
6.2 Memory representation
In this section, a representation satisfying the requirements set for memory
signs above is introduced on the basis of an analysis of the properties of the
neural organization of the brain. It will be assumed that in cognitive pro-
cessing, (re)cognized input qualia are always stored in a non-deleting memory.
According to the model of sect. 2.3 input qualia can be interpreted either as a
state or as an effect, depending on their appearance in the current and previous
input percepts. From the assumption of economic information processing by
the brain, it follows that the representation of memory qualia must be homoge-
neous. In turn this implies that the collection of a’ and b’ memory signs may
arise through different interpretations from same memory qualia. The benefits
of a homogeneous representation of memory information may be illustrated by
3In this chapter too, the Peircean signs are used as references to the status of a sign in the
process of sign recognition.
4This point will be explained later, in sect. 6.3.1.
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the potential of memory qualia of ‘run’ events to be interpreted as a nominal
state (a’ ) or as a verbal effect (b’ ).
The input of cognitive activity too is homogeneous, as the input percepts are
‘static’ representations of observed phenomena. It is due to the interpretation
of those percepts, as an interaction between some state and effect, that they are
conceived as an event.
6.2.1 Practical limitations
The assumption of a finite non-deleting memory of the brain may not be consis-
tent with the assumption of a potentially infinite number of different observa-
tions. The impact of this mismatch can be reduced by making use of filtering,
that is, rejecting input qualia if the difference between their value and the value
of the triggered memory response is below a certain threshold. A consequence
of filtering is that memory signs always stand for a generalization of perceived
sensory qualia.
Another practical problem is the limited speed of information processing by
the brain. This problem can be tackled by refraining from the interpretation
of individual memory response qualia, and interpreting signs as representing
qualia collections.
6.2.2 Average value representation of state qualia
Motivated by the solution of the problem of processing speed by the brain,
a’ -type memory signs are defined as an average value of the memory qualia
responding the a-type input trigger (see fig. 6.2, on the left-hand side). This
representation may be called ‘natural’, in virtue of the brain’s potential for
storing qualia of some sort, in brain areas. By reacting on the input stimu-
lus, neurons of a brain area may simultaneously become active and generate a
response. In the current model it is metaphorically assumed that the average
value of a’ -type memory signs could be generated from qualia stored by the
neurons of a responding brain area.
6.2.3 Dense domain representation of effect qualia
Stored values of b-type input qualia of some sort are assumed to be collected by
the brain in dense domains. Effect type memory signs (b’ ) are representations
of such collections (see fig. 6.2, on the right-hand side). These representations
too may be called ‘natural’, in virtue of the potential of the brain to organize
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+ b’a’
m
Figure 6.2: Average value (a’ ) and dense domain (b’ ) representation of memory
qualia. A ‘•’ and a ‘◦’ symbol refer to a responding and a non-responding neuron,
respectively; m is a representation of a measure; the average value represented
by a’ is indicated by a ‘+’.
neurons in linked structures. Conceptually, a domain of effect qualia can be
represented as a chain of neurons. A chain, as an ordered set (Birkhoff & Bartee,
1970), may be favorably used for deciding whether the input effect precedes or
succeeds a certain element of the chain, simply by means of comparing their
values. According to (Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998), comparison is a ‘natural’
binary operation of the brain.
6.2.4 The duality of representation
Memory qualia are representations of input qualia obtained in earlier obser-
vations. As memory signs arise from individual memory qualia by means of
generalization, they may not refer to actual phenomena, indicating that their
meaning is prototypical. Because the representations of memory qualia (memory
information) as averaged values (a’ ) and dense domains (b’ ) are independent,
memory response signs contain the meaning of a duality .
Following the process model of perception introduced in sect. 3.1, the repre-
sentation obtained through the complementation of input qualia with memory
information can be interpreted as a sign of an actually existent entity: a- and
b-type input qualia are represented as an instance of a prototypical state (a’ )
and a prototypical effect (b’ ), respectively. Inasmuch as a’ stands for an av-
erage value, the perception process represents the observed input state (a) as
a possible discrete value, and by the a pair: (a,a’ ). This is opposed to the
interpretation of the input effect (b) as a measure of a dense domain (b’ ) of
memorized effects, and by the pair: (b,b’ ).
The proposed memory model assumes the existence of monotonous functions
mapping domains (b’ ) to linearly ordered sets of values. If those values can be
associated with a symbolic representation, the domain is called a ‘scale’. A
measure m of a domain b’ is represented as a relative value, defined by the
distance of m from the first value or zero point of b’ (see fig. 6.1). Conceptually,
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the zero point of a domain can be defined by the threshold value of sensory
perception of the corresponding effect qualities.
6.2.5 Economic memory representation
The above representation of memory qualia enables a flexible use of symbols. As
qualia of different observations can be associated with identical average values
and measures, the symbolic representation of memory signs can be efficiently
re-used. For example, the measure ‘fast’ can be equivalently used for the rep-
resentation of the observed motion of a race car or a rabbit, in the domain of
‘race-car-speed’ and ‘rabbit-run-speed’, respectively, in spite of the obvious differ-
ences between the absolute values of their speed. Similarly, the average value
‘chair’, prototypically representing anything that can be sat on, can be used
to enrich any observed chair-like quality (state) with the general properties of
chairs.
6.2.6 ‘Naive’ semantic sign processing
According to the model of chapter 3, the initial signs of cognitive processing
arise from the final signs of perception. In semantic sign processing the final
signs of perception arise as value/measure representations of the input stimulus
(a∗a’ , a+a’ , b∗b’ , b+b’ ). Due to the close relationship between the perception
and the cognition process, also the qualisigns of cognition contain this meaning
of the input. More specifically, A and ¬A include the meaning of a value, B and
¬B the meaning of a measure. In virtue of the dependency relation between of
the signs generated by cognition, this meaning of the qualisigns is included in
the meaning of all of its representations.
A+B, A∗B: the expression of the input as a co-occurrence of values, repre-
sented as constituents (icon) and an event (sinsign).
A∗¬B, ¬A∗B: the expression of the input as a relation between the value of
the perceived state (A) and the measure of a possible effect (¬B); and
the other way around, as a relation between a value of a possible state
(¬A) and the measure of the observed effect (B). The two expressions are
synonymously interpreted as a representation of a range of possible values.
A∗¬B+¬A∗B: the expression of a compatibility relation between the repre-
sentation of the input as a possible value (A∗¬B) and measure (¬A∗B).
Or, alternatively, the specification of the values (A and ¬A) and measures
(¬B and B) that can be rule-like combined with each other. The legisign is
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interpreted as a representation of such a combination as a possible measure
of an effect.
¬A+¬B, ¬A∗¬B: the expression of the context, as a relation between the
values/measures indicated by the complementary input qualia.
A+¬B, ¬A+B: the expression of the input as an implication relation between
the value of the observed state (A) and the measure of the observed effect
(B). The value of A implies the measure of B, and the other way around.
The two expressions are synonymously interpreted as a representation of
an actually existent value.
A∗B+¬A∗¬B: the expression of A as a value affected by the measure indi-
cated by B, in the light of a similar interpretation of the complementary
qualia. Or, alternatively, a representation of the input as a measure of a
conventional property appearing as an effect.
A is B: the expression of the state A undergoing the effect of B. A is inter-
preted as a value affected by the measure represented by B, and the other
way around, indicating the potential of the argument sign to be used as a
state or as an effect, in a subsequent recognition process.
6.3 Semantic symbol processing
As the model of ‘naive’ semantic syntactic symbols is not fundamentally dif-
ferent from the earlier model of syntactic signs (see sect. 5.1.3), a definition of
a model for semantic sign processing is omitted. However, syntactic and se-
mantic syntactic concepts are different. For instance, semantic dicent signs (cf.
syntactic subject) may represent the ‘patient’ or ‘agent’ of the predicate of a
sentence. Because the semantic terminology used here is restricted to a small
subset, semantic syntactic concepts will be introduced in the examples on the
fly.
The existence of a close relationship between ‘naive’ syntactic and semantic
syntactic sign processing is an assumption also shared by traditional language
modeling. According to that view, the semantic structure of the input can be
built upon or developed in parallel with the syntactic structure. Following the
theory of this thesis, the two types of interpretations can be developed indepen-
dently and their results can be merged in a single representation by means of
structural coordination. The isomorphism between their models supports the
view that syntactic and semantic syntactic sign processing could be simulta-
neously established by the brain/mind. Experimental evidence supporting this
view is found in (Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004).
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6.3.1 Trichotomic specification
According to the proposed model, the combinatory properties of ‘naive’ seman-
tic signs can be specified by means of trichotomies (see sect. 3.5). While ‘naive’
syntactic symbols can be characterized by a relatively small collection of gen-
eral properties, semantic syntactic signs may require a vast number of specific
rules. Although semantic signs too can be specified in terms of (semantic) n-,
p-, and a-needs, the diversity of semantic syntactic phenomena may demand
a recursive classification of combinatory properties by means of trichotomies.
Recursive classification is possible, as the signs of the ‘naive’ semantic domain
can be classified on the basis of the category exhibited by their objects. As a
result, a hierarchical ontology of in principle arbitrary depth can be constructed.
Notice that it is always the combinatory potential of states and effects, repre-
sented as values and measures, respectively, that can be recursively specified as
a trichotomy. Theoretically, such a specification can be given for any knowledge
domain.
Recursive classification could also be practical for the specification of ‘naive’
syntactic qualia, for example, for a classification of verb complementation phe-
nomena. A verb can have a number of complements and an a-need for each one
of them. A recursive classification of the a-needs of a verb may be useful for
the specification of an order for the realization of verb-complement relations. In
English, the number of verb complements can be zero, one, or two, indicating
the possibility for a trichotomic specification. For example, give, give a book, and
give Mary a book, respectively.5.
Potential evidence for the use of semantic trichotomies in natural language
processing, more specifically, in the recognition of adjective-noun combinations,
has been experimentally proved by (Draskovic, Pustejovsky, & Schreuder, 2001).
The results of that study indicate that such combinations can be distinguished
in three types (defining a trichotomy): intersective, subsective compatible and
subsective incompatible.
An intersective type of adjective–noun combination is a 1st (cf. sect. 3.5),
representing something existing. An example is yellow car, referring to an entity
that is both yellow and is a car, intersectively:6 yellow is a potential meaning,
which is actualized by car (see fig. 6.3).
5Although in certain cases there may be a third complement, it is always subordinated to
one of the other complements, that together form a single unit, for example, John gave Mary
her coffee black.
6Assume there are many things around, some of which are yellow. Then the utterance,
“Show me a yellow one”, can be meaningful.
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Figure 6.3: A sample intersective nomen-adjective relation
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car entities
interesting cars
Figure 6.4: A sample subsective nomen-adjective relation
A subsective compatible adjective–noun combination is a 2nd, including the
meaning of a link between two entities that are both meaningful. An example is
interesting car. There can be various cars around, and we may select a subset of
them by means of pointing to certain cars through interesting.7. This is illustrated
in fig. 6.4. The meaning of car is restricted by means of interesting, which entity is
complementing car in a negative sense (cf. logical complementation as negation).
A subsective incompatible combination is a 3rd, representing the conven-
tional use of a rule involved in the meaning of certain adjective-noun combina-
tions. An example is fast car. A car can be fast, because its meaning contains
the meaning of speed, which in turn can be modified by fast in the intersective
or subsective compatible sense of combination. Car and fast that are meaningful
symbols both, together define the meaning of fast car.
The findings obtained in the experiments testing the semantic interpretation
of the three types of combinations show the differences in terms of computa-
tional complexity with intersective combinations being the simplest and the two
subsective types being progressively more complex (Draskovic et al., 2001).
7“Show me an interesting one”, can only be interpreted, if a collection of entities is already
selected.
107
6.3.2 Semantic syntactic relational needs
A trichotomic specification of qualia enables the definition of a natural order
relation (‘<’) on semantic relational properties, representing semantic signs.
An element of a trichotomic classification will be called a 1st, a 2nd, or a 3rd,
indicating the category exhibited by the semantic sign potentially obtained by
establishing the semantic relation of the element in question. In the examples of
this chapter, the category associated with the semantic combinatory potential
of a symbol is expressed by means of an integer given in parentheses. In this
chapter, trichotomic specification is restricted to sign classes. For example,
semantic rheme signs expressing the abstract meaning of states represented by
nouns can be classified as a possible existence(1), an actual reference(2), and a
conventional function(3).8 A recursive analysis of the elements of a reference(2)
division of rheme signs (referential rhematic signs) may reveal their meaning as
a general(1), an indefinite(2), or a definite reference(3). For example, girl, a girl,
and the girl, respectively. Similarly, semantic legisigns expressing the habitual
meaning of effects represented by verbs can be distinguished, for instance, as an
act of existence(1), a modification(2), or a transformation(3). For example, is,
covered with mud, and disappeared, respectively. In these examples it is assumed
that covered with mud may modify a state by enriching it with a property which
may be removed as well, but disappeared definitely changes the state effected.
The duality involved in index signs (¬A∗¬B, ¬A+¬B) representing the
context of a phenomenon is utilized in the present model as a potential for the
expression of a relation of ‘conversion’ (see (Sarbo, Hoppenbrouwers, & Farkas,
2002)). An illustrative example is the verb escape (¬A∗¬B) and its converse,
the nominal running (¬A+¬B): if we observe the event of escaping, then there
must be somebody in the state of running.
6.4 Merging different types of knowledge
According to this thesis, structural coordination is the key to an efficient merging
of knowledge. The focus of this section is on the potential of the proposed
representation for that operation.
The full interpretation of a symbol may arise from its interpretations in
different domains, each representing a different view or aspect. As there can
be numerous such aspects (and domains), and since information processing by
the brain must be efficient, language symbols frequently are used ambiguously.
8An example for the last may be the potential thematic function of a noun, in the sentence.
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For example, if we recognize ‘Mary’ as the syntactic subject of the sentence, and
also identify ‘Mary’ as the agent of the predicate, then we can commonly refer to
those interpretations by the symbol ‘Mary’, synonymously representing the two
concepts.
From the analytical point of view, a synonymous interpretation of signs can
be obtained through coordination (in the broad sense). An advantage of the
uniform representation proposed in this thesis is that such an interpretation
can be realized by means of structural coordination, merging signs exhibiting
identical meaning aspects in a single representation. This potential of the pro-
posed model can be favorably used for the definition of a simple calculus on
‘meaning’. An illustrative example may be the following. Assume the recogni-
tion of symbols, in different sentences, such as (i) girl, (ii) a girl and (iii) Mary,9
that are syntactically represented as rheme signs. In addition, assume that also
a semantic syntactic analysis is offered to these symbols recognizing them as
referential rhematic signs (cf. sect.6.3.2). By making use of the trichotomy of
the semantic referential meaning of rheme signs, represented by the induced
ordering: general<indefinite<definite, the above semantic rheme signs can be
ordered as: girl<a girl<Mary (notice that synonymous semantic and syntactic
signs are denoted by the same symbol). Because in an order relation a smaller
(less meaningful) element can be safely omitted in favor of a larger (more mean-
ingful) entity of the same ordering, the above three signs can be summarized in
the symbol: Mary.
This simple calculus will be used, in chapter 9, for the definition of a tech-
nique for text summarization. Trichotomic specification can be applied to all
signs (and interpretation moments), enabling a nonadic classification for the
representation of sign interactions. This potential of trichotomic definition shall
not be considered in this thesis, however.
6.5 Example
‘Naive’ semantic syntactic information processing is illustrated in this section by
the analysis of the sample phenomenon of a running rabbit, depicted in fig. 6.5.
The rabbit is on the run, perhaps because it is chased by a fox, but this in-
formation is not part of the observation. In the analysis below it is assumed
that in a semantic trichotomy the linguistic expression of a less meaningful ele-
ment can be derived from a more meaningful one. For instance, that escaping(3)
9Here Mary is assumed to refer to somebody who we are familiar with, as opposed to girl
that is assumed to refer to any person.
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Figure 6.5: The phenomenon of ‘a rabbit on the run’. The focus is on the
qualia of the observed rabbit, such as its greyish form, long ears, and kind of
motion. The qualia of the background, for example, the qualia of the grass, are
complementary.
contains a kind of(2) running(1) event, which can be derived from the interpre-
tation of escaping. For the analysis of the example of this section, a recursive
classification of semantic signs is not needed (an illustration of such a definition
will be given in chapter 9). In this section the focus is on the impact of the
value/measure interpretation of memory signs on the signs generated by the
recognition process.
Semantic syntactic qualia are represented as a collection of relational needs,
defined on the fly. As the input qualia of a phenomenon always exhibit the
category of firstness (1), this information can be omitted. An essential property
of ‘naive’ syntactic sign recognition is that sign interactions can be represented
by means of the combinatory properties of the constituent symbols. From the
point of view of knowledge representation, the aspect of sequential processing
is secondary. In fact, sequential sign processing is modeled in sect. 5.1.1 by
considering the sequential order of appearance of input symbols, as a quale,
and interpreting such qualia as a parsing algorithm (cf. coercion, accumulation
and binding). In the example below, the sequential character of ‘naive’ semantic
information processing is not considered. It will be assumed that all input qualia
are present in a single observation.
The input qualia of the perception process are defined as follows. As in
earlier examples, boldface, Sans Serif and slanted symbols are used for denoting
input and memory signs, and the signs generated by the recognition process,
respectively.
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a = observed-rabbit (the state qualia of the observed rabbit,
for example, a grayish form, long ears)
a’ = prototype-rabbit (information about rabbits, such as their
parts of body(2), that rabbits can become a prey(3))
b = observed-motion (the effect qualia of the observed motion,
for example, that it is fast, rabbit-like)
b’ = prototype-motion (information about rabbit-like motion,
for example, that rabbits can hop(1), walk(1), run(1), escape(3))
The above definition makes tacit use of the trichotomic classification of a’ -type
memory signs, as an existence(1), a form(2), and a function(3). For exam-
ple, potential similarity(1) with the input state, a factual list of the ‘parts of
body’(2) of rabbits, including a reference(2) to their known color and approxi-
mate size, and the potential of rabbits to function as a prey(3). An analogous
classification of b’ -type memory signs may reveal their meaning as a possible
occurrence(1), an actual property(2), and a conventional use of some rule(3),
for example, the property of similarity(1) with the observed motion effect with
hopping and walking, the qualification of that effect as fast or galloping(2), and
its interpretation as an act of escaping(3).
Following earlier observations of this chapter, semantic signs are processed
analogously to syntactic signs (cf. sect. 5.1.3). A remark on the linguistic repre-
sentation of semantic signs is in place, however. In ‘naive’ syntactic processing,
the representation of a symbol interaction usually can be easily derived from the
constituent symbols. An example may be nice girls, representing the syntactic
modification of girls by nice. The representation of semantic syntactic symbol
interactions can be more sophisticated. For example, the semantic qualifica-
tion of running by fast can be represented by escaping. Nevertheless, throughout
this chapter it will be assumed that adequate linguistic representations can be
derived from the constituent symbols, also in the case of semantic sign interac-
tions.
The elaboration of the perception process is restricted to a definition of its
initial and final signs. In this section, the focus is on the definition of the signs
generated by the cognitive process.10
A = a∗a′: observed-rabbit ‘∗’ parts-of-body
¬A = a+a′: observed-rabbit ‘+’ prey
B = b∗b′: observed-motion ‘∗’ {running, escaping}
¬B = b+b′: observed-motion ‘+’ {hopping, walking}
10In this chapter too, Peircean signs and ‘naive’ logical expressions are used as pointers to
the status of a sign in the process of sign recognition.
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A=a∗a’ stands for an agreement relation between the value of the observed
qualia (a) and their similarity with the average value of the parts of a rabbit’s
body (a’ ). This is represented by the symbol rabbit(ness) or, simply, rabbit.
¬A=a+a’ represents the observed rabbit as a possible prey. B=b∗b’ is a repre-
sentation of the observed effect as an act of escaping motion; running(1), which
is contained in the meaning of escaping(3), is expressing the observed effect as a
measure in the domain of ‘rabbit-run’ effects. This is represented by the symbol
escaping. ¬B=b+b’ is an expression of the input effect as a possible ‘rabbit-like
motion’, represented by the symbol running. Complementary qualia referring
to the background of the observed phenomenon, such as the grass in which the
rabbit is running, are not included in the current specification.
In sum, cognitive processing is engaged with the recognition of the following
qualisigns:
A = rabbit
¬A = prey
B = escaping
¬B = running
The interpretation moments of cognitive processing are defined as follows.
A+B: the expression of the simultaneously present(2) input qualia, rabbit and
escaping, as constituent values(1).
A∗B: the expression of the co-occurring input qualia as a rabbit-like-running
event(2) that happens ‘now’(1).
¬A+¬B, ¬A∗¬B: the expression of a relation between(2) the complementary
information of prey and running. The synonymous representation of the two
index signs is an expression of their common meaning. For example, the
conversion relation between prey as an appearing grayish form (¬A+¬B),
and running as a kind of motion event by some agent (¬A∗¬B).
A∗¬B: the expression of the potential of the observed state (rabbit) for moving
in a rabbit-like fashion (running), as a relation between their value and
measure, respectively. For example, if the rabbit is perceived as a certain
form and color (A), then now it is known that potentially it may be able
to hop, walk, and run (¬B). This rheme sign is referring to the input as an
abstract entity represented as a range(3) of possible(1) values, that may
be called abstract-rabbit.
¬A∗B: the expression of the range(3) of possible(1) entities (prey) capable of
rabbit-like galloping (escaping). This may be called rabbit-like-running (as a
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value). Notice that galopping(2) is contained in the meaning of escaping(3),
and rabbit-like is contained in the meaning of prey(3).
The synonymous interpretation of the two rheme signs obtains the abstract
meaning of the input state as a-rabbit-that-may-be-a-prey.
A∗¬B+¬A∗B: the expression of the rule-like compatibility of ‘abstract rabbit’
(A∗¬B) and ‘rabbit-like running’ (¬A∗B), as measures of some effects.
This may be called running-as-a-rabbit.
A+¬B: the expression of the input as an actually existing rabbit(3) undergo-
ing(2) some rabbit-like running motion(2). As ¬B contains the meaning
of the perceived effect (B) as a possibility, this dicent sign represents the
fact that our rabbit is actually affected by the observed event (escaping).
¬A+B: the expression of the input as an actually occurring escaping event(3)
of some entity qualifying(2) for a prey. As ¬A contains the meaning of the
perceived state (A) as a possibility, this dicent sign represents the potential
of the observed escaping effect to also apply to the observed state (rabbit).
The two dicent signs above synonymously represent the input as a-rabbit-
escaping-as-a-prey or as an entity running-as-a-rabbit. Because escaping is
an active expression of the verb, the dicent sign can be interpreted as a
representation of the observed rabbit as the agent of the observed event.
A∗B+¬A∗¬B: the expression of the conventional property(3) of the input as
an escaping rabbit (rabbit∗escaping), in the light of(2) its possible inter-
pretation as a prey (prey∗running). This may be called running-as-a-rabbit-
escaping-as-a-prey.
A is B: the expression of the hypothesis that the observed rabbit IS escaping,
representing the input as a proposition(3) of a perceptual judgment(3).
Finally, this proposition may be paraphrased as a-rabbit-on-the-run.
6.6 Summary
‘Naive’ semantic syntactic signs are an example of a domain in which a defini-
tion of the combinatory properties of the primary symbols may not be available.
The results of this chapter indicate that such a definition could be systemat-
ically given by means of trichotomies. The trichotomic specification of qualia
is compatible with the process model of cognitive activity. This is illustrated
by the signs of the semantic processing of a sample phenomenon. The idea is
suggested that, due to its uniform character, the representation proposed in this
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thesis may enable the merging of interpretations found in different domains, by
means of structural coordination.
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Chapter 7
Reasoning signs
Reasoning can be defined as our potential for deriving conclusions from premises,
using a given methodology. The goal of this chapter is the introduction of a
model for ‘naive’ reasoning as a kind of sign recognition. An account of the
properties of the major methods of reasoning is given by means of Peirce’s
analysis of logical reasoning as a form of authentic semiosis. The focus of this
presentation is way more restricted however, as it only attempts to justify that
reasoning, interpreted as a process, contains Peirce’s nine signs as meaning
aspects. The results of this chapter reinforces an earlier conjecture of this thesis,
that all representation of human knowledge or ‘logos’, be it low- or high-level,
could be based on a single type of process.
The structure of this chapter is the following. After a Peircean analysis of the
properties of reasoning, as a methodology, a process model for ‘naive’ reasoning
is introduced. This is followed by an illustration of the proposed model, by an
extended example. Finally, in a closing section, the model of ‘naive’ reasoning
is analyzed from the syllogistic point of view.
7.1 Logica Utens
In ordinary life everybody has a reasoning instinct or habits of reasoning by
which he forms his opinions concerning many matters of great importance (Fann,
1970). We not only have a reasoning instinct but we have an instinctive theory
of reasoning, for every reasoner “has some general idea of what good reasoning
is” (CP 2.186). According to Peirce, such a theory of reasoning, antecedent to
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any systematic study of the subject, constitutes our logica utens (CP 2.189),
the acritical and implicit or ‘naive’ logic of the common man. Because we do
not possess a full stock of instincts to meet all occasions, we study the process
of reasoning and inquire the methods by which we can most efficiently advance
our knowledge. The result of such a study is called logica docens, or formulated,
scientific and critical logic (see CP 2.204).
By our logica utens we are able to guess right in many instances. This
ability may be regarded as the result of the adaptation of the brain/mind to
the universe. But, where our instinctive reasoning power begins to lose its self-
confidence, as when we are confronted with extraordinary or unusual problems,
we look to the help of our logica docens (Fann, 1970). Though “reasoning, prop-
erly speaking, cannot be unconsciously performed” (CP 2.182), in this chapter
the hypothesis is raised that our logica utens naturally follows from our po-
tential for sign processing and, in turn, the logica docens may stem from this
implicit or ‘naive’ logic of the brain.
7.1.1 The three modes of inference
Thoughts are the ground for any inference, and any thought is a proposition
which is a premise. As our propositions are hypotheses, inferences and hypothe-
ses are closely related.
The three major modes of inferencing can be characterized as follows. De-
duction explicates hypotheses, deducing from them the necessary consequences
which may be tested. Induction consists in the process of testing hypotheses,
that is, the determination of a value. Abduction is the process of forming ex-
planatory hypotheses (see CP 5.171). From this specification, the following
properties of the three types of reasoning can be derived.
In deduction, initially, we know something (a hypothesis or belief) and in
the end we know something more. This ‘increase’ of knowledge is due to the
additional information deduced about the object that is in our focus, revealing
its other properties.
Induction consists in testing whether an entity does or does not possess a
certain property. That we have knowledge about the property to be tested
implies the existence of other entities we learned in earlier inductive inferences.
Successful testing indicates that the current entity is found to be similar to the
entities that we are already aware of. This similarity can be expressed as a
measure of the property inductively derived from those entities. An example
for such a property can be ‘motion’, such measures can be ‘walking’, ‘running’,
or ‘galloping’.
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The above specification does not reveal the properties of abduction, except
that abductive reasoning must be a process, ‘generating’ propositions that are
hypotheses. Insofar as, in logical reasoning, propositions appear as premises and
such premises are hypotheses, the conclusion can be drawn that all knowledge
must initially arise from abductions. Peirce defined abductive inferencing as
follows:
The surprising fact C is observed. But if A were true, C would be
a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true
(CP 5.189).
Such a process is inferential, because the hypothesis “is adopted for some
reason, good or bad, and that reason, in being regarded as such, is regarded as
lending the hypothesis some plausibility” (CP 2.511). As Peirce pointed out,
abduction is “the only logical operation which introduces any new idea” (CP
5.171).
The goal of this chapter is to show that this corollary of abduction may be
the key to an explanation of the relation of abduction with the other two modes
of inference. By revealing the properties of that relation, this chapter makes an
attempt to justify the conjecture that sign recognition, as a process, contains the
meaning of the three modes of inference, as meaning aspects. But the results of
this chapter can be of interest also for another reason. By proving that ‘naive’
reasoning can be modeled isomorphically to ‘naive’ logical, (morpho-)syntactic
and semantic syntactic information processing, the possibility for the definition
of a practical calculus of signs are significantly increased.
7.2 Towards a model for ‘naive’ reasoning
This section is an attempt to show that the interpretation of memory signs,
according to the theory of this thesis (see sect. 6.2), provides the ground for
establishing a link between Peirce’s nonadic signs, as meaning aspects, and his
concept of perceptual judgments. According to Peirce (Murphy, 1961):
Every judgment consists in referring a predicate to a subject. The
predicate is thought, and the subject is only thought-of. The ele-
ments of the predicate are experiences or representations of experi-
ence. The subject is never experimental but only assumed. Every
judgment, therefore, being a reference of the experienced or known
to the assumed or unknown, is an explanation of a phenomenon by
a hypothesis, and is in fact an inference.
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Perceptual judgments are propositions about the ‘real’ world. Following
the model of this thesis, propositions are representations, ‘generated’ by the
process of sign recognition. This relation between perceptual judgments and the
model of cognitive activity introduced in sect. 2.3 can be made more explicit
by establishing a link between the above mentioned properties of perceptual
judgments, and the interpretation moments of the processing schema. The
interesting events are (q1,C) and (q2,C), representing the input state and effect in
context, as an actual existent (subject) and a conventional property (predicate),
respectively. In the model of perception, in sect. 4.3, (q1,C) and (q2,C) are
represented by (a,a’ ) and (b,b’ ), respectively, expressing the input qualia as
instances of prototypical memory signs. For example, (a,a’ ) is interpreted as an
instance of a’ triggered by a, arising from a (rheme), through complementation
by a’ (index). Although a’ itself is thought, the complementation operation
may only link a subset of the prototypical properties of a’ to a, in the sense
of agreement. Furthermore, as a may contain qualia that do not match the
information stored in memory (such input qualia may indicate a novel value of
a sort of quale, for example), (a,a’ ) may only represent an input meaning that
is imagined or ‘thought-of’.
For example, if the input a consists of the qualia obtained through the ob-
servation of an oak tree, then a’ may represent the prototypical concept of oak
trees (an average value of their known qualia). The complementation of a with
this a’ enables the interpretation of this input as an actually existing instance
of an oak, independently from the specific properties of the observed tree, for
example, whether it has leaves, or is a sapling, or an old tree. The dicent sign
of perception, (a,a’ ), is a representation of such an input meaning.
The interpretation of (b,b’ ) is completely different. Similarly to a’ , also
prototypical b’ memory signs are ‘thought’. However, due to the representation
of stored effect qualia in a dense domain (see sect. 6.2.3), the input b always
can be interpreted as a measure or a subset of b’ . As b’ is thought and b is a
subset of b’ , (b,b’ ) too must be a representation which is ‘thought ’.
7.2.1 Sign interactions and inferences
By looking more closely at the process of perception, in particular at the in-
teractions that generate (a,a’ ) and (b,b’ ), meaning aspects of inferences can be
discovered. This may be explained as follows.
By recognizing a as an instance of a’ , two goals can be achieved. First, known
(combinatory) properties of a can be deduced from a’ ; second, novel properties
of a can be used for extending the meaning of a’ , by means of memorization.
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Either way, a representation of an entity satisfying certain properties can be
deductively derived. Such a process has the element of deduction.
Similarly, by recognizing b as a measure of b’ , two goals may be attained.
First, b can be tested for the property indicated by b’ , that is, whether b can
be a measure of b’ . Second, the property indicated b’ can be generalized for b,
that is, the domain b’ can be adjusted by b, as a potentially new element. Such
a process strongly resembles to induction.
Due to the aspect of generalization included in the meaning of the dense
domain representation of effect qualia, the potential for inductive generalization
is possessed by the sign recognition process by definition. This means that the
testing of b may not involve the aspect of a genuine generalization, but may be a
product of the recognition of a meaning that is potentially general by definition.
Deduction and induction, interpreted as meaning aspects, can be shown to
be present in the complementation sign interactions generating the dicent and
symbol signs of cognition as a process. Since the qualisigns of that process
are defined as a re-presentation of the final signs of perception, A (¬A) and
B (¬B) naturally inherit the meaning of a value and a measure, respectively,
and this meaning of the qualisigns is also present in all other signs brought
about by cognitive processing. For example, the index sign (¬A+¬B, ¬A∗¬B)
may be interpreted as a compatible pair of a measure of an effect (¬B) and a
(scale) value of a state (¬A). The legisign (A∗¬B+¬A∗B) may be interpreted
analogously. The interaction between the index sign and the legisign may be in-
terpreted as an adjustment (cf. complementation) of the measure (and domain)
included in the meaning of the legisign, by the (scale) value indicated by the in-
dex sign. Such an ‘intensional’ enrichment of a domain, introducing new values
of an effect, has the aspect of induction. Similarly, the interaction between the
rheme sign and the index sign may be interpreted as an adjustment (cf. modi-
fication) of the value included in the meaning of the rheme (A∗¬B, ¬A∗B), by
new values indicated by the index sign. More specifically, the value represented
by A∗¬B may be extended by the value indicated by ¬A∗¬B, and the value of
the measure represented by ¬A∗B, by the value indicated by ¬A+¬B. Such an
‘extensional’ modification of a domain, introducing new values of a state, has
the aspect of deduction.
Finally predication, the interaction between the dicent (A+¬B, ¬A+B) and
the symbol sign (A∗B+¬A∗¬B), interpreted as a proposition which is a hy-
pothesis, has the aspect of abduction. Also sorting and abstraction (via inheri-
tence), eventually representing the input as an abstract state (rheme) and effect
(legisign) or, as premises of a later ‘naive’ deductive and inductive inference,
respectively, have the aspect of abduction (degenerately, in the logical sense).
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Figure 7.1: Bambi is staring at his marking tree. On the basis of the shadow
casted by the tree, he decides to turn to the right, branch towards his grazing
land.
7.3 An extended example
Cognitive activity as a ‘naive’ reasoning process is illustrated in this section by
means of an analysis of an extended example. The aim of this analysis is an
attempt to show that also ‘naive’ reasoning can be modeled as a kind of sign
recognition process, in which, the arising signs exhibit the aspects of a minor,
and a major premise, as well as the conclusion of a logical inference.
The example introduced in this section is about the deer Bambi (see fig. 7.1).
More specifically, the focus will be on the phenomenon, in which, Bambi, walking
in the forest, arrives at a certain location of his path. This location is marked
by a tree, indicating a branch of the path in two directions: one, leading to
Bambi’s grazing land, and another, to his watering place, a lake. Every day,
Bambi follows his path, and every time he branches to the pasture, if the sun
has not yet reached its zenith, and to the lake otherwise. In the example it will
be assumed that the marking tree is the only information about the location of
branching and, that the tree looks naturally. The deer arrives at this branching
point before noon where, following his habit, he turns right, to the east, towards
his grazing land.
This section contains an analysis of the recognition of the marking tree,
from Bambi’s point of view. In addition, it will be assumed that the observed
phenomenon is embedded in another one, which only differs from the nested
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phenomenon in a single quality: Bambi feels hungry. The focus will be on the
interpretation moments of the process of cognition. The specification of the per-
ception process is restricted to a definition of its initial and final signs (and the
latter only as the qualisigns of the process of cognition). In the example below,
interpretation moments can be indicated by their ‘naive’ logical expressions.
Synonymous signs can be referred to by means of identical symbols. In the
specification of the input of perception only the qualia appearing in Bambi’s
focus are defined, a definition of the complementary input qualia is omitted.
Like in the previous chapter, the explanations of the sign interactions capitalize
on the reader’s knowledge about the input qualia, including their combinatory
properties.
The qualisigns of perception are:
a = tree-at-branching
a’ = marking-tree-prototype
b = shadow-on-the-left
b’ = branching-state-prototype
The qualisigns of cognition are:
A = a∗a’= tree
¬A = a+a’= other-tree
B = b∗b’= to-branch
¬B = b+b’= not-to-branch
Here, A=tree stands for a tree where branching may occur; B=to-branch repre-
sents the need for branching, as an appearing property.
Although the specification of the complementary qualia of perception is be-
yond the goal of the current analysis, an example of such a memory sign may
be a’=tree-prototype, indicating the prototypical meaning of marking-trees, as a
possible interpretation of a=tree-at-branching. An example of a complemen-
tary input sign can be a= tree-not-at-branching, referring to a tree in the
surroundings where any action (including branching) may possibly take place.
The qualisigns of cognition may be explained as follows. The deer is looking
at the marking tree, rising at a certain location of his path (A). He may also
see other trees and shadows, but those are not in his focus (¬A). Suddenly
he observes the appearing shadow of his marking tree, indicating the potential
need for branching (B). He may also notice the appearance of other objects,
that he is not concentrating on and do not compel him to branch anywhere
(¬B). In the current example it will be assumed that B contains the qualia of
the characteristic shadow casted by the marking tree, and ¬B contains mem-
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scenery
fork
turn−to−the−east
branching−event
other−tree  not−to−branch
turn−left−or−right
tree−on−the−left
branching
potential−
go−grazing
tree  to−branch
Figure 7.2: The signs of the sample branching phenomenon
ory information about the possible directions of branching, in relation to the
presence of the shadow of the marking tree.
The above qualisigns only represent a potential meaning of the input. At
this stage of information processing, Bambi may not ‘know’ that the tree he is
looking at is the tree where branching may occur and, more importantly, he may
not be aware of the direction he should turn to. That level of understanding
may arise later as a result of the recognition process, briefly explained below.
The signs generated are recapitulated in fig. 7.2.
A+B= tree+to-branch= fork: the expression of the observed tree and branching
need, as constituents of the input phenomenon.
A∗B= tree∗to-branch= branching-event: the expression of the simultaneous oc-
currence of the observed tree and branching need, as an event that occurs
now.
¬A+¬B, ¬A∗¬B= scenery: the expression of the complementary qualia as the
context of the observed phenomenon. Information about the context can
be necessary for the identification of the input as a marking tree. This may
include information about those properties of the observed tree that make
it different from any other tree (¬A+¬B), as well as information about
the properties of the appearing branching need, such as the direction the
tree is indicating and branching may follow (¬A∗¬B).
A∗¬B= tree∗not-to-branch, ¬A∗B= other-tree∗to-branch: the expression of the
input as an abstract marking tree and branching need, indicating a range
of possibilities, synonymously called potential-branching.
¬A∗B+A∗¬B= turn-left-or-right: the expression of the compatibility relation
between the abstract signs, A∗¬B and ¬A∗B, representing the habitual
meaning of ‘branching-at-a-marking tree’, as a rule-like property of the
observed bifurcating path.
¬A+B, A+¬B= tree-on-the-left: the expression of the input meaning, as an
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act of branching somewhere (¬A+B) or branching in the direction implied
by the actual marking tree (A→B); the other expression, A+¬B, can be
explained analogously. The synonymous interpretation of the two signs
immediately above amounts to a representation of the input as the subject
of the observed phenomenon.
A∗B+¬A∗¬B= turn-to-the-east: the expression of the input as a conventional
property such as ‘turning-to-the-grazing land’ (A∗B) ’at-a-certain-location’
(¬A∗¬B). In the current analysis, the expressions ‘to the east’, ‘to the
pasture’, and ‘to the grazing land’ are used interchangeably.
A is B= go-grazing: the expression of the relation between the observed tree
(A) and branching need (B), as a proposition which is a hypothesis.
Bambi may validate his hypothesis about the marking tree (go-grazing), by
considering it in the context of the nesting phenomenon marked by the new
quale: Bambi feels hungry. To this end, he may degenerately represent his
final sign (go-grazing) as an effect quale, affecting the state represented by the
quale (the feeling of) ‘hungry’. By skipping the details of the corresponding
preception process, the qualisigns of cognition can be defined as follows:
A = hungry
B = go-grazing
Bambi may find his hypothesis correct, if he is able to establish a true rela-
tion between the above qualisigns, for example, that he can abductively conclude
that grazing may appease his hunger in all likelihood. A syllogistic representa-
tion of that inference can be the following (quantifiers are omitted):
go-grazing IS disappear-hunger
hungry IS go-grazing
⇒ hungry IS disappear-hunger
A true conclusion can make the deer go towards his grazing field, but only
if according to Bambi’s knowledge, the reaction disappear-hunger can diminish
the ‘feeling of hunger’. In that scenario, hungry and disappear-hunger are consid-
ered as state and effect qualia, respectively. Establishing a meanigful relation
between these qualia may represent a neutralization of the input stimulus (hun-
gry). If Bambi’s conclusion is in conformity with his knowledge about the world,
the final sign of his ‘marking tree’ phenomenon will not introduce more inter-
actions and changes, indicating that input processing may terminate. Bambi’s
conclusion may not satisfy him however, if during input processing the input
stimulus somehow had changed and contains qualia that are not included in
Bambi’s latest conclusion. The difference induced from those qualia may reveal
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tree−like? scenery
fork
turn−left−or−right
branch−here?
branching−event
tree?  to−branch
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where−to−branch?
other−tree  not−to−branch
Figure 7.3: The signs of the sample damaged tree phenomenon
as a change, initiating further information processing. That possibility is not
considered in the current example.
7.3.1 The need for abduction
While Bambi was away, his marking tree has been seriously injured by another
deer. What happens, if Bambi arrives at his tree as usual?
Let us assume that the damaged tree cannot be interpreted as a potential
marking tree (A), but the perception of a branching need (B) is still possible (if
even that is not possible, no ‘branching’ would occur and Bambi would proceed
without noticing anything). Given these conditions, the input qualisigns can be
defined as follows:
(Perception)
a = damaged-tree-at-branching
a’ = tree-prototype
b = shadow-on-the-left
b’ = branching-state-prototype
(Cognition)
A = a∗a’= tree?
¬A = a+a’= other-tree
B = b∗b’= to-branch
¬B = b+b’= not-to-branch
The signs of the current phenomenon are illustrated in fig. 7.3. It is assumed
that the damaged marking tree still qualifies as a tree. This means that, also
now, the input may be recognized as a possible co-occurrence of constituents
(fork). However, the injury of the tree hinders the recognition of a suitable
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rheme sign (tree-like?), as the current input cannot be interpreted as a ‘tree-
marked-branching-of-a-path’ (potential-branching).
Although the event signs of the input impel Bambi to move ahead (go to
the pasture, branch according to the position of the sun), the representation of
the input as something ‘tree-like’ is inadequate. As a consequence, Bambi may
not be able to recognize the location of branching (branch-here?) and his final
argument sign (where-to-branch?) may not activate the necessary decision to
branch. Bambi is vacantly staring at the tree. This is what Peirce formulated
as “the surprising fact C is observed” (see sect. 7.1.1).
Bambi has now two options. Either he does not care about anything and
pursues his course in the direction he followed so far, or he is waiting until the
bark of the tree is sufficiently healed, thereby risking starvation.
7.4 Towards a process model of abduction
But let us help Bambi in this desperate situation. For us, his problem is almost
trivial: The observed tree does not match the information about marking trees.
But if we assume that the observed entity could be a marking tree, we may prove
our conjecture by abductively deriving how the injury of the observed tree could
have occurred. By conceptually removing any damage from the observed tree,
we may be able to recognize it as a marking tree.
How can we make the above strategy work? The current input does not
contain the qualia of a marking tree. Let us assume that the daily growth of
the observed tree, the natural increase or decrease of its leafs does not hinder
its recognition as a marking tree. As the bark of the tree is seriously damaged,
Bambi is unable to link the input qualia with his memory information about
marking trees. The problematic sign is the rheme (A∗¬B, ¬A∗B), as it can-
not be complemented by the information of the index (A∗B, ¬A∗¬B). This is
because the input (tree-like?) does not contain information enabling its inter-
pretation as a possible location of branching. Either the observed tree is not a
marking tree, or something has happened while he has been away, that deprived
it from its potential to function as a marking tree.
As the input effect (B) is assumed to be correct, the interpretation of the
input as an abstract state (rheme) may be improved by means of introducing
new input qualia (A), via abduction. The reader may remember the assumption
taken by the process model of perception (see sect. 3.1), that input as well as
memory qualia can be distinguished in a pair of subsets of focused (f) and
complementary qualia (c): a=af+ac; a’=a’f +a’c .
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For the model of ‘naive’ abductive reasoning, the most important are the
state type memory signs (a’ ). In the current phenomenon, an example for a fo-
cused memory sign may be a’f =tree-prototype. As the observed damaged marking
tree qualifies as a tree, following the assumption above, there must exist com-
plementary memory response qualia representing information about marking
trees.1 An example of such a memory sign may be a’c =marking-tree-prototype.
An illustration of the two subsets of input qualia, af and ac, will be given in
sect. 7.5.
7.4.1 A revised model of perception
Abduction can be modeled by means of interpreting the difference between a’
and a, as an effect conceptually transforming a to a’ . This understanding of
abduction involves a ‘shift’ of focus from a to its relative difference with a’ : we
take a different look at the input phenomenon. Here is an illustrative example.
If we know what marking trees generally look like, and what the difference
between the input qualia (af ) and their prototypical concept (a’c ) is, then we
may obtain the qualia of a marking tree by removing or abstracting that differ-
ence (a’c \af ) from the input.
The reader may remember that, according to the model of cognitive activity
presented in sect. 2.3, the input qualia arise from the input percepts through
a comparison operation. For example, the input effect qualia are defined as a
relative difference of current and previous percepts, represented as sets. Most
importantly, it is the previous percept that is ‘subtracted’ from the current
one, indicating that the current percept is interpreted by cognitive activity as a
‘goal’ that the previous percept is conceptually transformed to, by the current
interaction. The above example shows that this principle can be naturally
generalized to the abduction of novel input qualia.
The generation of a relative difference between a’ and a can be accomplished
analogously to the generation of the input qualia of the perception process: a-
and a’ -type qualia that are related to each other in the sense of agreement
may generate a new state (new-a), those related to each other in the sense of
possibility, a new effect (new-b).2 In the definition below, ‘∗’ and ‘+’ denote
a relation in the sense of agreement and possibility, respectively. ‘\’ stands for
the operation ‘relative difference’. For example, a’c \af is an expression of qualia
1It must be so, because Bambi does have knowledge about marking trees, according to the
analysis of sect. 7.3.1.
2This generation of new qualia capitalizes on the assumption of a homogeneous represen-
tation of memory information by the brain (see sect. 6.2).
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that are elements of a’c , but are not included in af . Notice that a relation in
the sense of agreement is only possible between qualia that are in the focus
(a’f and af ); a relation in the sense of possibility may exist between all other
combinations of the qualia, such as, a’c and af , a’f and ac, and a’c and ac.
new-a := a’f ∗af
new-b := a’c \af+a’f \ac+a’c \ac
In the revised model of perception it is assumed that abducted new qualia
are type-wise merged with the original input. The rationale behind this step is
that it enables the entire input to be recognized as a state (a) undergoing the
abducted new effect (new-b), transforming it to another state (a’ ).
The potential analogy of this model with the model of apparent motion
perception may be used for an explanation of the importance of relative differ-
ence in the definition of new-b. By considering the input (af ) and the memory
response qualia (a’c ) as subsequent pictures of a film, their difference can be
interpreted as an effect, transforming the previous picture into the next one.
Another illustration of abduction can be the following example taken from nat-
ural language. Consider the ‘naive’ semantic language phenomenon defined by
the qualia: af=girl, a’c =beauty. The difference between beauty and girl can be
interpreted as an effect: new-b:=beautiful, transforming girl to a beauty, thereby
enabling the recognition of girl as a beautiful girl (new-a). Notice that new-a al-
ways forms a subset of the input a, due to the agreement relation (subsectively)
between af and a’f .
Abduction can be modeled by considering a and a’ as input percepts, in
the generation of the input qualia of perception by means of a comparison. A
similar feedback of b and b’ cannot be effective, since b’ is a dense domain and
a meaningful difference between b and b’ cannot be defined (remember that b is
interpreted as a measure representing a sub-domain of b’ ).
In the revised model of perception, depicted in fig. 7.4, the current percept
is copied to the previous percept, after some delay following input sampling. A
control signal (ctrl) is used to enable either the qualia of the feedback, or those of
the external stimulus, for generating the input state (a) and effect qualia (b), by
means of comparison. The two modes correspond to ‘abduction’ and ‘normal’
mode operation, respectively. Abduction mode operation may be activated, if
normal mode processing eventually fails. Following this realization of abduction,
the definition of the abducted new qualia can be simplified.
new-a := a’∗a
new-b := a’\a
This may be explained as follows. According to sect. 7.4, a=af+ac and
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Figure 7.4: The revised model of perception. The difference with the model of
fig. 3.1 consists in the existence of a controled feedback (ctrl) of a and a’ to the
comparison unit. The relative difference of a and a’ is used for the abduction of
new qualia, triggering potentially new interpretations of the input. A similarly
meaningful feedback of b and b’ is not possible.
a’=a’f +a’c . From this, it follows that
new-a := a’∗a
= (a’f +a’c )∗(af+ac)
= a’f ∗af+a’f ∗ac +a’c ∗af+a’c ∗ac
= a’f ∗af
because a relation in the sense of agreement (∗) may only exist between qualia
that are in the focus; the other three term above are representing the emptyset.
Similarly,
new-b := a’\a
= (a’f +a’c )\(af+ac)
= (a’f +a’c )*(¬af+¬ac)
= a’f ∗¬af+a’f ∗¬ac +a’c ∗¬af+a’c ∗¬ac
= a’f \ac +a’c \af+a’c \ac
because now it is a’f ∗af that is representing the emptyset. Notice the elemen-
twise negation (¬) involved in the relative difference operation established by
the comparison unit in fig. 7.4
Through abduction, new qualia may be introduced and merged with the al-
ready existing ones, in order to recognize their entire collection as a (meaningful)
sign. This potential of the brain could be due to its capacity for maintaining the
activation of its input for a longer time, thereby enabling the signs generated
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to modify the input and initiate further processing, instead of using those signs
to generate signals for the motor sub-system. This way the brain may control
the activation of its effectors and possibly even block them. For example, if we
hear shouting ‘Fire!’ we will not run away, if we are able to abductively derive
that the sound comes from a motion picture that we are watching.
7.5 Sample abduction
Following the revised model of perception, the relative difference between the
qualia, af=damaged-tree-at-branching and a’c =marking-tree-prototype can be
interpreted as a new effect, transforming the observed damaged tree to a mark-
ing tree. In other words, it is a’c \af in terms of which a’c can be potentially
more meaningful than af . By ‘applying’ this difference to af , as an effect, the
injury can be conceptually removed from the input state.
a’c \af = marking-tree-prototype\damaged-tree-at-branching
= tree-at-branching
This value of new-b has the potential for transforming the qualia of the
damaged to the prototypical qualia of a marking tree. The abducted new effect
qualia may trigger new memory response, for example, b’=marking-tree-prototype,
representing the potential of the revised input for exhibiting the properties of
a marking tree. As the input tree is damaged, there must be complementary
qualia indicating that status, for example, ac=injury. Also this quale may
contribute to the abduction of a new effect:
a’f \ac = tree-prototype\injury
= tree-injury
This value of new-b has the potential for transforming the prototypical qualia
of a genuine tree to the qualia of an injured tree. The abducted new effect
may trigger new memory response, for instance, b’=tree-injury-prototype. In the
current example it will be assumed that the final term of new-b (a’c \ac) cannot
contribute to the definition of a new effect:
a’c \ac = marking-tree-prototype\injury
= tree-injury
Besides new effect qualia, new state qualia can be generated by means of
abduction:
new-a: = a’f ∗af
= tree-prototype∗damaged-tree-at-branching
= tree-at-branching
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The representation of a new state must be possible (this time tree-at-branching
is used as a reference to an a-type quale), for the memory sign a’f =tree-prototype
may contain information about branching, but is unlikely to contain informa-
tion about tree injuries (originally this was the reason why Bambi could not
recognize the observed damaged tree as an injured genuine tree).
Conform the revised model of perception, the abducted new qualia are type-
wise merged with the qualia of the original input, enabling the following defini-
tion of the input signs of perception (abducted new qualia are indicated by the
subscript “new”; comments are preceded by a percent sign). Although some
of the symbols, such as tree-at-branching and marking-tree-prototype, are used am-
biguously as a state or an effect, the meaning of those symbols is always clear
from the context.
a = damaged-tree-at-branching, tree-at-branchingnew , % af
injury % ac
a’ = tree-prototype, % a’f
marking-tree-prototype % a’c
b = shadow-on-the-left,
tree-at-branchingnew ,
tree-injurynew
b’ = branching-state-prototype,
marking-tree-prototypenew ,
tree-injury-prototypenew
The qualisigns of cognition are defined as follows:
A = tree?, % damaged-tree-at-branching∗tree-prototype
tree % tree-at-branching∗tree-prototype
¬A = other-tree
B = injury, % tree-injury∗tree-injury-prototype
to-branch % shadow-on-the-left∗branching-state-prototype
¬B = not-to-branch
Although this input still contains the qualia of a damaged tree, the important
good news is that the revised representation of the input as a state (A) contains
the meaning of a genuine tree. The new qualisigns enable the generation of a
new icon and sinsign:
A+B = tree?+injury, tree?+to-branch, tree+injury, tree+to-branch
= some-tree
A∗B = wounding
as well as the generation of a new rheme (details are omitted):
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damaged−tree
some−tree wounding
Figure 7.5: The generation of a new rheme sign
A∗¬B = tree?∗not-to-branch, tree∗not-to-branch
¬A∗B = other-tree∗to-branch, other-tree∗injury
The first term (A∗¬B) is an expression of the input as a potential tree or
‘tree-like’ entity, remotely related to ‘branching’. The second term (¬A∗B) is an
expression of the input as a potential branching event, in relation to some injured
‘tree-like’ entity. A synonymous interpretation of the two rheme signs can be
represented as ‘a-tree-which-has-been-damaged-though-has-the-potential-for-in-
-dicating-the-branching-of-a-path’, in short, damaged-tree. The signs generated
so far are recapitulated in fig. 7.5. As ¬A∗B contains the meaning of a branch-
ing, and therefore also the meaning of a potential marking tree, and A∗¬B the
meaning of a genuine tree, Bambi’s earlier signs may arise again (see fig. 7.2),
he can go grazing at last.
Such a process, generating a potentially more adequate interpretation of a
phenomenon through introducing new qualia by means of memory knowledge,
is called in this thesis ‘naive’ abduction. If the abductively generated proposi-
tion can be evaluated true, the input qualia can be used for adjusting existing
habits by means of learning. The potential of abduction for learning (including
learning from negative examples) is beyond the scope of this research, however.
According to this thesis, information processing and learning may be viewed as
orthogonal ‘dimensions’ of information processing, indicating that the model of
cognitive activity of sect. 2.3 can be combined with any strategy for learning.
Although Bambi can be satisfied by now, information processing may not
yet be finished, as the abducted new qualia may allow further sign processing,
recursively. This is illustrated with the earlier index sign (scenery) and the
newly generated sinsign (wounding) which may be used for the generation of
a more complete representation of the complementary qualia of the observed
phenomenon, as follows.
In conformity with their complementary meaning, the abducted complemen-
tary memory signs (a’c , b’c ) are not involved in the representation of the input
qualia that are in the focus. By extending the observer’s attention, by means
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(some−tree)
damage−due−to−biting
wounding−by−biting
bark−biting
symptoms−of−
bark−injury(damaged−tree)
Figure 7.6: The new signs implicated by the abducted event of wounding
(by an animal). Signs that are unchanged are indicated in parentheses.
of abduction, new complementary signs (¬A, ¬B) and novel index signs can be
generated, possibly recursively. In this process, the revised sinsign (wounding)
is mediating between the revised input qualisigns and the index sign (preceding
abduction), as a consequence of the processing schema, requiring that the input
qualia are first represented as an actual event (A∗B), before their representation
as an index sign. The revised sinsign may indirectly contribute to the gener-
ation of a revised index sign (due to the coordination function of the index),
for example, symptoms-of-bark-injury, representing such an event (¬A∗¬B) and
a state (¬A+¬B).
The modification of the index sign (context) may trigger a further revision
of the representation of input as an actual event (sinsign). This may include the
incorporation in the meaning of the sinsign the possible events of bark injury, as
well as, the abduction of new effect qualia and memory signs. By adjusting the
sinsign, new qualia can be introduced that may not be directly related to the
original input. This may enable the recognition of events, different from those
indicated by the observed phenomenon, such as the event of stripping, carving,
or biting (by an animal). There may be many such events, but only those will
be considered for interpretation that are compatible with the meaning of the
existing rheme sign (damaged-tree). An example of such an event is the act of
biting (by an animal). The incorporation of this event, and the corresponding
effect qualia may as well trigger the revision of the legisign (damage-due-to-biting)
and the index sign (symptoms-of-bark-injury), the latter due to its reference to
the bark of the tree. The signs generated by this process are depicted in fig. 7.6.
7.6 Sign recognition as a ‘game’
An important result of abductive sign recognition is that Bambi’s final sign (go-
grazing) may arise again, allowing him to proceed as usual. But this is not the
only possible benefit of this process. By focusing on the abductively generated
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new qualia, new memory response signs can be introduced, both focused and
complementary. In virtue of the brain’s assumed potential for shifting its focus,
for example, triggered by a high intensity memory response or an internally
generated change (e.g. a saccadic movement of the eyes), new memory signs may
arise and trigger further abduction recursively. Such a process is like a ‘game’,
in which, signs are repeatedly generated and revised, as long as a consistent
set of representations is obtained. The ‘goal’ of ‘naive’ reasoning, including
abduction, is the generation of such a collection of signs.
This is illustrated above by the generation of the revised sinsign (wounding-
by-biting) which may be summarized as follows. The input qualia as qualisigns
are the first approximation of the meaning of the observed phenomenon. By
abductively extending the collection of input qualia, we may broaden our focus.
If the entire collection of input and abducted new qualia can be interpreted
as a (meaningful) sign, the process of sign recognition terminates. As for the
sinsign this means that, by ‘freezing’ its event meaning, new qualia extending
the observer’s focus can be looked for. The condition for abduction is such
that the generated new qualia must be be compatible with, and enable the
existing (‘frozen’) interpretation of sinsign. The abduction of new qualia may
also introduce new complementary qualia (as A and ¬A, but also B and ¬B
arise due to the same input stimulus), but only those that enable to keep the
existing sinsign invariantly meaningful.
For the generation of a revised legisign, that sinsign is selected from the pos-
sible event interpretations of the input, which is compatible with the meaning
of the existing index sign. To this end, the event meaning of biting (sinsign)
has to be removed from the interpretation of the input as some-tree (icon).
As a result, the representation of the input can be generated, as the abstract
meaning of ‘biting’ (¬A∗B), as well as, the expression of the input as an en-
tity capable of enduring such an effect (A∗¬B). The revised legisign is called
damage-due-to-biting. By complementing this sign with the information of the
index (symptoms-of-bark-injury), the rule-like meaning of the legisign can be in-
ductively generalized in the predicate: bark-biting. A similar complementation
of the rheme (damaged-tree), by the index sign (symptoms-of-bark-injury) may
deductively generalize the rheme in the representation of the subject: bark-
bitten-tree (see also fig. 7.7).
7.6.1 The effects of ‘naive’ abduction
What may happen, if we put together the above signs yielded by deductive and
inductive generalization? It turns out that their combination can be interpreted
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damaged−tree
some−tree
damage−due−to−biting
bark−bitten−tree
wounding−by−biting
bark−biting
symptoms−of−
bark−injury
Figure 7.7: The signs of the sample nested phenomenon
as a proposition about the nested phenomenon: ‘causation-of-damage-to-a-tree’.
This sign, characterizing the conditions of our original predicate (turn-to-the-
east), can be degenerately represented as a quale and recognized as a state
undergoing the effect of the nesting phenomenon. In the domain of ‘naive’
semantic symbols, such an entity is usually called the theme or the patient of
the observed phenomenon.
The example of the previous section illustrates how complementary qualia
can be recognized by means of nesting. Natural language processing makes bene-
ficial use of this potential of cognitive activity, by introducing transitive forms for
certain verbs. For example, if experience shows that ‘damaged-tree-phenomena’
frequently occur, this may motivate the introduction of a transitive form for the
verb ‘branch’ (representing turn-left-or-right) such as ‘branch+<location>’.
Because the input qualia and the prototypical memory response may not
precisely match, perceptual judgments or the first or immediate interpretations
of the input may not adequately represent its meaning. One may improve on
this shortcoming, by offering an abductive analysis to the observed qualia. This
may include the generation of an extended set of qualisigns, enabling poten-
tially more meaningful interpretations of the input. The generated (new) signs,
representing the observer’s reaction to the input as a stimulus, or his/her solu-
tion for the input as a ‘problem’, may be memorized or learned as habits. New
memory information may be derived from those meaningful ‘solutions’, that are
hypotheses, through degenerately representing them as qualia.
In the view of this thesis, it is the diversity of such qualia that makes an
adequate explanation of prototypical memory signs so difficult or even impos-
sible. In sum, the ‘core business’ of abduction is the generation of suitable
memory qualia, thereby exploring the extension (a’ ) and comprehension (b’ ) of
the potential concepts of the brain.
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Figure 7.8: The classification of the three modes of ‘naive’ reasoning
7.6.2 Naive reasoning recapitulated
The process of sign recognition has the element of deduction in the interaction
between the rheme and the index, and the element of induction in the interac-
tion between the index and the legisign. This relationship of the three modes
of ‘naive’ inferences is illustrated in fig. 7.8. Because the abduction of new
qualia may entail a revised analysis of the entire input, abduction must contain
the element of deduction and induction, both. As the sign recognition process
includes the element of abduction in the predication sign interaction, and this
element is also included in the introduction of the input qualia, and their ab-
stract representations (cf. rheme and legisign), sign recognition, and so, ‘naive’
reasoning as a process is basically abductive and, within that framework, it is
deductive and inductive. The last two types of ‘naive’ inferences are coordinated
by the index sign, mediating the premises of the rheme and the legisign to their
interpretation in a conclusion.
7.7 Logica Docens
The logica docens stems from our logica utens. Though a full account of this
relation is beyond the goals of this thesis, in this section an attempt is made
to illustrate the above dependency for syllogistic logic, which is at the heart of
any formal theory of reasoning. It will be suggested that syllogistic reasoning
can be modeled as a sequential version of sign recognition, similar to ‘naive’
language processing, except that now input qualia are interpreted as premises.
The main result of this section is that the three syllogistic schemes or figures,
introduced by Aristotle (see fig. 7.9) can be interpreted as a ‘syntactic’ structure
underlying the three modes of ‘naive’ reasoning. Insofar as syllogistic reason-
ing is basically deductive, the three schemes are characterized as subtypes of
deductive inferencing.
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Figure 7.9: The three syllogistic schemes of figures of Aristotle
On the basis of the term structure of the inference modes it can be concluded
that scheme-2 and scheme-3 have the elements of abduction and induction,
respectively, due to the medium term functioning as the predicate (scheme-2)
and the subject (scheme-3). The two schemes above can be interpreted as
a process. Scheme-2: ‘In the beginning we know A is C. From X is C we
abductively conclude that A and X must have something in common, that is, A
is X, too’; scheme-3: ‘Initially we know C is X. From C is B we conclude that B
can be inductively generalized in X, that is, X is B’ too (X is more general than
B). Scheme-1 has the element of deduction, due to its potential for propagating
the properties of the predicate (B) to the subject (A), through the mediating
term X.
7.7.1 Structural analysis
Syllogistic inferences consist of three propositions, functioning as case, rule and
result. In this section the idea is proposed that it is possible to assign these
functions to the meaning of a minor, and a major premise, and the conclusion
of a syllogistic scheme, respectively.
In deductive inferencing, the conclusion (result) is a consequence of the major
and minor premises, which are rule and case, respectively. The mechanism of
induction is fundamentally different. According to Peirce, the key to induction
is that
by taking the conclusion so reached as major premiss of a syllogism,
and the proposition stating that such and such objects are taken from
the class in question as the minor premiss, the other premiss of the
induction will follow from them deductively (CP 5.274).
This means that induction must be an inference of the major premise of a
syllogism, from the minor premise and the conclusion. Following this analysis,
the three schemes of syllogistic reasoning can be characterized as indicated in
fig. 7.10.
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Figure 7.10: A functional characterization of the three inference schemes
From the point of view of its characteristic meaning, a premise can be ‘gen-
eral’ or ‘experienced’. This may be explained by means of scheme-1, as follows.
Aristotle proved (Bochenski, 1961) that from Barbara (scheme-1) any other
syllogism can be generated by means of two transformations, conversio3 and
reductio ad impossibile4 (the explanation of this section is restricted to the
structure of the three figures, the aspects of quantification and negation are
left out of consideration). Aristotle additionally assumed that any conclusion
must be derived from a major and a minor premise. But what are the ori-
gins of these premises? According to Peirce, some may come from experience,
but since Barbara requires a universal premise and experience without cognition
(and learning) cannot be universal, the original major premise cannot be derived
from experience alone. Thus, Peirce concluded, only minor premises can come
from experience, major premises exist and have their truth in the brain (Fann,
1970). The model of ‘naive’ reasoning presented in this chapter assumes that
such general premises correspond to rules, representing habits and abstractions.
7.7.2 A classification of the sign of reasoning
On the basis of the above considerations, a classification of syllogistic concepts
can be defined as a nonadic hierarchy. This is displayed in fig. 7.11 (argument
signs, representing a hypothesis, are assumed to function as a case, in a later
syllogistic inference). The definition of the mapping of premises to their function
as case, rule, or result, makes use of Aristotle’s assumption that syllogistic terms
represented by formal variables can be subject to renaming and, furthermore,
that in a syllogistic inference the order of the premises is free.
The relation between the Aristotelian modes, the schemes of inference, and
the Peircean signs, as meaning aspects, can be summarized as follows. Qual-
isigns, as well as the signs generated by sorting (cf. icon and sinsign) are expe-
rienced, indicating that these signs must be representations of a minor premise.
3SOME S is P ⇔ SOME P is S.
4X,Y→ Z ⇔ NOT Z,X→ NOT Y.
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Figure 7.11: The syllogistic meaning of signs and sign interactions. ‘Naive’
reasoning is modeled as a sequential process. The expression in the qualisign
position indicates a premise having the form either of A Y , or Y B.
Because, in the process of sign recognition, the complementary qualia repre-
senting the background of the observation, are experienced too,5 the index sign
of the input too must represent a minor premise (in accordance with their log-
ical meaning, index signs can have two representations that are each other’s
converses). The signs obtained through abstraction represent the input as the
minor and major premise of deductive and inductive inferences. In line with
the similarity between ‘naive’ logical inferencing and ‘naive’ language process-
ing, sorting and abstraction may correspond to degenerate sign interactions (in
the model of language processing, in sect. 5.1.1, such interactions were called a
coercion).
The rheme and the legisign represent the input, as a possible for an actual
existent (subject), and a law-like property (predicate), respectively. From the
syllogistic point of view, such a general meaning agrees with a major premise.
The dicent sign signifies the input as an actual existent, arising as an instance
of the range of possible entities indicated by the rheme. As such an instance is
directly related to the input qualia, that are experienced, the dicent sign must
be include the meaning of a minor premise. The symbol sign, finally, is the
expression of the law-like property of the legisign in context, and as such, must
include the meaning of a major premise.
The above classification holds for the process of cognition. In the perception
process, the ‘naive’ reasoning interpretation of the signs is slightly different.
This is due to the different ‘goal’ of perception, which is the recognition of the
individual meaning of the input qualia. In this process, it is the index sign
(memory) that is a representation of a general meaning (major premise). This
5This view is supported by the interpretation of the index (¬A+¬B, ¬A∗¬B) as a sorting-
like representation of the complementary qualia (¬A, ¬B).
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is opposed to the rheme and the legisign of this process, which refer to perceived
qualia, that are experienced (minor premise). This difference between the two
processes, perception and cognition, does not affect the relation between the
syllogistic schemes and their process interpretations, however.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the meaning of an average or ‘discrete’
value, and the meaning of a ‘continuous’ domain included in A(¬A) and B(¬B),
respectively, could be used for the definition of the interpretation of these terms,
as quantified expressions. A(¬A) could be associated with the meaning aspect
of ‘SOME’ (∃), and B(¬B) with the meaning aspect of ‘ALL’ (∀).
This closes the analysis of ‘naive’ reasoning, in this chapter. The three
types of inferences, deduction, induction and abduction, as the major methods
of reasoning, are beyond the possibilities of this research. However, ‘naive’
induction will be subject to further study in the next chapter, in which, its
function in mathematical induction will be analyzed.
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Chapter 8
Mathematical signs
The obvious or ‘naive’ concepts of mathematics are due to our innate capacity
for interpreting ‘real’ world phenomena as numbers. The premise of this chapter
is that ‘naive’ mathematics can be modeled as a kind of sign recognition process,
similarly to the symbols of ‘naive’ logic and natural language. The results of
this chapter indicate that the concepts of ‘naive’ mathematics, for example,
mathematical types, may function as mediating elements between the concepts
of ‘naive’ logic and those of ‘naive’ or natural language. The importance of this
close relationship between ‘naive’ mathematics and sign recognition is due to the
potential of (naive) mathematics to be interpreted as a representation of ‘real’
world phenomena, indicating the possibility of a ‘real’ mathematical universe.
As the focus of this chapter is on ‘naive’ mathematical signs, the ‘naive’ prefix
can be omitted.
8.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to show that the representation introduced in this the-
sis can be applied to the mathematical domain as well. Similarly to the model
of reasoning signs, the focus is restricted to the ‘naive’ or obvious meaning
of observed phenomena. What makes the ‘naive’ mathematical domain espe-
cially important is that its concepts underlie the complex meaning of abstract
mathematical notions. This relation will be illustrated by the definition of a
‘naive’ mathematical interpretation of the concept of infinity. In traditional
computational models of knowledge representation, for example, in program-
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ming languages, the notorious problem of infinite numbers is usually ‘solved’ by
introducing a maximum value (e.g. ‘max_int’). Clearly, such a value cannot
capture the full meaning of infinity. This chapter will foster the idea that the
representation of infinity can be more adequately solved by making use of the
prototypical meaning of memory signs. Besides the concept of infinity, attention
will be paid to the questions why in the mathematical domain we need types,
how ‘naive’ mathematics is related to ‘naive’ logic and natural language, and
why mathematical induction requires three steps.
8.2 Cardinality as a sign
The theory of ‘naive’ mathematical signs proposed in this chapter is based on
the possible interpretation of cardinality as a sign. The first part of this section
is devoted to an overview of the neuro-physiological grounds for the perception
of cardinality. In the second part, it will be shown how this ability of the brain
may contribute to the interpretation of cardinality as a number.
8.2.1 Counting abilities
A recent neuro-physiological research, by (Nieder, Freedman, & Miller, 2002),
experimentally proved the existence of number-encoding neurons in the brain.
Such neurons fire maximally in response to a specific preferred number, correctly
signifying a wide variety of displays in which the cues are not confounded. For
instance, one such neuron might respond maximally to displays of four items,
somewhat less to displays of three or five items, and none at all to displays of one
or two items. It does not matter whether the displays are equalized according
to perimeter, area, shape, linear arrangement, or density, such neurons attend
only to number.
The number-encoding neurons are able to recognize the number of similar1
items from 1 up to 5, but the representation of numbers gets increasingly fuzzy
for larger and larger numbers. Many neurons fire selectively 120 ms after display
onset, whatever the number on the screen, indicating that the neurons ‘count’
without counting (i.e. without enumerating items one by one).
The evolution of number-encoding neurons may entail superiority of a species,
as information about the number of preys or predators can be crucial in cer-
tain situations. An exotic example of a possible counter evaluation may be the
1Similarity is assumed to hold trivially for single entities.
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striped skin of zebras. The intertwining stripes of a group of zebras can make
the recognition of their number most troublesome.
The experimental results suggest that the primary meaning of the signals
produced by the number-encoding neurons is iconic. This is opposed to the
mathematical interpretation of cardinality, which is symbolic. The intermediate
indexical concept, linking the iconic and the symbolic interpretations, is the
concept of ordering. The hidden agenda of this chapter is an attempt to show
that, although those three interpretations of number signs are different, they
can be modeled in a uniform manner.
According to (Nieder et al., 2002), the signal of the number-encoding neurons
is vague already for low numbers, contradicting the common experience that
the brain is able to accurately stipulate cardinality (up to a limit) without
symbolic counting. In this chapter the hypothesis is raised that the number-
encoding neurons could function analogously to the color receptors of the eye.
An interesting property of color perception is that it is independent from the
number of the receptors simultaneously discharged.
The perception of cardinality is modeled as follows. Following (Nieder et al.,
2002), input entities that are similar to each other are assumed to be represented
by the brain as cardinality qualia, enabling the interpretation of the entire input,
as a number. Because cardinality, as a quale, arises in the brain and not in the
senses, the perception of a phenomenon as a number must be accounted for by
a higher level process, interpreting cardinality as a memory sign. Notice the
ambiguous use of ‘cardinality’, as a quale arising for each similar input item
(state), and a (cardinal) number representing their collection as a whole.
In line with the results of the neuro-physiological study mentioned above,
it will be assumed that the brain is capable of distinguishing the collection of
input state qualia in three types:
• no num
The entire input is recognized as a single entity. The number-encoding
neurons are not active. Cardinality does not arise as a quale.
• one or more
The input is represented as a small multitude of similar items. Some of
the number-encoding neurons are active. Cardinality arises as a quale; its
value can be recognized as a number.
• many
The input is interpreted as a large multitude of similar items. The number-
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encoding neurons are all active. Although cardinality does arise as a quale,
its value is too vague to be recognized as a number.
The boundary between no num and one or more is usually marked by collec-
tions consisting of one or two similar entities. Linguistic evidence for the latter,
in English, is found in the distinction between singular, two, and plural, such
as one, both, but all three, all four, or a trouser, a pair of trousers, but many trousers.
Singular, but also two always refer to a small multitude, representing a mini-
mal value of some sort. The boundary between one or more and many is usually
less sharp, but it could be between 5 and 9, in accordance with the capacity of
the brain for a simultaneous storage of signs in the so-called ‘working memory’
(Miller, 1956), (Broadbent, 1975).
The next section contains as analysis of the important case of one or more.
An analysis of the case of many is postponed until sect. 8.5.
8.3 The concept of finite numbers
Because cardinality as a memory sign is independent from the input effect,
it must be an a’ -type memory sign. And because it is not representing the
primary meaning of the input, it must be a complementary type memory sign
(a’c ). The interpretation of phenomena, as a number, may proceed as follows.
If, for any reason, the primary meaning of the input is found unsatisfactory, the
brain may seek for a more suitable interpretation, by means of abduction. The
modeling issues of such a process have been the subject of the previous chapter.
This chapter is concerned with the idea that abduction could also underlie the
‘naive’ mathematical interpretation of phenomena as a number.
8.3.1 Iconic number signs
The first level in the mathematical recognition of phenomena is based on an
iconic interpretation of cardinality qualia. This may be illustrated with the
cognition of a multitude of similar cubic bodies as a number. In the example
below, the existence of the following input and memory response qualia are
assumed:2
2As in earlier chapters, Peirce’s nine signs and ‘naive’ logical expressions are used as refer-
ences to the status of a sign in the process of sign recognition.
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(Perception)
a = cube
a’ = memory-sign-of-cube, memory-sign-of-cardinality
b = cubic-form, size
b’ = memory-sign-of-cubic-form, memory-sign-of-size
(Cognition)
A = a∗a’= cube % cube∗memory-sign-of-cube
¬A = a+a’= cardinality % cube+memory-sign-of-cardinality
B = b∗b’= form % cubic form∗memory-sign-of-cubic-form
¬B = b+b’= size % size+memory-sign-of-size
The primary meaning of the input is ‘cube IS form’, that may be paraphrased
as the proposition ‘some cubic entities are there’. If, for any reason, this proposi-
tion is found to be unsatisfactory, new input qualia may be introduced by means
of abduction. As pointed out earlier (see sect. 7.4.1), the abducted new-a qualia
are always included in the original collection of a-type input qualia. However,
the abducted new-b qualia may represent an effect, ‘transforming’ the observed
cubic entity (a) to a cardinality (a’ ). As usual, the abducted new qualia may
trigger new memory response signs.
The current example restricts itself to a definition of the abducted new qualia
in relation to their memory response, as the qualisigns of a cognitive process:
A = cube % a cubic multitude;
¬A = unit-value % the increment value of counting;
B = cardinality % cardinality as an property;
¬B = growth % incrementation as a property;
The interpretation of the above input signs, as a number, proceeds as follows
(see also fig. 8.1). The icon (A+B) and sinsign (A∗B) are an expression of the
simultaneously present similar entities and cardinality qualia, as a possible co-
existence (similar-items), and an actual event (number-event), respectively. As
cardinality qualia may arise for any countable phenomenon, the sinsign may
represent the input as a number, independently from the sort of similar entities
simultaneously present.
The rheme (A∗¬B, ¬A∗B) is an expression of the abstract meaning of the
observed cubic bodies and cardinalities, as the primary entities of counting
(number-base). The legisign (A∗¬B+¬A∗B) represents the rule-like meaning of
counting such abstract entities (rule-of-counting), by means of accumulating the
input cardinality qualia on a stack. The accumulated value is interpreted as a
measure, iconically representing the input as a number.
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Figure 8.1: Iconic representation of number-phenomena
An essential component of any procedure for counting is the unit value of that
operation. Such a value can be interpreted both as a increment (value), and as
an act of incrementation (property). For example, small cubes may be counted
in steps of 1/10, if a collection of ten pieces of small cubes is equivalent to a large
cube. According to the theory of this chapter, such a value and property, as a
type (incr), is the meaning of the complementary information or the context of
observed number phenomena, captured by the index sign (¬A+¬B, ¬A∗¬B).
The complementation of the abstract rheme sign with information provided
by the context (index sign) is represented as an actually existent multitude
(A+¬B) and cardinality value (¬A+B). The synonymous interpretation of
these dicent signs is an expression of the input as a computable entity, or the
subject of the observed number-phenomenon. The analogous complementation
of the legisign obtains the symbol sign, representing the input as a conventional
(cardinality) property, or the predicate (A∗B+¬A∗¬B). It is this property in
terms of which the subject can be interpreted as a number. In a computational
setting, the predicate sign of iconic number phenomena may be called the ‘al-
gorithm for counting B-number of A-entities by means of accumulation’. The
predicate (symbol sign) may use type information provided by the complemen-
tary qualia via the mediation of the index sign.
The final step in the recognition of the input as a number consists in the
interaction between the subject and the predicate of the input phenomenon.
This is represented by the argument sign, expressing the input a measure of
similar entities, which is iconic knowledge (multitude IS cardinality).
Evidence for counting by means of accumulation is found in a recent exper-
imental study by (Wittlinger, Wehner, & Wolf, 2006), proving that desert ants
measure distances by means of some kind of step integrator, or “step counter”.
In the experiment, the legs, and hence the stride length of freely walking ants
were manipulated. Animals with elongated or shortened legs took larger or
shorter strides, respectively. Travel distance is overestimated by ants walking
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on elongated legs, and underestimated by ants walking on shortened legs.
8.3.2 Inclusion ordering
Indexical interpretation of number-phenomena is the brain’s potential for or-
dering multitudes, without symbolical counting. This ability can be shown to
be present in children already at the age of two (Bullock & Gelman, 1977).
A sample ordering phenomenon may be defined as follows. Assume there
are two collections of cubes, one on the left- and another on the right-hand
side of a separating line, and that the task is the recognition of the relation
between those collections, as an ordering relation. Additionally assume that the
cardinality of the left-hand side collection is already available as a memory sign,
and the task is concerned with the recognition of the cardinality of the collection
on the right-hand side (nr), in the light of the cardinality of the collection on
the left-hand side (nl). The recognition of an ordering relation defined by the
two multitudes, which is indexical knowledge, may proceed as follows.
The argument sign of the recognition of the left-hand side collection (nl), as
an iconic number-phenomenon, is degenerately represented as a complementary
quale: ac:=nl, a’c :=nl (ac and a’c are a representation of nl as a cardinality
and a number, respectively; such a twofold interpretation of nl is possible, as
cardinality arises in a memory sign, and, in an abduction (cf. sect. 7.4.1),
memory signs can be interpreted as input qualia). In addition, it will be assumed
that the subsequently recognized number sign of the right-hand side collection
(nr) is represented analogously, this time, as a quale which is in the focus:
af :=nr; a’f :=nr.
These signs can be used for the recognition of the input, as an ordering-
phenomenon, as follows. By interpreting a’ and a, as the previous and current
percepts, respectively, new qualia can be generated through abduction, as de-
picted in fig. 8.2. Remember that a=af+ac and a’=a’f +a’c (cf. sect. 7.4) and,
that a relation in the sense of agreement (‘∗’) is only possible between qualia
that are in the focus (a’f and af ). A relation in the sense of possibility (‘+’)
may exist between all other combinations of focused and complementary qualia,
such as a’c and af , a’f and ac, and a’c and ac (cf. sect. 7.4.1).
new-a := a’∗a
= a’f ∗af
= nr
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Figure 8.2: The recognition of ordering-phenomena
new-b := a’\a
= a’c \af+a’f \ac+a’c \ac
= nl\nr+nr\nl
The relative difference operation is used for the implementation of subtrac-
tion of (iconic) numbers represented as sets. This operation may not always be
meaningful. For example, nr\nl can only be interpreted as an ordering relation
(‘<’), only if nl<nr. In conformity with the model of perception (sect. 3.1), the
difference of the previous and current percepts can only represent qualia which
were not there, but are there now. Similarly, nl\nr can only be interpreted as
an ordering relation (‘>’), only if nl>nr. Put differently, the relative difference
of iconic numbers (substraction) can be interpreted as an ordering sign, if the
accumulated cardinality of the subtrahend is not less than the accumulated car-
dinality of the subtracter. If both ordering relations can be recognized, then nl
and nr must be equal (‘=’).
The abductively generated new qualisigns may contribute to the recognition
of the input as an ordering-phenomenon, representing the inclusion relation
of the right-hand side collection (r), with respect to the one on the left-hand
side one (l). This relation can be expressed as a proposition: ‘r R l’, where
R∈{<,=,>}.
8.3.3 Symbolic number signs
What makes the indexical representation of cardinality especially important is
that it underlies the symbolic interpretation of phenomena as a number. This
potential of ordering signs may be illustrated by the rheme sign (number-base),
and how its meaning is involved in the symbolic signs of number phenomena.
The basic concepts of symbolic counting are the primary symbolic numbers
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(cf. cardinal numbers), representing cardinalities that we are able to recognize
‘naively’. As the properties of symbolic counting are well known, the focus of
this section is restricted to an analysis of the relation between the symbolic
and the indexical interpretation of number-phenomena. To this end, the earlier
example of the cubes is revisited and in this section the problem is considered
how the collections on the left- and the right-hand side of the separating line
may be rearranged such that, eventually there are equally many cubes on both
sides.
Children not possessing the concept of symbolic counting tend to solve this
problem by first collecting all cubes on one side of the separating line and then,
by moving cubes one-by-one, they iconically ‘count’ their number on the two
sides, in order to indexically determine equality. Those familiar with symbolic
numbers may attain the same goal simply by means of symbolic calculation.
If solving the above problem is supervised, and the act of moving a cube is
repeatedly followed by the articulation of “one cube”, the ordering operation
as well as the referencing to a cube may become rule-like associated with the
numeral “one”. By executing the operation for different number of cubes and
other entities, the prototypical meaning of “one”, representing ‘anything count-
able’, may arise through abstraction. In general, a finite number of numerals
can be learned analogously.
The prototypical meaning of symbolic numbers emerges from entities found
to be similar in earlier observations, by means of averaging and domain forma-
tion. An example is the symbolic meaning of “one”, as the value ‘1’ (state),
and as the operation ‘incrementation by 1’ (effect), amongst others. Large mul-
titudes can be recognized recursively by focusing on contiguous segments of the
input qualia, and recognizing them as nested number-phenomena. But large
multitudes may be more conveniently counted by making use of symbolic num-
bers. As the rules of symbolic counting are syntactical, similarly to the rules of
language processing, the definition of a model for the recognition of symbolic
numbers is omitted.
8.4 A ‘real world’ of mathematics
From the assumption that ‘naive’ mathematical signs arise from the observation
of ‘real’ world phenomena, it follows that a ‘real’ mathematical universe may
exist. That ‘world’ too must consist of phenomena that are interactions between
states and (cardinality) effects, except that such effects are of a special kind:
they have the potential to interact with any state. This is a consequence of
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the earlier assumption, that cardinality as a quale may arise for any countable
multitude. ‘Real’ world phenomena can be commonly interpreted as ‘existence-
events’. This is opposed to the phenomena of the mathematical ‘universe’ which
can be commonly characterized as ‘cardinality-events’. Because, in the mathe-
matical ‘world’, states are inherently related to cardinality effects, all state (a)
can be interpreted as a number: an ‘a-number’. For example, in the recognition
of a multitude of cubic objects as a number, initially it has been assumed that
each similar cubic entity is marked by a cardinality quality. The interpretation
of those cubic entities as a number can be generalized in the concept of ‘cube-
type-cardinality-sign’, or simply, ‘cube-number’, which may be used as a unit
value in an algorithm for counting cubic entities.
Number signs, or simply, numbers can be degenerately represented as a
state and such qualia can be considered similar hence countable, in a recursive
process. An illustrating example is be the number-phenomenon: sin2(x). In
this expression, the function sin( ) is representing an effect, interacting with
the function parameter x, which is interpreted as a state. In addition, sin( )
itself is functioning as a state too, in the interaction with the function ↑2, which
is an effect.
Such a flexibility of symbol use is not characteristic for natural language, in
which symbols representing a state or an effect are not interpreted interchange-
ably. An example is the verb run, interpreted as a syntactic effect. If we are
about to use the same symbol as a syntactic state, the verbal relational proper-
ties have to be removed, and run has to be interpreted as a noun. Mathematical
signification is free from this rigidity of re-presentation. The meaning of sin( ),
as an effect, is invariantly present in the interpretation of sin2(x), the second
power of sin(x). This is witnessed by the potential of sin2(x) to map its pa-
rameter x, which is a state, to its image sin(x), which is another state in the
function ↑2. The rigidity of natural language signs might be a consequence of
the concreteness of language signs, as opposed to the mathematical signs which
are more abstract.
Inasmuch as in the mathematical world all states may interact with all car-
dinality effects, the representation of symbol interactions is free from any con-
straints. However, following the assumption that mathematical signs are about
‘real’ world phenomena (possibly through a sequence of re-presentation steps),
the mathematical ‘universe’ must be part of the ‘real’ world, in which interac-
tions are subject to constraints. This roughly means that an entity may interact
with certain other entities, but that it may not interact with all kinds of entities.
In order to avoid the danger of chaos, mathematical symbol interactions are
checked for correctness, for example, by verifying the ‘well-formedness’ of the
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state and effect qualia of an interaction. To this end, mathematics introduced
the concept of a type. In the next section, it will be advocated that mathematical
types may arise, through refinement and generalization, from the indexical level
concept of the increment (incr).
8.4.1 Mathematical types
The correctness of mathematical operations included in the meaning of number-
phenomena may be affirmed by making use of complementary information about
the input state and effect, mediated by the context. A mathematical operation
shall be called well-formed, if the underlying number-phenomenon can be rec-
ognized as an index sign. The dicent and symbol signs of a mathematical phe-
nomenon, which arise from the rheme and legisign through complementation by
the index sign, contain all information necessary for a meaningful interpretation
of the input operation. As the complementary qualia of a phenomenon may sig-
nify the relation between the input and memory in the sense of possibility, the
mathematical index sign may only represent the observed operation in a general
sense, through a reference to the rule-like meaning of a type.
The model introduced in this chapter assumes that the mathematical index
sign is expressive of the type compatibility of the input qualia, as the con-
stituents of the observed operation (¬A+¬B). In addition, the index sign is
also an expression of the type of the entire input phenomenon, as a mathemat-
ical operation (¬A∗¬B). This type checking by the index sign enables the sign
recognition process to ‘find out’ whether the input phenomenon is a meaningful
combination of qualia, or is due to a malfunction, e.g. a hallucination.
According to this thesis, the index sign is the key to mathematical sign
recognition. As mentioned above, in the mathematical ‘universe’, (cardinality)
effects can also be interpreted as a state, which brings about the need for a
special treatment of number-phenomena. Because a mathematical function, as
a state, preserves its meaning as an effect, the well-formedness of mathematical
expressions requires that the sign interactions are properly typed. The expres-
sion of such a type is the meaning of mathematical index signs. In sum, if the
input can be recognized in a type (index sign), this indicates that the observed
mathematical operation can be meaningful.
The basic type of cardinality, ‘natural’ numbers, arises through generaliza-
tion, from the obvious meaning of mathematical index signs (incr), which is
enumeration. By applying this type to the input entities recognized as an ab-
stract state (number-base) and effect (rule-of-counting), the representation of the
input as a natural number may be obtained. For example, the ‘naive’ mathe-
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matical meaning of a collection of cubes may arise through the interpretation
of each cube as an abstract entity (“one”), and the accumulation of their car-
dinality on a stack (“counting one by one”). Formal mathematical types, such
as natural (N ), rational (Q), and real (R), arise from the ‘naive’ mathematical
concept of a number, through an iconic, indexical, and symbolic representation
of the meaning of ‘incr’, respectively, as a constant, a quotient, and a process,
and a generalization of these concepts in the habitual, rule-like meaning of a
type. In sum, N can be interpreted as the abstraction of (natural) numbers, Q
as that of an infinite sequence of natural numbers, and R as an abstraction of
an infinite sequence of rationals.
8.5 The concept of infinite numbers
Infinity is perhaps the most controversial concept of mathematics. This section
proposes the idea that the prototypical meaning of memory signs could be used
as a vehicle for a ‘naive’ representation of infinite multitudes.
According to the theory of sect. 6.2, memory signs are prototypical repre-
sentations of all memorized qualia responding to the input as a stimulus. This
implementation of memory signs allows for a twofold interpretation of the re-
lation between the input and memory. According to the first, A=a∗a’ is an
expression of a as a value complemented by a’ ; and B=b∗b’ an expression of
b as a measure (value) of b’ . In both cases, the interpreting sign contains the
meaning of a reference to an individual quale, as value. Following the second
interpretation, A=a∗a’ and B=b∗b’ are a representation of all qualia, that are
included in the definition of the average value (a’ ) and the dense domain (b’ ),
triggered by the input a and b, respectively. In this interpretation, A and B
have the meaning of a reference to a collection as a whole, but no reference
to the individual elements. In the proposed model, such signs are used for the
representation of the ‘naive’ mathematical meaning of infinite numbers.
How can we recognize the ‘naive’ mathematical meaning of phenomena, as
infinite numbers? Following the results of the neuro-physiological study by
(Nieder et al., 2002), in this thesis earlier it has been assumed that the brain
is capable of distinguishing the input state in three types: no num, one or more,
and many. The last one, many, refers to a multitude possessing cardinality, as a
quality, but without an increment (neither as a unit value, nor as a property).
In this section it will be suggested that such multitudes may be recognized as
the ‘naive’ concept of an infinite number. Because the ‘infinite’ interpretation
of memory qualia includes the meaning of a reference to a collection, but no
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reference to the elements contained, such an interpretation does not possess the
concept of an increment, indicating that the collection in question may not be
countable.
The suggested relation between the ‘naive’ mathematical interpretation of
phenomena and the ambiguous interpretation of memory signs is also supported
by linguistic analogy. For example, in the mathematical interpretation of the
utterance, the police are going to lunch, the syntactic subject is ambiguously in-
terpreted as a whole, and as individual persons. This analysis is underpinning
the conclusion that the ‘naive’ interpretation of infinite numbers and the proto-
typical meaning of memory signs, such as nouns, are related, tacitly implicating
that all memory signs contain the meaning of infinity as a possibility.
Returning to the domain of mathematical signs, finally it should be men-
tioned that the ‘naive’ mathematical meaning of formal variables too can be
explained on the basis of the concept of abstract states (number-base). The
representation of the input as an abstract state contains the meaning of a col-
lection of possible values as a whole, without access to the individual elements.
A reference to such a ‘container’ of possible values, is what is considered in the
proposed model to be the ‘naive’ meaning of a formal variable.
8.6 The concept of naught
Cardinality as a quality may arise if there are similar entities in the input. As a
consequence, naught cannot be perceived as a cardinality, except through infer-
encing. Such a process may be illustrated with the observation of a phenomenon
in which there is no cardinality, as a quale (‘no num’), but that nevertheless is
interpreted as a number. In this case, as the input is not perceived as a cardi-
nality, one may abductively infer that earlier there must have been ‘something’,
that has disappeared. If that entity can be interpreted as a countable state, its
cardinality can be represented in the current observation as naught or zero. In
sum, the ‘naive’ concept of zero can be defined as a hypothetical number sign,
not including the meaning of cardinality, nor the meaning of increment (incr).
8.7 The secondness of mathematics
From a categorical point of view, ‘naive’ logic is a 1st, ‘naive’ mathematics a
2nd, and ‘naive’ or natural language a 3rd of meaningful representation. The
goal of this section is a justification of this hypothesis.
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‘Naive’ logic is concerned with the types of relations existing between the
dual qualities of ‘real’ world phenomena. Such a relation may exhibit the cate-
gory of
• 1stness, if it is interpreted as a quale independent from other qualia; a
logical relation as a quale may be a state or an effect, focused or comple-
mentary (a, a’ , b, b’ );
• 2ndness, if it is interpreted as a link connecting two qualia; a logical rela-
tion as a link may exist between focused and complementary qualia, that
are a representation of a state or an effect (A, ¬A, B, ¬B);
• 3rdness, if it is interpreted as a logically meaningful relation between state
and effect qualia (A+B, A∗B, A∗¬B, . . ., A is B).
‘Naive’ mathematics is re-presenting the logical relations of the input, as
numbers. In addition, ‘naive’ mathematics introduces common types for the
incomparable (dual) input qualia of the input phenomenon. By defining com-
mon types, ‘naive’ mathematics lays the foundation for the primary concept of
natural language, which is the relational need of symbols.
The ‘naive’ mathematical concept of a type enables the derivation of an
induced ordering of (consecutive) numbers. This is due to the brain’s potential
for classifying the simultaneously present input entities in collections of similar
entities, thereby tacitly introducing a ‘boundary’ between them (notice that
‘separation’ is less meaningful than ‘identification’, which contains the element
of differentiation as well). The introduction of a boundary between the input
entities is crucial for language recognition, as information about potentially
different entities may be necessary for determining the referential meaning of
language symbols, for example, in syntactic modification phenomena.
Natural language is ‘lifting’ the three types of logical relations, mediated by
the concepts of ‘naive’ mathematics, to the concepts of a potentially existing
or ‘neutral’ (n), a lexically defined possible or ‘passive’ (p), and an actual or
‘active’ relational need (a), representing the types of combinatory properties of
language symbols.
8.7.1 Mathematical sign recognition revisited
There are some interesting properties of ‘naive’ mathematical signs, as well as of
the relation between mathematical and linguistic signification that may deserve
attention (see also fig. 8.3).
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Figure 8.3: A comparison of mathematical and language concepts
On the first ‘level’, in the recognition of number-phenomena (level-1) we find
the mathematical icon and sinsign, which are a representation of the input as
a constituency relation and an actual event, respectively. These signs, which
arise by sorting the input qualia in two types, are an expression of a logical
relation. As the icon and sinsign do not yet contain the meaning of the input as
a number, this level of representation can be called a logical level. In language,
the icon and sinsign may represent a morphological root (which may be subject
to affixation) and an affix (which requires a root), respectively.
The second ‘level’ (level-2) introduces the abstract concept of numbers. The
mathematical rheme and legisign represent the input as a countable abstract
entity or a ‘number-base’ (it makes no difference if houses or cats are counted)
and a ‘rule-of-counting’, respectively. The mathematical index sign represents the
concept of increment(ation), through a reference to a type. This follows from
the potential of the index sign for completing the meaning of the ‘number-base’
and the ‘rule-of-counting’, without changing their conventional meaning. This
level can be called a mathematical level, because the rheme, index, and legisign
only refer to the mathematical operation included in the input phenomenon,
as a structure. The language analogue of the two types of index signs is the
adjective and the adverb; the rheme and legisign are implemented by noun and
verb phrases, respectively.
On the third ‘level’ of the recognition of number-phenomena (level-3) we
find the concepts of a countable multitude (subject) and a counting algorithm
(predicate). This level can be called a language level, due to its potential for
representing the relation between the mathematical subject and predicate as a
proposition. The corresponding concepts of natural language are the syntactic
subject and predicate, and the sentence.
As the mathematical subject and predicate signs of a number-phenomenon
may only arise, if a suitable index sign exists, input phenomena that are not
well-formed, cannot be recognized (their recognition process fails). An example
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Figure 8.4: Logical inferences as symbol interactions (recap.)
for a not well-formed (symbolic) number-phenomenon is ‘2/1.5’, assuming ‘/’
stands for integer division. A semantically not well-formed (nonsensical) lan-
guage utterance is Chomsky’s famous example: ‘colorless green ideas sleep furiously’
(Chomsky, 1957).
8.8 Meta-mathematical signs
Mathematical induction is an instantiation of inductive reasoning.3 The goal of
this section is a justification of the claim that the process model of reasoning in-
troduced in chapter 7 is applicable to ‘naive’ mathematical signs too, indicating
that the two domains could be merged in a meaningful way. In turn, the close
relationship between the two knowledge domains may provide an explanation
why mathematical induction requires three steps.
The classification of the logical inferences as symbol interactions (fig. 7.8) is
recapitulated in fig. 8.4 (as the qualisign, icon, and sinsign are less important for
a model of ‘naive’ mathematical induction, the abduction meaning associated
with the operation abstraction (cf. sect. 7.2.1) is omitted.
8.8.1 Mathematical induction as sign recognition
The first principle of mathematical induction says: If for a property P , P (0)
holds and, for k>0, from P (k) it follows that P (k+1) holds too, then P is true
for all natural number. From this definition the second principle of induction
can be derived (which is more suitable for the purposes of this section): If for an
arbitrary n, from the statement that, P (k) holds for all k<n, P (n) follows, then
P (n) is true for any n. Formally, if ∀n∀k.(k<n→P (k))→P (n), then ∀n.P (n)
can be concluded. Here, ∀k.(k<n→P (k)) is a formal representation of the
3This section is based on a theory by J.J. Sarbo, presented in (Sarbo & Farkas, 2005).
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induction hypothesis. In the rest of this section an attempt is made to prove
that the meaning of the second principle of mathematical induction is included
in the ‘naive’ mathematical interpretation of number-phenomena.
Following the above definition of mathematical induction, initially we know
that P (k) holds for all k<n. Assuming each P (k) (k<n) arises from the ‘naive’
mathematical interpretation of a phenomenon, initially we have k states satis-
fying the property P . This is alternatively represented as a collection of states
P (0),. . .,P (k), for k<n. In order to prove that P (n) holds too, the next state
satisfying P has to be considered. To this end, the change brought about by
the effect of incrementation (succ) to the state P (0),. . .,P (k), is interpreted in
the context of P .
The qualisigns of this induction-phenomenon may be defined as follows.
Braces are used for indicating set formation, and square brackets for domain
formation (in later definitions). P is tacitly ‘lifted’ from elements to sets and
domains; P (0),. . .,P (k) is abbreviated as P{0,. . ., k}.
A = P{0, . . . , k} ¬A = P
B = succ ¬B = P
The above specification may be explained as follows. The initial condition
for induction requires that P holds for all k<n. This indicates the existence
of earlier observation of k+1 phenomena as deductive inferences P (0),. . .,P (k),
depicted in fig. 8.5. The above definition of A is obtained by merging the
proposition signs of the individual observations P (0),. . .,P (k) in a single sign
through coordination, and by degenerately representing that sign as a state.4
In order to prove the inductive statement about P , it has to be shown that P
holds for the next element satisfying P or the successor of P (k). This can be
modeled by applying incrementation (succ) as an effect on P -type entities. This
explains the definition of B. The complementary signs, ¬A and ¬B, are defined
by P , as a state and an effect, indicating the context in which the interaction
between A and B has to be interpreted.
Sign recognition proceeds as usual. In this section, the focus will be on
the process of cognition (see fig. 8.6). The first interesting sign is the rheme,
abstracting the meaning of P{0,. . ., k} and succ in the concept of a ‘P -number’
(number-base). The rheme sign contains the prototypical meaning of memorized
P -type entities as an average value. That meaning is now extended with the
meaning of succ, representing the subsequent P-type element as a possible.
The legisign is an expression of the compatibility of the abstract meaning of
4The resulting state-type quale contains the meaning of P ,0,. . .,k, and that of
P (0),. . . ,P (k).
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P(0) P(k)P(1)
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Figure 8.5: Earlier observations as deductive inferences
deduction
abduction
inductionP{0,..,k},succ P[0,..,k]+succ
P{0,..,k}+succ
P{0,..,k} succ
All n.P(n)
P
P{0,..,k}*succ
P{0,..,k,k+1} P[0,..,k,k+1]
Figure 8.6: The logical relations of mathematical induction as a cognition pro-
cess (complementary qualia are not indicated, except in the index position)
P{0,. . ., k} and succ, according to which the collection of P -type input entities
may be rule-like extended with a subsequent next element. This interpretation
of the legisign makes use of the dense domain meaning of P{0,. . ., k}, in short:
P [0, . . . , k]. The fact that this domain exists and can be extended with a next
element indicates the existence of a property shared by all elements in this
domain.
The interpretation of the rheme sign in the context of P (complementation)
obtains the representation of the input as an existing collection of P -type car-
dinalities. In the context of P , succ can be interpreted as “k+1”, referring
to such an element (P (k+1)) and such an incrementation event, ambiguously.
The information deduced from the context is used in the complementation of the
rheme in the meaning of the dicent sign, representing P{0,. . ., k} and P{k+1}
as actually existent entities, in short: P{0,. . ., k+1}. This interpretation mo-
ment, in which, P is applied to the next possible element indicated by “k+1”
or, alternatively, the collection of P{0,. . ., k} is extended by the next element,
has the aspect of a deductive inference.
An analogous complementation of the legisign amounts to testing the new
element of the extended domain for compatibility under P (the legisign is only
an expression of the rule-like compatibility of P [0,. . ., k] and the operation succ).
This requires the hypothesis that P [0,. . ., k] can be inductively generalized to
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P(k) P(k+1)P(0)
state−view
P[0,...,k]
P[0,...,k+1]
effect−view
"k+1"
Figure 8.7: Sample mathematical induction. Initially we have knowledge of
P (0),. . . ,P (k). These elements are deductively generalized as a collection by
deriving their next element, and inductively generalized as a dense domain by
testing that element for P . In the two operations, “k+1” is used as a value and
a measure, respectively. The essence of ‘naive’ mathematical induction is the
hypothesis that the results of deductive and inductive generalization are equal.
the next element (k+1) in the context of P . If testing is successful, it means that
P (0),. . .,P (k) and P (k+1) are related to each other in the sense of agreement.
This is expressed by P [0,. . . ,k]∗P (k+1) or briefly P [0,. . . ,k,k+1], representing
the conventional property included in the meaning of the observed number-
phenomenon (cf. symbol sign).
In the final step, the interaction between the dicent and symbol sign is in-
terpreted as a proposition which is a hypothesis, postulating that the input as
a collection of P -type entities (state-view), or alternatively, as a P -type event
(event-view); see also fig 8.7. The ‘naive’ mathematical meaning of this relation
is expressed by the formula: ALL n.P (n), where n is a formal variable represent-
ing a collection of P -type entities as a whole, and ‘ALL’ is used as a shorthand
for generalization on the basis of ‘all’ entities that we have knowledge of. In the
proposed model, such entities are represented as a domain and interpreted as
an infinite number, providing the meaning of ‘ALL’ included in the meaning of
the argument sign of mathematical induction phenomena.
The reader may have noticed the secondary role of P . What really matters
in ‘naive’ mathematical induction is the testing of the next element of some
domain. The concept of infinity arises as a tacit ‘ingredient’ in this process.
8.8.2 Example
Assume, the task is to prove that P (n)=0+1+2+. . .=(n2+n)/2, for all n≥0.
The interesting interpretation moment is the re-presentation of the input, as a
conventional property (symbol sign). This requires some preparatory calcula-
tions, recognized as nested phenomena:
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P (k+1) = ((k+1)2+k+1)/2
= (k2+k)/2+(k+1)
= P (k)+(k+1).
The meaning of this calculation is degenerately represented as a complemen-
tary quale which, then, is recognized as an index sign accumulating with the
indexical meaning of P as the context (“k+1” is interpreted as a representation
of the increment induced by P ). This index sign is used for the generation of
the dicent and symbol signs. By establishing the correspondence between the
deductively and inductively generated expressions, represented by the dicent
and symbols signs of the input, respectively (cf. fig. 8.7), the final meaning of
the input is presented as a proposition: ALL n.P (n). The meaning of ‘ALL’ is
due to the continuous domain interpretation of P [0,. . . ,k,k+1].
8.9 Summary
According to an earlier assumption of this thesis, knowledge arises from the
observation of ‘real’ world phenomena, which are interactions between dual
qualities represented as qualia. This duality is captured by ‘naive’ logic, rep-
resenting it as a relation or fact. The generalization of the independent qualia
of logical relations in types is the main contribution of ‘naive’ mathematics.
Language abstracts from the mathematical concept of types, by lifting them to
the meaning of relational needs. This indicates that ‘naive’ logic, mathemat-
ics, and language, may be interpreted as increasingly more meaningful levels of
human knowledge representation. An interesting ‘feature’ of mathematical sign
recognition is that, to some extent, it includes the whole of this knowledge repre-
sentation potential of the brain/mind. Although mathematical sign recognition,
as a process, is about mathematical signs only, its interpretation moments show
strong affinity with ‘naive’ logical and linguistic information processing.
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Chapter 9
Text summarization
Natural language as a knowledge representation is frequently redundant. Words,
phrases, and even larger units can sometimes be removed without changing the
essential meaning of a text. This feature is used by text summarization, which
is a technique for generating a concise summary of a text typically by means
of syntactic parsing and statistical analysis (Jones, 1993), (Endres-Niggemeyer,
1998), (Hovy, 2005) (Mani, 2001). These techniques may not be sufficient for
the generation of meaningful summaries however. According to this thesis, the
limitations of traditional text summarization are due to two factors. One of
them is the formal ontology underlying traditional language modeling, because
it is not based on a model of cognitive activity and, therefore, does not support
the generation of semantically meaningful concepts. The other factor is the
lack of a uniform representation, that may be necessary for merging knowledge
obtained in different domains.
The premise of this chapter is that, on the basis of the theory introduced in
this thesis, an alternative method for text summarization can be introduced that
does not suffer from those limitations. The essential constituents of that method
are a uniform representation of knowledge, including a trichotomic specification
of qualia, and a process interpretation of summarization. The focus of this
chapter is on an illustration of the theoretical potential of the proposed method
for the generation of summaries.
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9.1 Introduction
The approach suggested in this chapter is based on the idea that a pair of
subsequent sentences (previous and current sentence) may be interpreted as a
transition, transforming the state represented by the previous sentence, to the
next state indicated by the current sentence. Text summarization, as a process,
combines transitions induced from consecutive sentences of a text, in a summa-
rizing single transition, representing the meaning of the text as a whole. By
removing signs not contributing to the unifying single transition induced by the
entire text, a summary may be generated and represented as a sentence.1 A sign
may be superfluous for various reasons. For example, a syntactic modification
may be unimportant, if there is no reference to the modifier elsewhere in the
text; a verb phrase may be redundant, if it is an expression of a semantically
neutral effect.
What is in the focus of summarization, may depend on the interest of the
observer (the reader of the text). For example, it may be one of the characters
or one of the occurring events. Text summarization, therefore, may have many
different outcomes in general.
The idea behind the interpretation of sentences as ‘transitions’ may be il-
lustrated by the metaphor of apparent motion perception. What makes this
phenomenon especially interesting, is the fact that, although we observe steady
pictures that may be meaningful in themselves, we are able to perceive their
series as motion. According to the hypothesis of this chapter, the summarized
meaning of a text may arise from an analogous process of interpretation. A
single picture may correspond to the individual state and effect represented by
a clause or a sentence, and the experience of motion to the meaning of the entire
text as a summarizing state transition. The goal of text summarization, as a
process, is the generation of such concise representations.
There is an important difference between motion perception and text sum-
marization, however. Motion perception is successful if the subsequently dis-
played pictures are not ‘too’ different from each other. This is opposed to text
summarization, in which subsequent sentences may refer to semantically ‘dis-
tant’ phenomena. That we are be able to combine a series of sentences compris-
ing a text in a summarizing single sentence, indicates that we mentally ‘bridge’
the gap between their individual meanings. Text summarization capitalizes on
the interpretation of the input symbols in different domains. For example, two
sentences may be summarized in a single sign, if they are related to each other
1A tacit assumption of this chapter is that such a sentence may exist.
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by means of a syntactic or a semantic state transition. As a side effect of such
a process, new signs may be introduced, enabling further summarization recur-
sively.
Text summarization is a hard problem. This may explain why the method
presented in this chapter is illustrated by the summarization of a non-trivial
text, but is not defined as an algorithm. The sample text of this chapter, which
is a version of the fairy tale “Snow White” (Grimm & Grimm, 1988), contains a
number of difficult sentences. The hidden agenda of this chapter is an attempt
to show the potential of the language model, introduced in chapter 5, for the
analysis of complex utterances characterizing actual language use.
9.2 Language model revisited
An important element of the process model of cognitive activity (see sect. 2.3) is
the assumption that input recognition can be established by means of process-
ing contiguous segments (disjoint collections) of qualia. In natural language, an
example for such collections are the contiguous strings of input symbols corre-
sponding to phrases, clauses, and sentences. Another important element of the
model of cognitive activity is the trichotomic specification of qualia. An exam-
ple of such a classification is the trichotomy of verbs as legisigns (cf. sect. 6.3.2),
defined by the divisions: an act of existence(1), modification(2), and transforma-
tion(3), or alternatively, by the ordering existence<modification<transformation,
which represents a phenomenon as a semantically neutral action (e.g. there is a
book), a modification of a state (e.g. she has a book), and a state transformation
(e.g. John begun running), respectively. These three classes of verbs correspond
to increasingly more meaningful semantic phenomena.
The summarization of the sample text of this chapter makes use of a morpho-
syntactic analysis of article symbols. As the parsing of such phenomena has not
been discussed earlier (in sect. 5.2), it has to be specified now. An illustrative
example may be the expression ‘the beautiful Queen’. Following the classification
of morpho-syntactic symbols, recapitulated in fig. 9.1, the above string may be
analyzed as: (beautiful)(the Queen). This analysis, which is depicted in fig. 9.2,
illustrates how article symbols may become immediate neighbors of their refer-
ences, as a result of morpho-syntactic sign recognition, according to the model
introduced in this thesis.
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Figure 9.1: The classification of morpho-syntactic symbols (n=neutral,
p=passive, a=active relational need)
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Figure 9.2: The morpho-syntactic analysis of ‘the(t) beautiful(b) Queen(Q)’
(bs=‘base-degree’; the treatment of inter-word space symbols is omitted)
9.3 Towards a theory of text summarization
The input qualia of the summarization process are the input sentences and
clauses, that will be commonly referred to as sentences. A sentence is interpreted
as a state transition, representing the change occurring to the input state (sub-
ject), as a ‘modulation’ due to the input effect (predicate). The modulated state
shall be called the next state; the act of ‘modulation’ itself, a state-transition.
The reader may have noticed the analogy of the above model with the process
model of cognitive activity (sect. 2.3), in which qualia representing the observer
as a state (q1) are affected by qualia representing the stimulus as an effect (q2).
In this chapter, the summarized meaning of a text is defined as the cumulative
effect of individual sentences, transforming the initial state of the first sentence,
to the final state indicated by the last sentence. This is illustrated by fig. 9.3.
A pair of subsequent sentences can be summarized, if a transition from the
previous sentence to the next or current sentence exists. A transition is viable,
if the states (subjects) and the effects (predicates) of the two sentences can
be pairwise unified and, furthermore, a common context shared by the two
unifications can be defined. Such a unification is an operation generating a
synonymous interpretation of signs exhibiting different meaning aspects (notice
the difference with the sign interaction, accumulation, which is restricted to
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Figure 9.3: The generation of the summary of a text consisting of n sentences
(sent1,. . ., sentn); the summary itself is represented by sent1−n. The symbols
subj, pred, and sent are short for subject, predicate and sentence, respectively; a
‘∼’ symbol denotes a unification operation.
signs having identical meaning aspects, according to its definition in sect. 5.1.1).
In a state transition, the subjects and the predicates, their unification, and the
common context, are typically a result of a ‘naive’ syntactic, semantic syntactic,
and reasoning interpretation of the input symbols, demonstrating the benefits
of the uniform knowledge representation provided by the model of this research.
If a transition is possible, the previous and the current sentence are merged
in a summarizing single sentence, called the summary. Otherwise, the current
sentence is interpreted as a nested phenomenon or an ‘episode’, later intertwin-
ing with the nesting phenomenon, marked by the previous sentence.2
The interpretation of sentences as ‘transitions’ is also supported by the pro-
cess model of language, introduced in chapter 5. According to that model, the
subject and the predicate of a sentence arise from the rheme and the legisign,
respectively, through complementation by the index sign3. The rheme is inter-
preted as ‘a possible for the subject’, and the legisign as a representation of ‘the
rule-like meaning included in the predicate’. Besides providing the context, in
the generation of the subject and the predicate, the essential function of the
index sign is coordination between the complementation events of the rheme
and the legisign (see fig. 9.4).
Text summarization may proceed as follows. Preceding summarization, the
input sentences are analyzed individually. A pair of previous and current sen-
2This is a consequence of the tacit assumption that the entire text can be summarized in
a single sign.
3In this chapter too, the Peircean signs are only used as pointers to the status of a sign in
the process of sign recognition.
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sentence
previous
sentence
current
index
pred
pred1
2subj
A   is  B2
A   is  B11
subj1
2
2~ ~
Figure 9.4: Coordinated unification. The previous sentence (A1 is B1) and the
current sentence (A2 is B2) are represented as an argument sign and a qualisign,
respectively. The typewise unification of the subjects and predicates of the two
sentences is coordinated by the index sign. Unification is denoted by a ‘∼’
symbol.
tences are re-presented as a qualisign and an argument sign, respectively. This is
followed by a re-generation of the syntactic rheme, index, and legisign of the pre-
vious sentence, and the syntactic dicent, index, and symbol sign of the current
sentence. In this preparatory phase, the signs derived from the two sentences
may not be representations of a single phenomenon. In fact, the generation of
such a consistent set of signs is the essential goal of the text summarization
process. The unification of the rheme and the dicent sign on the one hand, and
the legisign and the symbol sign on the other, may obtain the definition of the
subject and the predicate of the summarizing sentence, as well as of the qualia
of the underlying phenomenon.
The above procedure of text summarization complies with the earlier re-
quirement set for the processing schema of cognitive activity. The existence of
a successful unification of the signs obtained from a re-analysis of a pair of sub-
sequent sentences indicates that a transition from the previous to the current
sentence is possible. This may be illustrated by the summarization of the sample
text: ‘John left the house. The door closed’. In the two sentences, the subjects are
John and the door (in short door); the predicates are left the house (in short left)4
and closed (see fig. 9.5). By making use of the model of ‘naive’ reasoning, intro-
duced in chapter 7, the summarization of the two sentences may be explained
as follows (in the syllogistic inferences below, the aspect of quantification is
omitted; unification is denoted by a ‘∼’ symbol).
The unification of John and door is possible (John∼door), if there is (semantic)
memory information about John’s ability to open something. As the same ability
may be characteristic for door too (doors may be opened), John and door can be
4The complement of left, the house, may be represented as an index sign.
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closeddoor
leftopen/doorJohn
Figure 9.5: Sample summarization (accumulation is denoted by a ‘/’ symbol)
unified as participants of an ‘open’ event.
open IS door % the door is opened
John IS open % John opened something
⇒ John IS door % it is John who opened the door
Similarly, the unification of left and closed is possible (left∼closed), if it can
be derived that left and closed may both refer to door as a constituent state.
door IS left % somebody left (the house) through the door
door IS closed % now the door is closed
⇒ closed IS left % (the door which is) closed (is the door)
% through which somebody left (the house)
The two unification operations above reveal the existence of a common prop-
erty (open) possessed by the two subjects (cf. deduction), as well as the exis-
tence of a common state (door), compatible with the rule-like meaning included
in the predicates (cf. induction). Summarization is possible, if this property
and this state can be interpreted as dual representations of a common context
(open/door). If this condition holds, a summarizing single sentence can be gener-
ated, for example: ‘John, who opened the door, left the house behind the closing
door’, or briefly, ‘John left (the house)’. Notice that the above summary of the
original text is generated from John’s (actor) point of view.
In order to prove that John and left can be used as the subject and pred-
icate, respectively, of a sentence representing the summary of the input text,
summarization needs semantic memory information. In the current analysis it
will be assumed that, through their ‘naive’ semantic syntactic meaning, John
and door can be unified by the symbol John, as John and door may be the agent
and patient of an open event, respectively, and, from the semantic point of view,
patient(2)<agent(3) (a specification of thematic roles will be given later in this
chapter). John (unifier) is interpreted as ‘John, who opened the door’. Simi-
larly, the unification of left and closed may obtain the symbol left, representing
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the property ‘left behind a closing door’. Unification is possible again, because
close (a door) may indicate a measure in the dense domain of ‘leave’-events. The
meaning of open and door, as converse symbols, is included in the unification of
John and door, expressing door as the patient of the act indicated by open. Put
differently, if we observe an open event to occur, then there may be a door, un-
dergoing that event. Given these unifications, the summarizing sentence, John
left (the house), can be used to replace the original two sentences and can as
well be summarized with another sentence, if the sample text is part of a larger
discourse.
A potential benefit of an intertwined ‘naive’ syntactic, syllogistic, and seman-
tic syntactic analysis is the introduction of new signs, enabling further summa-
rization recursively (this aspect is not illustrated by the above example). The
generation of new signs may entail the definition of new qualia that, together
with the original input qualia, may be used as a definition of a summarizing
single phenomenon.
Efficient combination of knowledge obtained in different domains is possible
due to the uniform character of the proposed representation. By applying text
summarization to a series of sentences, recursively, the effect induced by the
individual sentences may be combined in a single effect, changing the initial
state represented by the first sentence, to the final state indicated by the last
sentence. It should be mentioned that text summarization may put a great
burden on the lexical specification of the input qualia. This aspect falls outside
the focus of this thesis however.
9.4 An extended example
The proposed method of text summarization is illustrated in this section, by
the summarization of the non-trivial text of the fairy tale “Snow White”. The
sample text is displayed in fig. 9.6. Dialogs, not affecting the development of
the story, are removed.
As mentioned before, the summary of a text depends on the focus taken, as
well as on the degree of conciseness required. In this section it will be assumed
that the focus is on the main character, Snow White, and that the goal of
summarization is the derivation of a single catchy sentence describing the events
occurring to her. The price that has to be paid for requiring such a summary is
that other important aspects, such as the narrative structure of the text, may
not be respected by the final result.
In the presentation of the analysis below, individual summarization steps
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“SNOW WHITE”
(s0) In a far off land, there lived a very beautiful Queen who had a stepdaughter
called Snow White. (s1) The wicked Queen ordered a servant to take Snow
White to the forest and put her to death, but the poor man had not the heart
to do it, and told her to hide in the forest. (s2) Snow White ran into the thickest
part of the forest and walked for many long days, until she came upon a tiny
little house. (s3) The Princess thought that in such a lovely place as that, there
must live kind people who would give her shelter. (s4) The house, which at
that moment was empty, was in a state of complete disorder. (s5) The furniture
and everything inside was small. (s6) Snow White cleaned and tidied the little
house until it shone. (s7) Then she lay down exhausted on one of the little beds
and fell asleep. (s8) When she woke up, she found herself surrounded by seven
little dwarfs who, on hearing what had happened to her, promised to protect
her from her stepmother. (s9) They were all very happy and contented. (sA)
One day, the Queen, who had heard that Snow White was still alive, disguised
herself as an old woman and invited her to try an apple which she had poisoned.
(sB) The Princess was tempted by the lovely apple the old woman was offering
her. (sC) The old woman insisted, assuring her that she had nothing to fear,
until at last, she accepted. (sD) But ... when she bit into the apple, Snow
White fell senseless on the ground, and how those dwarfs cried and cried. (sE)
A Prince who was passing by saw the beauty of Snow White and kissed her on
the forehead, whereupon she wakened from that bad dream and the dwarfs were
happy again. (sF ) Snow White and the Prince married and were happy ever
after.
Figure 9.6: Sample input text for summarization. The individual sentences are
marked by a letter ‘s’, followed by a sequence number (in hexadecimal).
are simplified as follows. In a symbol interaction, less meaningful symbols are
omitted in favor of symbols that are more meaningful. This holds for index
signs representing complementary information too. For example, in an adjecti-
val modification of a noun, the adjective may be omitted (for instance, if there is
no other reference to that entity). This is opposed to a lexically defined comple-
ment of a verb which always has to be represented (remember that in a ‘naive’
syntactic analysis, adjectives and verb complements are uniformly represented
as index signs). Index signs may complement the meaning of rheme signs and
legisigns. In the analysis below, the reference of an index sign is represented by
a ‘←’ and a ‘→’ symbol, indicating the rheme and the legisign, respectively. In
virtue of the differences between their references (which can be the rheme or
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nouns (rheme):
possible existence < actual reference < conventional function
actual reference:
general < indefinite < definite
intersective < subsective compatible < subsective incompatible
adjectives (index):
nouns (dicent):
theme < patient < agent
nouns (dicent):
unnamed < episodic < title
verbs (legisign):
existence < modification < transformation
transformation:
neutral < modulation < change
Figure 9.7: An overview of the semantic trichotomies used in the ex-
ample. A classification is expressed as an ordering, for instance,
general<indefinite<definite is short for general(1), indefinite(2), definite(3). Re-
cursive definitions are given in italics.
the legisign position), index signs can be accumulated typewise.5 Temporal as-
pects of verbs are left out of consideration. It will be assumed that the order of
appearance of the input sentences and the temporal order of their effects are iso-
morphic, from which it follows that ‘neighboring’ sentences may be summarized
in any order (summarized sentences may be replaced by their summary). The
analysis below makes use of thematic relations in the interpretation of semantic
relations between verbs and complements (Fillmore, 1968). Semantic syntactic
information is specified by means of trichotomies. Some of the trichotomies have
been introduced earlier, in sect. 6, others are defined ‘on the fly’. The semantic
trichotomies used in the example are recapitulated in fig. 9.7.
The syntactic analysis of a sentence is presented in the tabular form, in-
troduced earlier in section 5.4 (a column corresponds to a sign class, a row to
the recognition of an input symbol). The signs generated by ‘sorting’ (icon and
sinsign) and ‘predication’ (argument sign) are omitted. The following abbrevi-
ations are used: input(i), accumulation(a), coercion(c), binding(b), degenerate
representation(d). A pair of accumulated signs are separated by a ‘/’ symbol;
coordination is uniformly denoted by an ‘&’, subscripted by the actual coordi-
5In sect. 5.1.1, this potential of the language model has been used for a uniform represen-
tation of syntactic modification and complementation phenomena.
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nator symbol, for example, ‘&but’; a sign interaction is indicated by a ‘-’ symbol.
Coinciding semantic and syntactic sign interactions are merged in a single (iso-
morphic) representation. In a syntactic analysis, signs that play a role in a
summarization step are displayed in bold face.
s0 (In)(far off)(a land)(there)(lived)(very beautiful)(a Queen)(who)(had)
(a stepdaughter)(called)(Snow White).
s1 (Wicked)(the Queen)(ordered)(a servant)(to take)(Snow White)(to the forest)
&and (put)(her)(to death) &but (poor)(the man)(had not)(the heart)(to do)(it)
&and (told)(her)(to hide)(in the forest).
Figure 9.8: The morpho-syntactically finished symbols (in parentheses) of the
sentences s0 and s1. Coordinator symbols are uniformly denoted by an ‘&’,
subscripted by the actual coordinator.
The signs generated by a morpho-syntactic and a syntactic analysis of s0
are shown in fig 9.8 and table 9.1, respectively. This sentence contains (nested)
syntactic language phenomena, that are represented degenerately as comple-
mentary qualia, and are recognized as index signs. These are: in a far off land
(inﬄ), a stepdaughter called Snow White (stcsw), who had a stepdaughter called Snow
White (hadst). The syntactic signs of s0 that play a role in the summarization
process are recapitulated in fig. 9.9.
The first clause of the syntactic analysis of s1 is depicted in table 9.2, the
second clause in table 9.3. The syntactic signs of the first clause that are involved
in a summarization step are displayed in fig. 9.10. As the predicate complement
in this clause itself is a clause, its summarization is postponed. For the time
being it will be assumed that the predicate of this clause is the verb ordered (this
analysis makes use of the lexical interpretation of this symbol as an intransitive
verb). The coordination structure, ‘take Snow White to the forest and put her to
a Queen livedvery beautiful
who had...
in a far off land
Figure 9.9: The syntactic symbols of s0 as the signs of the previous sentence, in
the summarization with s1
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input rhme indx legi dcnt symb action
in
far off(foff) in c
a land(alnd) foff in c
alnd foff in c,b
foff-alnd in b
there(t) inﬄ→ d
lived(lvd) t inﬄ→ c
very beautiful(vb) inﬄ→ lvd t c,c
a Queen(aQ) ←vb,inﬄ→ lvd t c,a
aQ ←vb,inﬄ→ lvd t c
recursion(1)
who(wh)
had wh c
wh had c
recursion(2)
a stepdaughter(st)
called(ca) st c
Snow White(SW) st ca c
st SW ca c
st ca-SW b
st-ca-SW
return(2)
wh stcsw had d,c
stcsw had wh b
wh had-stcsw b
return(1)
aQ ←vb/hadst, inﬄ→ lvd t d,b
. . .
t/aQ-hadst. . . lvd-inﬄ b
Table 9.1: The syntactic analysis of s0. The analysis of this complex sentence
needs recursion, for example, the subordinate clause starting with who is parsed
recursively. A recursive call(return) of the parsing algorithm is denoted by the
symbol recursion(return). Recursion depth is indicated by an integer given in
parentheses. Whether the syntactic analysis of a sentence is recursive or not,
has no effect on the summarization process.
death’ is represented by the short term ‘take&put’.
Is a transition from s0 to s1 possible and, if so, what may be the summarized
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input rhme indx legi dcnt symb action
wicked(wk)
the Queen(tQ) wk c
ordered(ord) tQ wk c,b
ord wk-tQ
recursion
a servant(se)
to take(ta) se c
Snow White(SW) se ta c
to the forest(tf) SW ta se c,c
tf ta-SW se b
se ta-SW-tf b
coordination
put(pu)
her(he) pu c
to death(td) he pu c,b
td pu-he b
pu-he-td
restore
se take&put
return
se-take&put ord wk-tQ d,b
wk-tQ ord-se-take&put b
Table 9.2: The syntactic analysis of the first clause of s1
meaning of these two sentences? In order to answer these questions, the relation
between s0 and s1 is established by analyzing the relation between the rheme,
index, and legisign of s0 on the one hand, and the dicent, index, and symbol
signs of s1 on the other (see fig. 9.11, on the left-hand side).
The unification of the subjects may proceed as follows. The two symbols,
a Queen (rheme) and the wicked Queen (dicent) may be unified by the symbol
the Queen. Following the trichotomy of referential rhematic signs,6 a(2)<the(3),
implicating that the indefinite article (a) may be removed. According to the
trichotomic classification of adjectives (cf. sect. 6.3.1), wicked(1) and very beau-
tiful(1) are semantically less meaningful than who had a stepdaughter called Snow
White(2) (in short who had. . .), indicating that those two adjectives may be ig-
nored.7
6The trichotomy general(1), indefinite(2), definite(3), introduced in sect. 6.3.2.
7As part of the re-analysis of s0, wicked is represented as an index sign.
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input rhme indx legi dcnt symb action
coordination
poor(po)
the man(tm) po c
tm po c
po-tm b
recursion(1)
had not(hn)
the heart(th)
hn c
th hn c
hn-th b
recursion(2)
to do(td)
it td c
it td c
td-it b,d
return(2)
td-it hn-th
hn-th-td-it b
return(1)
po-tm hn-th-td-it
coordination(2)
told(td)
her(hr) td c
hr td c
td-hr b,d
recursion
to hide(hi)
in the forest(tf) tf hi c
hi-tf bd
return
hi-tf td-hr b
td-hr-hi-tf
restore(2)
po-tm hd. . .&td. . .
restore(1)
Table 9.3: The syntactic analysis of the second clause of s1
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orderedthe wicked Queen
wicked
Figure 9.10: The syntactic symbols of the first clause of s1 as the signs of the
current sentence, in the summarization with s0
the Queen ordered
who had...a Queen
orderedthe wicked Queen
livedvery beautiful
who had...
in a far off land
wicked
Figure 9.11: The summarization of s0 and s1
The unification of the predicates obtains the symbol ‘ordered’, because lived(1)
may be classified as an act of existence, and ordered(2) as a modification of a
state,8 according to the semantic trichotomy of verbs as legisigns9 (notice that
in both events, the actor is the Queen). Summarization is possible, based on the
index sign (who had. . .) which coordinates the unifications of the subjects and
the predicates. This is depicted in fig. 9.11, on the right-hand side (the indexical
sign in a far off land is removed, as it does not change the interpretation of lived
as an existence(1) event).
The complement of ordered contains embedded clauses, enabling further sum-
marization. To this end, the process makes use of a semantic specification of
verbs as legisigns, in particular of their meaning as an act of transformation(3)
recursively defined as: neutral(1), modulation(2), and change(3), representing a
neutral (told her), a reversible (take her to the forest), and an irreversible transfor-
mation (put her to death), respectively. The analysis below tacitly assumes the
existence of a trichotomy of prep–complement symbols (cf. sect. 5.1.3) as index
signs, that may be specified analogously to the above classification of verbs as
transformation acts.
The summarization of the complement of ordered, which is the clause to
8Here, ordered is considered to be an intransitive verb. This is opposed to the interpretation
of the same symbol as a transitive verb in table 9.2 (which also explains its representation as
a legisign (ord), instead of a symbol sign).
9The trichotomy: existence(1), modification(2), transformation(3), introduced in
sect. 6.3.2.
175
take Snow White to the forest and put her to death, may proceed as follows. To
take(2) and to put(2) are reversible transformation events. As the modifications
of the two events, to the forest and to death, are semantically different (to the
forest(2)<to death(3)), the first conjunct of the above clause (to take Snow White
to the forest) may be removed. The resulting expression, (to) put her to death, may
be summarized with the second conjunct of ‘but’. This requires the unification
of the subjects (servant and the man), and the predicates (to put her to death and
had not the heart. . .). The first unification obtains the symbol the servant, because
the current coordination does not affect the meaning of the subjects (‘but’-
coordination structures exhibit the aspects of a syntactic complementation).
The indexical symbol, poor, which is not representing a lexically defined semantic
relation of the servant, may be removed.
The unification of the predicates proceeds as follows. As told her. . . is a neu-
tral transformation event, it may be safely removed. In the first conjunct (had
not the heart to do it), the logical meaning of not can be abstracted in a negation
operator (‘neg’) and represented as a prefix symbol: ‘to put her to death, but (neg)
had the heart to do it’. Next, the semantic trichotomy of verbs as transformation
events (legisign) is used in order to derive that had the heart to do it(2)<put to
death(3). Indeed, the first conjunct is an expression of an intention indicating a
‘modulation’ of a state (for example, the emotional state of the actor), but the
second conjunct is a reference to an irreversible change. As put to death may be
synonymously represented by the verb murder, her is a reference to Snow White,
and it is anaphorically linked with the first conjunct, the summarization of the
predicates eventually may obtain the expression: ‘(neg) to murder her’.
The complement of ordered, which is a non-finite clause with an explicit
subject (syntactically), may be interpreted as an argument sign. The summa-
rization of this clause with the earlier summary of s0 and s1 (see fig. 9.11, on the
right-hand side), is illustrated by fig. 9.12 (the index sign, who had. . ., which is
not representing a lexically defined relation of the Queen, is omitted). Summa-
rization is possible, if the subjects (Queen and servant) and the predicates (ordered
and murder her) can be pairwise unified and, most importantly, a common con-
text coordinating the two unification operations exists. Queen and servant may
be unified (Queen∼servant), because the Queen may be the ‘master of’ the servant
(‘master of’ is assumed to be a lexically defined potential relation of ‘Queen’).
As a result of this unification operation, ‘master of’ is defined as an index sign.
At this point the summarization process makes use of the classification of
thematic roles, defined by the trichotomy: experiencer(1), patient(2), agent(3).
Because, Queen is the agent, but servant is the patient of ordered (this time,
order is syntactically interpreted as a transitive verb), and ordered transitively
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the servant (neg) to murder her the Queen to murder her
(neg) ordered 
the Queen ordered
Figure 9.12: The summarization of s0 and s1 (cont.)
links the agent (Queen) with the theme of this verb ((neg)to murder her), through
the mediation of the patient (servant), it is concluded that the servant (index
sign) may be removed. Put differently, by acknowledging the Queen as the
‘master mind’ behind the murder event, her role as the real actor of that event
is exposed. The above complementary meaning of order, as a mediation event,
may be represented as an index sign too.
A summary may only exist, if the index signs introduced in the course of the
unification of the subjects can also be used in the unification of the predicates.
That this condition may be satisfied as well, is explained below.
The unification of the predicates makes use of the ‘naive’ induction mean-
ing included in complementation sign interactions (cf. sect. 7.2.1). The inter-
pretation of ordered, as a legisign, contains the meaning of a dense domain of
‘order’-effects. A measure of this domain, indicated by ‘to-make-somebody-do-
something’ (index sign), may be ordered to murder her. The summarization of the
predicates, ordered and (neg)to murder her, is possible, because ‘master of’ and
‘to-make-somebody-do-something’ may be interpreted as semantic counterparts
(converse symbols), and these signs together with the mediation meaning in-
cluded in ordered (index) may be interpreted as synonymous signs. In the end,
this enables the definition of the subject and the predicate signs of the summary
generated so far, which are the Queen and (neg) ordered to murder her, respectively.
Because ordered refers to a semantic transformation event and neg is an indica-
tion of the failure of that event, the predicate may be alternatively expressed
by the converse of failure: failed. The above interpretation of neg can be merged
with the meaning of ordered, by means of syntactic coordination: (s0−1) The
Queen ordered to murder her, but it failed (notice the use of it, as a reference to
murder).
Further summarization is possible, by interpreting the title of the text as
an incomplete clause, the predicate of which is defined by the tale itself (more
precisely, by that part of the tale that has been considered for summarization
so far). The unification of the Queen with Snow White needs a classification of the
roles of a personage in a story. Such a trichotomy is: unnamed(1), episodic(2),
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title(3). Because the predicate of s0−1 can be interpreted as a measure of order
events ((to) murder her), and to murder (event) is a counterpart of murder (noun),
the final summary can be expressed by the catchy sentence:
Snow White: A murder failed.
Interestingly, this sentence may as well function as the summary of the
whole story. The analysis of the rest of the tale proves that the remaining
sentences do not change the meaning of the above summary (assuming the
focus of summarization is on Snow White). Indeed, when the Queen discovers
that the servant has not been loyal to her, she begins her ‘apple project’, but
that eventually fails as well.
The summarization of the remaining sentences may proceed as follows. Be-
low, the presentation of the analysis is restricted to an overview of the individual
summarization steps. A transition act is denoted by a ‘⇒’ symbol. Summaries
are labeled such that the label recursively refers to the sentences involved. For
example, the summary of s2 and s3 is labeled by s2−3.
s2: Snow white ran into the forest indicates the beginning of a new episode.
This sentence may be summarized with s4, assuming that Snow White and the
Princess are identical persons. s2⇒s3: (s2−3) Snow White ran into the forest and
thought. . .. Also s4 is marking the beginning of a new episode. Because in the
summarization of s2, house (index sign) may be removed, the entire sentence
s4 can be ignored. As s5 may be summarized with s4, that sentence can be
removed as well.
s2−3⇒s6: (s2−6) Snow White ran into the forest and cleaned and tidied (some)
house. s7: She lay day and fell asleep. s2−6⇒s7: (s2−7) Snow White ran. . .and lay
down and fell asleep. s8: She found herself. . .. s2−7⇒s8: (s2−8) Snow White ran. . .and
lay down. . .and fell asleep and found herself. . .. s9: They were. . .. Because dwarfs,
indicated by they, have been removed in s8, the entire sentence of s9 can be
ignored.
sA: The Queen disguised herself and invited her to try an apple. s0−1⇒sA: (s0−1,A)
The Queen ordered. . .but it failed, and disguised herself. . .. Assuming that her refers
to Snow White, the stories of the Queen and Snow White can be merged by means
of the linking element, the event ‘invited’. As a result of merging, all events
that only refer to one of the personages, such as ran and found herself, may be
removed. s0−1,A⇒s2−8: (s0−A) The Queen invited Snow White to try an apple (here,
summarization tacitly assumes her to be a reference to Snow White).
sB : The Princess was tempted. . .. This sentence can be summarized with s0−A,
but it does not modify its summarized meaning. sC : The woman insisted. Also
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this sentence can be merged with s0−A and, again, there will be no change in
the summary. sD: Snow White bit. . .and fell. As the dwarfs have been ignored in
s8, they can be omitted in this sentence too. s0−A⇒sD: (s0−D) The Queen invited
Snow White to try an apple and Snow White bit into the apple and fell.
sE : A Prince saw Snow White and she wakened from (a) dream indicates the
beginning of a new episode. s16: SnowWhite and Prince married. sE⇒sF : (sE−F ) A
Prince saw Snow White and they married.
Finally we are left with two sentences, which are s0−D and sE−F . These
sentences may be combined in a summarizing single sentence through logical
inferencing. By taking the first part of s0−D (Snow White bit into the apple and
fell), as the first premise, and using earlier information about the apple (which
she (Queen) had poisoned), as the second premise, it may be deduced that Snow
White could have been poisoned. Inasmuch as a poisoned person (who fell) must
be dead, it may be abductively inferred that Snow White must be dead too.
However, according to sE−F , which occurs later in time than s0−D, Snow White
gets married. From this, it may be deductively concluded that Snow White must
be alive. Assuming poisoning is a lexically defined counterpart of murder, we get:
(s0−F ) a murder failed.
9.5 Conclusion
This chapter introduces the blueprints of a method for the hard problem of
text summarization. The proposed technique makes beneficial use of the poten-
tial of the process model introduced in this thesis for a uniform representation
of knowledge in different domains. This includes a specification of such do-
mains as nonadic classifications, and a recursive classification of their signs as
trichotomies.
The sample text “Snow White” is commonly known and almost everybody
is able to summarize its meaning in a few sentences. Such a summary may
be different from the one derived above, because of the specific goal of this
chapter which is the generation of a single catchy sentence. Another reason for
obtaining a different summary may be the limited number of domains considered
by the example, which are the ‘naive’ syntactic, semantic syntactic and reasoning
domains, but also the lack of important other interpretations, such as a discourse
analysis of the sample text. Nevertheless, the extended example of this chapter
illustrates that, theoretically, the proposed method could be successfully applied
for summarization. A practical realization of the underlying algorithm requires
that trichotomic specifications of symbols in different domains are available.
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Chapter 10
Recursive analysis
This thesis is engaged with the question how knowledge may arise from the
observation of ‘real’ world phenomena. It assumes that in an observation the
observer generates the meaning of the input phenomenon (stimulus) by means
of (re)cognizing it as a sign. From the input meaning, knowledge may arise
through learning, for example, by means of generalization. Sign recognition and
learning may be considered to be independent processes. This thesis restricts
itself to the introduction of a model for the first process, an analysis of the
second one is beyond its goals.
Meaningful interpretation is a hard problem as has been shown by Searle in
his famous Chinese room thought experiment. Searle maintained that, in virtue
of its irreducible character, meaning must contain the element of qualitative
change (Searle, 1992). This is opposed to the basically compositional ‘knowl-
edge’ representation enabled by the current computer, that cannot capture the
full complexity of human meaningful representation. Roughly, the world ‘per-
ceived’ by the current (electronic) computer is more restricted than the world
perceived by the human, enabling the latter to experience a richer variety of
qualitative changes. In conformity with this limitation of knowledge represen-
tation, this research has set as its goal the introduction of a model for cognitive
activity only as a process.
Due to the specific nature of the subject of this research, i.e. knowledge
representation, a summary of this thesis may be given in a unique way. Since
the presentation of this work itself may be perceived as a phenomenon, it is
possible to apply the theory to itself, recursively. This is the goal of this final
chapter, in which the different chapters of this thesis are interpreted as the events
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of a meaningful interpretation or understanding of the problem of knowledge
representation, as a process.
10.1 A meta-theory of knowledge representation
In order to prove that the theory of this thesis can be recursively applied to
itself, the chapters of this book are re-visited one by one, and characterized
from the point of view of knowledge representation. The goal of this analysis
is to show that the meaning aspects exhibited by the subjects discussed in
the different chapters can be interpreted as interpretation moments of a sign
recognition process. This is specified by means of a set of Peircean signs and
suitable keywords. The results of this meta-level analysis of this chapter are
displayed in fig. 10.1.
reason
structure
interpretant
object abstraction
sign
quality
language
proposition
constituent
definition
aspect
type
relation
logicconnection
context
mathematics (naive)
(naive)
Figure 10.1: A meta-level analysis of knowledge representation introduced in
this thesis. Keywords associated with identical Peircean signs (possibly in dif-
ferent chapters) are represented by a single expression; the imputed meaningful
representation of a meaning aspect is denoted by a bold-face symbol.
10.1.1 Phenomena and signs
The initial assumption of this thesis, in chapter 1, states that meaningful inter-
pretation is teleological by nature and, therefore, contains the element of com-
pleteness. Applications of the theory of knowledge modeling reveal the presence
of this property of sign recognition in all domains. For example, the model of
‘naive’ logical signs indicates that cognitive activity, as a process, considers the
meaning of input phenomena from all possible angles.
The appearance of completeness as a property indicates that an observed
phenomenon is meaningful from some point of view. Because sign recognition
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is always related to some aspect(s) of interpretation, but not to all aspects, the
meaning generated by that process may always be an approximation of the (full)
meaning of the observed phenomenon.
The assumption that phenomena, appearing as qualities, have the potential
of being interpreted as signs, is acknowledged in the proposed model by assuming
that input qualities can be represented as qualisigns. For example, in qualisigns
the qualities of the external stimulus are represented as qualia.
Qualisign = quality, sign
10.1.2 Signs and their recognition process
Meaningful interpretation is intimately tied up with signs and, therefore, this
thesis is interested in the properties of signification. According to Peirce, a sign
always stands for something else than itself. That what the sign is standing for,
Peirce called the sign’s object. Because phenomena are interactions and hence
a duality, and, because all signs are re-presentations of phenomena, it follows
that all signs must be a duality. This property of signs, in combination with the
teleological nature of interpretation (i.e. the compelling need for completeness),
enables sign interpretation to be modeled as a process of interaction events.
The dual qualities comprising a sign are represented, in chapter 2, by a con-
stituency relation of qualisigns, forming the (immediate) object of the observed
phenomenon from the point of view of the recognition process.
Icon = constituent, object
10.1.3 Perception and cognition
Following the assumption about the organization of memory in the brain, in
chapter 3, cognitive activity is defined as a combination of two processes that
are isomorphic instances of a single schema. The goal of the first process,
perception, is the analysis of the input qualia in themselves; the goal of the sec-
ond process, cognition, is the establishment of a relation between the perceived
qualia. As has been shown in this thesis these two processes may uniformly char-
acterize information processing in different knowledge domains. What makes
the domains different, is the point of view or aspect of interpretation. For exam-
ple, phenomena can be interpreted from a ‘naive’ logical, a (morpho-)syntactic,
or a semantic syntactic point of view. The meaning of an interpretation aspect
contains the element of abstraction, as an event.
Sinsign = aspect, abstraction
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The habitual character involved in the ‘interpretation from a certain point
of view’ may be generalized in a rule or a rule-like meaning of which the most
fundamental is the one captured by the (naive) logical interpretation, which has
been shown to be a close relative of Boolean logic, in chapter 4.
Legisign = relation, ‘naive’ logic
Index = Boolean logic, process
Logical signs, capturing the relational meaning of observed phenomena, are
an abstract account of the combinatory properties of their qualia, such as a
lexical definition expressing the relational potential of a symbol as a range of
possibilities. This is acknowledged in the proposed model by the generation of
the (immediate) interpretant of the input phenomenon, as an expression of the
abstract meaning of the constituent input qualia.
Rheme = definition, interpretant
According to a theory of Categorical Perception (CP) (Harnad, 1987), ‘real’
world phenomena as qualities are perceived by the senses as qualia. Qualia may
characterize the higher level cognitive activity by the brain as well. This is ac-
knowledged in this thesis by ambiguously using the term ‘qualia’ as a reference
to the primary symbols of knowledge domains, as well as a reference to memory
information. The input qualia may trigger memory, generating a response con-
sisting of memorized qualia. This interaction is interpreted as a memory sign,
representing the relation between the input and the memory response, in the
sense of agreement or possibility.
Index = CP, qualia, memory model
10.1.4 Syntactic signs
An adequate definition of the combinatory properties of input qualia is com-
plex. The impact of this problem may be reduced by considering knowledge
domains that are more well-known. Such a domain is natural language. For
example, in the domain of (morpho-)syntactic signs, a lexical definition of the
combinatory potential of the primary symbols is available. However, language
recognition introduces the problem of sequential processing. Chapter 5 shows
that the processing schema of cognitive activity can easily be adapted to sequen-
tial processing by means of capitalizing on the model’s potential for handling
unfinished signs. The feasibility of the proposed language model is demonstrated
by parsing non-trivial sentences taken from actual language use.
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Legisign = (morpho-)syntactic language rules
Rheme = (morpho-)syntactic relational needs
10.1.5 Semantic syntactic signs
The close relationship between signs and categories is beneficially used, in chap-
ter 6, for a systematic specification of signs on the basis of Peirce’s categor-
ical interpretation of phenomena. More specifically, it is shown by example
that ‘naive’ semantic syntactic qualia can be specified by means trichotomies.
Evidence for the use of semantic trichotomies in human language processing
has been found in a psycholinguistic research on nomen-adjective combinations
(Draskovic et al., 2001).
The analysis of ‘naive’ semantic syntactic signs reveals the need for the
introduction of a more complete model of memory signs. To this end, memory
signs are defined as a duality, consisting of an interpretation of memory qualia
as average values and as dense domains of values.
Legisign = semantic syntactic rules
Rheme = semantic syntactic relational needs
Index = average, domain, trichotomy
10.1.6 Naive reasoning signs
The ‘naive’ logical interpretation of the model of cognitive activity opens the
way for an analysis of the interpretation moments of this process, from a ‘naive’
reasoning’s point of view. This analysis, in chapter 7, shows that also higher
level knowledge can be modeled by means of the processing schema. Due to the
complexity of this domain, a lexical definition of the combinatory properties of
‘naive’ reasoning signs may not be available. In the examples, a definition of
the input qualia is taken for granted.
Legisign = ‘naive’ reasoning
Index = deduction, induction, abduction
10.1.7 Naive mathematical signs
Another important knowledge domain, besides language and ‘naive’ logic, is
‘naive’ mathematics. The model of ‘naive’ mathematics is based on three types
of cardinality, introduced in chapter 8. In conformity with the results of neuro-
physiological research by (Nieder et al., 2002), that cardinality arises in the
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brain, not in the senses, it is suggested that ‘naive’ mathematical signs are
inherently related to abductive reasoning.
An analysis of non-trivial mathematical concepts, such as infinite and zero,
reveal the hidden potential of memory signs as ‘naive’ interpretations of a type.
It is suggested that this ‘naive’ concept is underlying the abstract mathematical
notion of types. Because types may characterize the conventional property
involved in the meaning of observed phenomena, they may as well be defined as
law-like rules in context. The close relationship between ‘naive’ reasoning and
‘naive’ mathematics is illustrated by an analysis of sign recognition as ‘naive’
mathematical induction.
Symbol = ‘naive’ mathematics, type
10.1.8 Text summarization
The application of the process model of cognitive activity to different knowledge
domains is motivated by the need for an illustration of the proposed theory,
including the conjecture about its uniform representation potential. This boils
down to a definition of models for different knowledge domains as isomorphic
instances of the processing schema introduced in chapter 2, as well as a test
confirming the hypothesis that the concepts generated by those models may
also be meaningful in the ‘naive’ or obvious sense.
Encouraged by the successful test of the theory in the domain of ‘naive’
(morpho)-syntactic language signs, a blueprint for a systematic approach of
text summarization is introduced in chapter 9. An important element of this
model is the assumption that the cumulative effect of a series of sentences can be
interpreted as a transition, transforming the initial state represented by the first
sentence to the final state indicated by the last sentence. It is suggested that,
from the individual clauses and sentences, interpreted as premises, a summary
of the entire text can be generated as a conclusion. The summarizing conclu-
sion or summary, which is a proposition, may be represented as a sentence as
well. This result indicates that the key to efficient text summarization could
be uniform knowledge representation, reducing the hard problem of merging
complex signs to the less difficult problem of structural coordination. The pro-
posed method, which is illustrated by a non-trivial example, makes extensive
use of a trichotomic specification of signs as well as the interpretation of such
trichotomies as order relations. The latter proves to be especially useful for the
simplification of representations.
The suggested approach for text summarization capitalizes on the interpre-
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tation of a sentence (argument sign) as a relation between the subject (dicent
sign) and the predicate (symbol sign). From the point of view of sign recogni-
tion, the essential meaning of the dicent sign is an expression of the input, as
a proposition about the structural relation between the input qualia. This is
opposed to the argument sign, which is an expression of the relation between
the input qualia, as a proposition expressive of the aspect of reason. As all
signs are in principle symbolic, representations including the aspect of reason
or meaning are inherently related to language.
Text summarization is one of the fields in which the theory of this thesis
might prove to be of practical. The potentially large number of knowledge do-
mains, a systematic definition of the properties of their symbols and an efficient
use of the definitions may require a uniform representation, which is at the heart
of the approach of this thesis.
Dicent = structure, proposition
Argument = reason, language
10.2 Process interpretation
Finally, in the final chapter, an analysis is offered to the theory itself, recursively.
In order to simplify the presentation of the results of this analysis (cf. fig. 10.2),
collective names are introduced for some of the concepts identified. For example,
all keywords indicated as index signs are collectively called context, in conformity
with meaning of those concepts to establish a link between the qualia that are in
the focus and those that are complementary. The corresponding meaning aspect
is denoted by connection. The collective name for the keywords and the term
for the meaning aspect of the legisign are relation and logic, respectively.
The classification of meaning aspects depicted in fig. 10.2 may be interpreted
as a sign recognition process as follows.
Sorting is an operation representing the appearing qualities as constituents
and as the view or aspect of interpretation. Abstraction has two interpretations
that may be explained by means of their logical meaning, as relative difference
operations.1 The first, ‘constituent\aspect=definition’, is an abstract expression
of the input constituents, independently from the actual aspect of interpretation,
such as a (lexical) definition. The second, ‘constituent/abstraction=relation’, is
an expression of the logical dependency exhibited by the input, as a rule-like
relation.
1A definition of these, ‘naive’ logical operations can be found in sect. 3.3.1.
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Figure 10.2: A meta-level analysis of knowledge representation as a process
(cf. fig. 10.1). A horizontal line denotes a sign interaction, a diagonal one a
representation relation. The four types of sign interactions are indicated on the
right-hand side of the diagram.
Complementation has two instances. The first is an expression of the actual
meaning of the input constituents, or the abstract or lexical definition of the
input qualities in context (the interaction between definition and connection).
The duality involved in the input is represented as a structure. The second is
an expression of the logical relation of the legisign in context (the interaction
between relation and connection), or the inductive generalization of the property
involved in the input qualia, as a type.
Predication is an expression of the relation between the input qualia, which
are arranged in a structure, and their conventional property which is a type.
This is presented as a proposition, expressing the completeness of the input or,
in other words, the reason why the input is found potentially meaningful. An
example, in language, is the expression of the syntactic well-formedness of the
input, for instance, a sentence.
Finally, the category related dependencies of the concepts of fig. 10.1 may
be interpreted as polymorphic order relations (‘<’) in two different ways and in
both cases as a trichotomy of orderings. In the first case or on the ‘phenomeno-
logical dimension’ (how signs appear in our experience):2
1st: sign < object < interpretant
2nd: abstraction < connection < structure
3rd: logic < mathematics < language.
In the second case or on the ‘ontological dimension’ (how signs function as a
mediation of meaning):
2The ordering, logic<mathematics<language refers to a relation between the ‘naive’ models
of these domains. According to Peirce, (full) mathematics precedes (full) logic.
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1st: quality < aspect < relation
2nd: constituent < context < type
3rd: definition < structure < reason.
Peirce characterized his nonadic signs from the phenomenological and the
ontological points of view.3 Briefly, the phenomenological type can be firstness,
secondness, or thirdness, depending on the category exhibited by a sign. The
ontological type can be a 1st, a 2nd, or a 3rd depending on the signification
function of a sign (Liszka, 1996).
10.3 Potential cognitive relevance
Throughout this thesis, serious effort has been made to clarify the potential
relation between the proposed approach and certain evidences provided by cog-
nitive research. Although it cannot be proved that the model introduced in this
thesis could be used as a model for knowledge representation in the brain, one
cannot withstand making a parallel between the process model of cognitive ac-
tivity introduced in this work, and the ‘working memory’ suggested by cognitive
theory.
In an early paper (Miller, 1956), George Miller reported about the capac-
ity of the working memory of the brain. In his research, Miller considered the
brain as a communication channel, and examined the effect of input variance on
the output change. In one of the experiments, listeners were asked to identify
tones between 100Hz and 8kHz, by assigning numerals to them. After each
classification act, the test person was told the correct solution. This experiment
showed that classification was precise when 2-3 different tones were presented.
With 4 different tones the result was increasingly more erroneous and beyond 14
different tones identification was very bad. From this and a number of similar
experiments, Miller concluded that the capacity of the brain as a communica-
tion channel could be 2.5 bit information, that is, 7 signs approximately. This
capacity is invariant, whether the entities are simple (e.g. simple words) or com-
plex (e.g. large numbers). Donald Broadbent, who repeated Miller’s experiment
fifteen years later, wrote (Broadbent, 1975):
Human processing is limited to handle a fixed number, say 7, inde-
pendent units at one time. Each unit could nevertheless be divided
into sub-units so that facts and actions of enormous complexity could
3Van Breemen (pers. comm., 2007).
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be handled by calling up a fresh ensemble of sub-units at each stage
when it became necessary.
The hypothesis about the size of the working memory may speculatively be
interpreted in the context of the theory of this thesis. The process model of
cognitive activity acknowledges the existence of nine interpretation moments.
The first (qualisign) is a representation of the input, as qualia. As qualisigns
are not yet meaningful, their value may be stored outside the working memory,
for example, in neurons generating the input for information processing. The
last interpretation moment (argument sign) is a representation of the output of
sign processing. This value too may fall outside the recognition process, and
may be stored elsewhere (e.g. in neurons generating signals for motor control).
In sum, the proposed model has 7 interpretation moments that have to be
remembered during input processing, which is in conformity with the Miller–
Broadbent conjecture. It should be mentioned that according to that conjecture
the working memory may simultaneously contain 7 independent signs. In the
model of sign recognition of this thesis all signs are a representation of the
input qualia and, therefore, are not independent. This is not the case in text
summarization, however, in which signs obtained from different sentences are
combined in a single recognition process.
10.4 Conclusions
This chapter shows that the model introduced in this thesis can be used re-
cursively. The recursive analysis reveals that the order of the chapters is not
arbitrary, but is dictated by the dependencies between the interpretation mo-
ments of the process model of cognitive activity. The possibility of a recursive
application of the theory also shows that the proposed knowledge representation
must be generic indeed.
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Appendix A
Towards a definition of a
syntactic lexicon
This section introduces the blueprints of a lexicon for syntactic sign recognition,
but the results trivially apply to the morpho-syntactic domain as well. Lexical
definition of syntactic entities is simplified by assuming that the properties of
syntactic (proto-)signs, illustrated by fig. 5.4, are available to the processing
schema interpreted as a parser. For example, that in sequential sign recognition
only coercion sign interactions (cf. sect. 5.1.1) may occur between symbols
occurring in the icon and sinsign positions or, that passive relational needs are
always optional, except in the dicent position (syntactic subject), in which they
has to be realized in conformity with the SV(O) rule of English.
An important contributions of this chapter is an illustration of the possibility
that, by making use of the above simplifications, a lexical definition of syntactic
symbols may be given, which is close to their specification known from English
grammar (Aarts & Aarts, 1982), (Quirk et al., 1985). The lexical definitions
presented in this appendix are restricted to the syntactic symbols used in the
examples of chapter 5. A specification of a full fledged lexicon is beyond the
possibilities of this research.
A syntactic lexicon is defined as a set of entities. A single entity or a lexical
entry of a symbol consists of two parts: a defining string, and a trichotome,
recursive specification of relational properties, represented by tuples, defining
the symbol’s neutral, passive, and active relational need in a symbol interac-
tion. A tuple is subdivided in three parts: (1) information about the relational
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properties of a symbol in itself, (2) about the relational needs the symbol may
be affected by, and (3) about the relations the symbol itself may establish.
For example, the verb likes (1) may not be neutral (n()); (2) it may function
as a verbal entity in a coercion symbol interaction, due to the neutral need of
an appearing next symbol (the optional passive relational need of likes, which is
not realized in a coercion, is ambiguously denoted by an n-need too) or, in an
accumulation or a binding symbol interaction, for instance, due to the passive
need of a syntactic modifier or a complement (p(verb,n/p,acc/bind)); finally,
(3) it may function as a transitive verb in an accumulation symbol interaction
with another verb or, actively trigger a complementation relation with a syn-
tactic complement or a predication relation with the subject of the sentence
(a(trans,compl/subj,acc/bind)). In sum:
likes[n(); p(verb,n/p,acc/bind); a(trans,compl/subj,acc/bind)]
Following the theory of this thesis, lexical definitions of morpho-syntactically
finished or syntactic symbols can be dynamically generated from their morpho-
syntactic constituents. A definition of such a process, for instance, the genera-
tion of a lexical definition of likes as a combination of morpho-syntactic relational
properties due to like and -s, as well as their morpho-syntactic symbol interac-
tion, is beyond the goal of this section.
A.1 A formal definition
A formal definition of a syntactic lexicon, as a context-free grammar extended
by regular expressions is given below. In order to keep the size of the grammar
small, nonterminals representing related concepts are unified in a single symbol
(clearly, this may increase the size of the language generated by the specifica-
tion). For example, the three nonterminal symbols occurring in the definition
of “rel needs”, specifying a neutral, passive, and an active relational tuple, are
generalized in the nonterminal symbol “rel tuple”. The definition below makes
reference to grammatical notions, but no reference to model specific concepts
such as interpretation moments or Peircean signs, except the categorically in-
spired three types of relational needs, indicating that a syntactic lexicon could
be ‘naturally’ defined. Information about the language model is made available
to the parser through the classification of syntactic entities depicted in fig. 5.4
(in fact, that classification can be used as a specification of the parser itself).
lexicon= {lex entry}∗
lex entry= string, ”[”, rel needs, ”]”.
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rel needs= n-needs, ”;”, p-needs, ”;”, a-needs.
n-needs= ”n”, ”(”, rel tuple, ”)”.
p-needs= ”p”, ”(”, rel tuple, ”)”.
a-needs= ”a”, ”(”, rel tuple, ”)”.
rel tuple= element type, ”,”, implied rels, ”,”, imputed rels.
element type= neutral type; passive type; active type.
neutral type= conjuction.
passive type= {nominal type; verbal type; mod type}+.
nominal type= common-noun; proper-noun; pro-noun.
verbal type= copula; intransitive; transitive.
mod type= adjective; adverb; preposition-compl.
active type= {complement; subject}+.
implied rels= {n; p; a}+.
imputed rels= {coercion; accumulation; binding}+.
Sample lexical specifications
This section contains an illustration of a lexical specification of the symbols
occurring in the examples of chapter 5. In this presentation the convention is
used that terminal symbols derived from a regular expression are separated by
a “/” symbol. For example, “p/a” is a representation of two values, “p” and
“a”, generated from the nonterminal “implied rels”. Below, the following ab-
breviations are used: accumulation(acc), binding (bind), complement (compl),
verbal (verb), transitive (trans), intransitive (intrans), subject (subj), conjunc-
tion (conj), adverb (adv), adjective (adj), preposition-compl (prep).
1. John likes Mary and Mary, John likes.
John[n();p(proper-noun,n/p/a,acc); a()]
likes[n(); p(verb,n/p/,acc/bind); a(trans,compl/subj,acc/bind)]
Mary[n();p(proper-noun,n/p/a,acc); a()]
2. John likes Mary and Kim.
John[n(); p(proper-noun,n/p/a,acc); a()]
likes[n(); p(verb,n/p/,acc/bind); a(trans,comp/subj,acc/bind)]
Mary[n();p(proper-noun,n/p/a,acc); a()]
and[n(conj,(),()); p(); a()]
Kim[n();passive(proper-noun,n/p/a,acc); a()]
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3. Mary eats pizza with a fork.
Mary[n();p(proper-noun,n/p/a,acc); a()]
eats[n(); p(verb,n/p,acc/bind); a(trans,compl/subj,acc/bind)]
pizza[n();p(common-noun,n/p/a,acc); a()]
with a fork[n(); p(); a(prep;p/a;acc/bind)]
4. Mary is a democrat and proud of it.
Mary[n();p(proper-noun,n/p/a,acc); a()]
is[ a(); p(); a(copula,bind,compl/sub)]
a democrat[n();p(proper-noun,n/p/a,acc); a()]
and[n(conj,(),()); p(); a()]
proud[n(); p(adj,n/p,acc); a(adj,p/a,acc/bind)]
of it[n(); p(prep,n/p/0,()); a(adj,p/a,bind)]
5. A man entered who was covered with mud.
a man[n();p(proper-noun,n/p/a,acc,); a()]
entered[n(); p(verb,n/p/,acc/bind); a(trans,comp/subj,acc/bind)]
was covered[ n();p(verb,p/a,acc,bind); a(trans,compl/subj,acc/bind)]
with mud[n(); p(); a(prep,p/a;acc/bind)]
who[n(); p(pronoun,n/p/a,bind); a()]
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Summary
This thesis introduces a model for knowledge representation as a sign recogni-
tion process, on the basis of an analysis of the properties of cognitive activity.
By offering a logical account of this model, the existence of a ‘naive’ logic un-
derlying human information processing is revealed, which in turn opens the way
towards a Peircean semiotic characterization of the cognitive model. ‘Naive’
logic is a procedure generating relations between collections of qualia, in the
sense of agreement, possibility, and (relative) difference. It is suggested that
those relations have common meaning aspects shared with Boolean relations on
two variables.
The close relationship between the process model of cognitive activity on
the one hand, and the Peircean signs on the other enables the cognitive model
to be interpreted as a meaningful process, and the Peircean classification of
signs as a process, generating meaning aspects or parameters of (meaningful)
interpretation.
In conformity with the fundamental nature of cognitive activity, it is sug-
gested that the process model of cognitive activity may be uniformly applied for
modeling different knowledge domains. This hypothesis is tested for the domain
of ‘naive’ logical, (morpho-)syntactic, semantic syntactic, reasoning and mathe-
matical symbols. Each of these models consists in a specification of a recognition
process (parser) and a definition of combinatory properties of primary entities
(lexicon). An advantage of the proposed theory is that adjustments of the model
of a domain, for example, in order to cope with new phenomena, may only re-
quire an adjustment of the lexicon, not the parser, which can be invariantly
used.
Besides a uniform representation of knowledge, also the possibility for a
systematic, trichotomic specification of lexical entries is proposed by the thesis,
on the basis of an analysis of Peirce’s category theory. This hypothesis is only
illustrated by means of a simple lexicon, specifying the syntactic symbols used
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in the examples of the chapter on language modeling (sect. 5). A definition of
a full fledged lexicon is far too complex and falls beyond the possibilities of this
research, unfortunately.
An advantage of uniform knowledge representation is that it may reduce
the hard problem of merging complex signs obtained in different domains to the
more simple task of structural coordination. Such a representation of knowledge,
in combination with a trichotomic specification of combinatory properties of
lexical entities is used in this thesis for the definition of a technique for text
summarization. This too is only illustrated by an example, however by a non-
trivial one, which is the summarization of the fairy tale Snow White.
The paradigmatically new understanding of reality developed by Peirce is
consequently present in the different applications considered in this thesis. A
simple comparison of the theory introduced in this thesis, with traditional
knowledge representation theory may not be possible, as a consequence of
paradigmatical differences. As the traditional, and the semiotically inspired
knowledge representation proposed by this thesis are expected to possess iden-
tical predictive potentials, by only focusing on a few examples one may not be
able to prove the superiority of any one of these theories.
In my opinion, the importance of the Peircean approach will become more
obvious in tasks, in which knowledge arising in different domains has to be
merged in a single representation. Because of the need for translations between
different representations, such a task can be too complex for traditional knowl-
edge representation, that may become impractical. A solution necessarily must
be found in a uniform representation, precisely what the Peircean approach can
offer.
Evidence for a uniform representation by the brain is found in a research
by (Hagoort et al., 2004), who experimentally proved that input stimuli are
simultaneously analyzed by the brain in the syntactic and semantic domains.
The (full) meaning of the input may contain its interpretation in both domains,
but the temporal differences between a syntactic and a semantic analysis is
small (there may not be time for a translation between the representations in
the two domains), indicating the necessity of a uniform representation (in those
domains at least).
According to this thesis, human information processing may be character-
ized as a certain type of process. This hypothetically implies that information
generated by the computer could be more easily processed as knowledge by the
human, if the computational process respects the properties of cognitive activ-
ity. An experimental validation of this conjecture has been provided by a recent
research by (Couwenberg, 2007).
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The practical value of the theory developed in this thesis is strongly de-
pending on the practical value of Peircean semiotics. With respect to the latter
let me refer to the abundant literature available in libraries and on the Web,
proving the usefulness of Peirce’s theory in various fields such as conceptual
modeling, organizational semiotics, etc. With respect to the first, I must admit
that the research presented in this thesis is restricted to an illustration of the
proposed theory. Although the thesis contains a number of non-trivial problems
and shows how they can be solved by means of the theory introduced, it does
not contain a computational specification of the proposed knowledge represen-
tation. Such a specification (and a program), its use in requirement engineering
as well as in medical text summarization is the subject of current research.
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